



EXAMINING **REPRESENTATION** **AND CITIZEN ADVOCACY** AT THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

A COOPERATIVE RESEARCH PROJECT FUNDED BY THE
CONGRESSIONAL BLACK CAUCUS FOUNDATION, INC.

University of Maryland Baltimore County • Mississippi Valley State
University • Howard University • Ohio University •
National Conference of Black Political Scientists

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Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy at the 2016 Democratic National Convention

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A Cooperative Research Project Funded by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc.

Participants:
University of Maryland Baltimore County,
Mississippi Valley State University,
Howard University,
Ohio University,
and the National Conference of Black Political Scientists

May 2018

Research Supported by Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc.¹

¹ The content of these reports do not reflect any official positions or opinions of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc. Each author owns responsibility for the content of their respective reports.

RNC report: due to safety concerns leading up to the Republican National Convention in Cleveland, Ohio, July 18-21, 2016, CBCF and the academic community withdrew university students and faculty, and other participants from the RNC report assignment.

Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy at the 2016 Democratic National Convention

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Summary Report	6
Tyson D. King-Meadows, Ph.D. <i>University of Maryland Baltimore County</i> <i>September 2017</i>	
Overview of the Study	7
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Context of the Study• Objectives and Methods of the Study• Limitations of the Study• The Research Team• The Advisory Board• Acknowledgement	
Part I: Highlights from the Study	12
Part II: Demographics of Convention Respondents	15
Part III: Ideology, Candidate Support, and Select Policy Views	18
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Liberal-Conservative Identification of Self and of Politicians• Support for Clinton and Sanders• Perceptions about the Party Platform• Opinion about U.S. Trade and Business Ties with Other Countries• Opinion about Whether Nomination Fight Weakened Party• Support for Vice-Presidential Choice• Explanations for Racial and Gender Inequality• Opinion about Dealing with Illegal Immigration• Perspective on Black Lives Matter	
Part IV: Thematic Analysis of Responses to Open-Ended Questions	28
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Most Important Thing to be Accomplished at Convention• Biggest Issue During Primary Contest• General Impressions of the Obama Administration	
Part V: Post-Election and Post-Inauguration Views	34
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Results from National Panel of Registered Democrats• Results from Convention Follow-Up Panel	
Part VI: Conclusion	41

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Appendix A: Excerpts from Student Field Reports	44
Appendix B: Excerpts from Faculty Pedagogical Impact Statements	48
Appendix C: Select Pictures	51
Appendix D: List of Figures and Tables	56

Undocumented Immigration And Election 2016: An Analysis Of Immigration Policy Preferences

57

Niambi M. Carter, Ph.D.
Howard University
May 1, 2017

Overview of the Study	58
Part I: Race And Public Opinion On Immigration	60
Part II: Elite Framing Of (Undocumented) Immigration	63
Part III: Participants	65
Part IV: Findings	65
Part V: Policy Proposals	71
Appendix A: Works Cited	75

Perceptions of Trade and Evidence of Populist Candidate Support Among 2016 Democratic National Convention Attendees

80

Andra Gillespie, Ph.D.
Emory University
May 9, 2017, Revised October 6, 2017

Overview of the Study	81
Part I: Data and Methods	82
Part II: Descriptive Statistics	82
Part III: Multivariate Analysis	91

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Part IV: Analysis and Conclusion	93
Appendix A: Works Cited	95
Political Elites' Explanations for Race and Gender Inequalities	96
Shayla C. Nunnally <i>University of Connecticut</i> <i>May 8, 2017</i>	
Introduction	97
Part I: Approach and Methods	99
Part II: Results	100
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Explanations for Inequality among Black Americans: Bivariate Analysis • Explanations for Inequality among Women: Bivariate Analysis • Explanations for Inequality among Black Americans: Defining the Odds • Explanations for Inequality among Women: Defining the Odds 	
Part III: Conclusion and Recommendations	110
Appendix A: Logit Regression Models of Explanations of Black Americans on Average Having Worse Jobs, Income, and Housing Than White Americans	112
Appendix B: Logit Regression Models of Explanations of Explanations of Women on Average Having Lower Pay Than Men	113
Appendix C: Works Cited	114

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EXAMINING **REPRESENTATION AND CITIZEN ADVOCACY** AT THE 2016 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION

SUMMARY REPORT

Tyson D. King-Meadows, Ph.D.
University of Maryland Baltimore County
September 2017

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Context of the Study

In many ways, the 2016 U.S. presidential nomination cycle – the period beginning with the primary and caucus contests and ending once the nominating conventions conclude – challenged conventional thinking about contemporary racial, gender, and class politics in America. Indeed, the nomination cycle was filled with much political intrigue: the pending departure of a two-term Democratic president; the approaching exit of the country's first president of African American heritage; growing public fatigue over conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; a fluctuating investment and employment market still reeling from a widespread mortgage crisis; new protests against police involved shootings of unarmed black men and against the deaths of black men and women in police custody; mounting public discord about the environment and natural resources; a likely referendum on the Republican congressional majority; and the historic campaigns of Democratic and Republican candidates who championed 'insurgency-style' challenges to political convention and who championed populist economic messages.

Shortly before the July 2016 Democratic National Convention, the contest for the party's presidential nomination narrowed to two contenders: Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders. Clinton was a former U.S. Senator from New York, a former First Lady, and wife of former two-term Democratic President William "Bill" J. Clinton. Vermont U.S. Senator Sanders was the longest serving independent in U.S. senatorial history. Former Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley was no longer in contention. While Clinton held a delegate-count numerical advantage over Sanders, trepidations remained amongst some political observers that the nominating convention would not adequately address lingering concerns which had emerged from the primary contest.

These circumstances served to remind onlookers about the magnificence of America's democracy. First, it had been over three decades since the country witnessed an openly contentious nominating convention of a major political party. Second, it had been decades since neither a sitting president nor a vice-president had sought the nomination. Third, while the 2016 convention was not the first convention where a female candidate sought the

nomination, it was the first convention where a female candidate had amassed enough pre-convention delegate commitments to mathematically secure the nomination. Fourth, the convention would feature remarks from the first American president and first lady of Black heritage, respectively. As such the 2016 battle for the Democratic presidential nomination reinvigorated conversations about the benefits and challenges of using electoral politics to enact substantive political change and the future of inclusiveness in America.

Against this backdrop, the 2016 Democratic National Convention, held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 25-28, 2016, provided an excellent perch from which to examine elite opinion about the advocacy, representation, and inclusion of diverse political interests and identities.

Objectives and Methods of the Study

The objective of the *2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Study* (ERCAS) was to collect attitudinal, perceptual, and political experience information from delegates, alternates, and general attendees of the Democratic Party's 2016 presidential nominating convention. The study was commissioned by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation (CBCF) and was implemented by a multi-university faculty-student research team which was led by faculty affiliated with the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS). The Research Team, which consisted of representatives from the Foundation, students, and faculty, designed the questionnaire, research protocols, and administered the questionnaire.²

Utilizing the methodology of in-person intercept surveys – whereby interviewers approach patrons traveling in and out of public places to gauge opinion about products or events – members of the Research Team intercepted attendees of the 2016 Democratic National Convention as they entered or left official meetings. The Research Team also intercepted attendees at informal gathering spaces and at hotels. The Research Team approached individuals, disclosed the purpose of the study, and asked for informed consent to conduct the interview.³ Respondents completed the questionnaire on paper or on a tablet. The

² The Research Team received training on interviewing techniques and on relevant scholarship. They also observed proceedings at the Philadelphia Convention Center and Wells Fargo Arena and conducted photo documentation.

³ Members approached every 9th person. UMBC IRB #Y16TKM18247. Respondents were assured confidentiality. All disseminated results are aggregated; no results disclose information from which to identify respondents.

questionnaire contained close-ended and open-ended items; responses to open-ended questions were recorded. Respondents answered questions about their delegate status, their preferred candidate, the primary, their perceptions of the party platform, and their political views. Some respondents consented to participating in a follow-up interview and provided contact information.

Following the convention, faculty members completed Pedagogical Impact Statements (PIS) outlining how their convention experiences would be used to enhance research and teaching. Faculty also finalized plans to donate convention paraphernalia to their university libraries.⁴ Student members completed Field Reports (FR) outlining their observations and how they would use the research experience in future academic endeavors. In addition, a follow-up survey was fielded in 2017 for the purposes of ascertaining opinions from convention attendees and from a nationwide cross-section of registered self-identified Democrats. Respondents answered questions about the nominating convention, the November presidential election, the leadership contest for the Democratic National Committee, and the Trump Administration.⁵

In totum, the *2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Study* contributes to research on party politics and electoral politics **as well as** contributes to university research, teaching and student learning in social science research. Thus, the ERCAS enabled researchers to take advantage of the unique opportunity that the Democratic National Convention provided to enhance research and teaching about American politics.

Limitation of the study

Results of the study cannot offer a definitive treatment of the views of delegates, alternates, and attendees at the 2016 Democratic National Convention. The sample frame underlying the 2016 face-to-face intercept survey of attendees and the 2017 follow-up survey of attendees

⁴ Albin O. Kuhn Library & Gallery (University of Maryland Baltimore County); James H. White Library (Mississippi Valley State University); Hannah V. McCauley Library (Ohio University – Lancaster); Founders Library & Moorland–Spingarn Research Center (Howard University).

⁵ UMBC IRB # Y17TKM18168. Survey fielded from February 16, 2017 to April 18, 2017. Responses from the convention survey were not linked to the follow-up. Respondents from the 2017 National Panel were assured confidentiality and anonymity. No personal information was collected by the Research Team. Both follow-up surveys were completed on Qualtrics.

make them convenience samples. Results, therefore, cannot be extrapolated to the entirety of attendees. Likewise, the sample underlying the 2017 cross-sectional survey is an unweighted quota-based national sample of registered adults drawn from an opt-in panel. *Nonetheless, the overall findings offer general impressions from those interviewed, are robust, and are illustrative.*

The Research Team

The research team consisted of eighteen individuals. *Faculty members:* (1) Dr. Tyson King-Meadows, University of Maryland Baltimore County (UMBC); (2) Dr. Kathie Stromile Golden, Mississippi Valley State University (MVSU); (3) Dr. Elka Stevens, Howard University (HU); (4) Dr. Linda Trautman, Ohio University-Lancaster (OUL); and (5) Dr. Jodi Kelber-Kaye, UMBC. *Member from the American Political Science Association Foundation:* (1) Dr. Kim Mealy. *Student members:* (1) Allie Mann, UMBC; (2) Arnita Heathington, UMBC; (3) Carley Shinault, HU; (4) Rhoanne Esteban, University of California, Santa Barbara; (5) Gabrielle Gray, HU; (6) Maya Deloria Murry, MVSU; (7) Shawn Tang, UMBC; and (8) William Howard, OUL. *Members from the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation:* (1) Dr. Menna Demessie; (2) Dr. Harold Watkins; (3) Jalen Alexander; and (4) Maurice Starks.

The Advisory Board

Three scholars of American electoral politics advised the project and assisted with the following activities: the training of the Research Team; the drafting and designing of the questionnaire content; and the designing of the research protocols. The Advisory Board members were:

(1) Dr. Niambi Carter, *Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science at Howard University*; (2) **Dr.** Andra Gillespie, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Director of the James Weldon Johnson Institute at Emory University; and (3) Dr. Shayla C. Nunnally, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science & Africana Studies Institute at the University of Connecticut and then president-elect of the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS). Members also produced select issue briefs and, along with the PIs and Co-PIs, assisted with the final report.

Acknowledgements

The Research Team and the National Conference of Black Political Scientists thank the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc. (CBCF) for its generous support of this project. The PI/Co-PIs thank the American Political Science Association for granting Dr. Kim Mealy the time to participate in the project.

Project Artwork by Dr. Elka Stevens, Howard University, 2016. Use with permission only.

PART I: HIGHLIGHTS FROM THE STUDY

- ***Perceptions of Ideology:*** Hillary Clinton was identified as being more moderate than Senator Bernie Sanders on a 1-7 ideological scale, where “1” is extremely liberal and “7” is extremely conservative. Clinton was also identified as being more moderate than President Barack Obama. Also, fifty-percent of respondents identified Speaker Paul Ryan and Republican Donald Trump as being extremely conservative.
- ***Support for Vice-Presidential Nominee:*** Over 80% of respondents disagreed with the statement that the VP nominee (Tim Kaine) was the worst possible choice.
- ***Agreement with statement that college should be free for all citizens:*** Four out of every ten respondents indicated complete agreement with the statement.
- ***Perspectives on the Party Platform:*** On average, Sanders supporters were much more likely than were Clinton supporters to believe that the platform *did not* adequately represent the issues of labor and blacks.
- ***Opinion about Growing Trade Ties Between U.S. and Other Countries:*** On average, Sanders supporters perceived that trade was a “somewhat bad thing”, while Clinton supporters perceived that trade was a “somewhat good thing.”
- ***Opinion about Whether Nomination Fight Weakened Party:*** Twenty-five percent (25%) of respondents agreed with the statement that the nomination fight weakened the party. A greater percentage of Sanders delegates/alternates reported complete disagreement with the statement than did Clinton delegates/alternates.

- ***Most Important Thing to Be Accomplished at Convention:*** “Unity” was the predominate theme expressed by delegates and attendees.
- ***Opinion about Best Route to Deal with Illegal Immigration:*** More than seventy percent (72.7%) of Sanders delegates chose “Pathway to Citizenship” as the priority for dealing with illegal immigration, whereas only sixty-percent (60.3%) of Clinton delegates chose this answer.
- ***Explanations for Racial Inequality:*** Over ninety percent believed that discrimination or educational opportunities, rather than natural intelligence and motivation, explained why on average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than whites. Eighteen percent (18.4%) attributed racial inequality to spokespersons for black rights.
- ***Explanations for Gender Inequality:*** Over ninety percent believed that discrimination explained why on average women had lower paying jobs than men. Over half of the respondents (52.6%) attributed this to educational opportunities.
- ***Perspective on Black Lives Matter:*** When respondents were asked whether the “Black Lives Matter” or the “All Lives Matter” statement was closest to their point of view, there was a significant difference between Clinton supporters and Sanders supporters, with the former being less likely to choose “Black Lives Matter”.
- ***Biggest Issue During Primary Contest:*** Many respondents expressed outrage and dismay over what they believed was mistreatment. Some decried how the media treated the campaign of Clinton. Others decried how the Democratic Party leadership treated the campaign of Senator Sanders.
- ***Perception of Impact of Clinton Candidacy on Party:*** Six out of ten self-identified Democrats in a post-election survey (N = 259) believed that the Clinton candidacy was either “extremely good” or “somewhat good” for the

Democratic Party. Only twenty percent selected “somewhat bad” or “extremely bad”. Less than a third of Sanders supporters (21 out of 67) indicated that the Clinton candidacy had a positive impact on the party.

- **Concerns about Unity of Party after Election:** Forty-six percent (46%) of self-identified Democrats in a post-election survey believed that the Democratic Party was divided. Three-fourths believed the Republican Party was divided.
- **Presidential Vote Choice by Primary Candidate Preference:** In a post-election survey, sixty-seven percent (67%) of self-identified Democrats who supported Sanders in the 2016 primary reported to have vote for Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. Fifteen percent (15%) reported to have voted for Trump.
- **Opinion about the Leadership Contest for DNC Chair:** Many respondents believed that the 2017 contest for the leadership of the Democratic National Committee rehashed the Sanders-Clinton primary.
- **General Impressions of the Obama Administration:** Many respondents praised President Obama for championing ‘progressive values’ and particular policies. Some however expressed some frustration that Obama did not do more.

PART II: DEMOGRAPHICS OF RESPONDENTS

Racial Identification

Individuals were asked “What best describes your racial or ethnic identification? Choose All that Apply”. Most individuals only selected one category. Reported below are the most reported or dominant racial groupings, with the categories Asian, American Indian, Alaskan Native, Native Hawaiian, and Pacific Islander grouped into “Other Racial Minority”. Almost half of the respondents (149 of 311) identified as “Black/African American”.




Figure 2.1 Racial Identification of Respondents

Gender Identification

Respondents identifying as ‘female’ represented a greater percentage of the respondents (56%).




Figure 2.2 Gender Identification of Respondents

Prior Convention Experience

A little over thirty-five percent of respondents indicated that they had attended at least one other Democratic presidential nominating convention. There were no statistically significant differences in convention experience based on gender/sex identification.




Figure 2.3 Prior Convention Experience by Gender Identification

Age Cohort

The mean age of respondents was 48 years old. The median age was 50 years old. Slightly more than two-fifths of the respondents were Baby Boomers (51 years old to 69 years old). Females were more likely than were males to be Baby Boomers (44 percent versus 40 percent).




Figure 2.4 Age Cohort (Percentage of Respondents in Each)

Partisanship

On a scale of 1 to 7, where 1 is a “Strong Democrat” and 7 is a “Strong Republican”, nearly seventy-two percent (71.8%) of respondents identified themselves as being Strong Democrats.

Education

Respondents reported having high levels of educational attainment: over four-fifths (83%) reported having a baccalaureate or an advanced degree.

Income

Respondents reported a range of 2015 household incomes, with less than a quarter reporting incomes of less than \$50,000. There were no gender differences in reported income.




Figure 2.5 2015 Household Income

LGBT Identification

Respondents were asked “Do you, personally, identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender?” (Self-administered portion). Sixteen percent (16%) of the respondents reported “yes”.

Religious Affiliation/Faith Identification

Respondents were asked to identify themselves by religious affiliation, if any. A little less than a third of respondents (32%) identified as Protestant, with nineteen percent and twenty percent, respectively, identifying as Something Else (19%) or Catholic (20%). Twenty-four percent (24%) identified as having no religious affiliation.

PART III: IDEOLOGY, CANDIDATE SUPPORT & SELECT POLICY VIEWS

Ideology

The figure below depicts respondent ideological placement of themselves, President Barack H. Obama, New York Senator Hillary Clinton, Vermont Senator Bernie Sanders, presumptive Republican nominee Donald Trump, and House Speaker Paul Ryan on a 1-7 scale of ideology—where “1” is extremely liberal and “7” is extremely conservative. Placement on 1,2, or 3 is defined as Liberal and placement on 5,6, or 7 is defined as Conservative.




Figure 3.1 Ideological Self-Placement and Placement of Select Officials as Liberal, Moderate, or Conservative

As the first panel of the figure shows, over three-fourths of respondents (79%) placed themselves on the Liberal end of the liberal-conservative scale. An overwhelming majority of respondents also placed Senator Sanders, President Obama, and former Senator Clinton on the Liberal end of the liberal-conservative scale. Respondents were nearly unanimous in their

placements of Trump and Speaker Ryan on the Conservative end of the liberal-conservative scale.

The placements of Clinton, Sanders, and Obama reveal some interesting differences in the way attendees perceived these officials. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of respondents placed Obama within the category of Liberal. Almost nine out of every ten respondents (88%) placed Sanders within the Liberal category, whereas only six out of every ten respondents (60%) placed Clinton within the Liberal category. A comparison of means also revealed that respondents considered Clinton considerably more moderate than Sanders, placing Clinton slightly above 3 and placing the latter closer to 2 on the 1-7 scale. Hence, there was a statistically significant difference in the ideological placements of Clinton ($M=3.25$, $SD=1.27$) and of Sanders ($M=1.82$, $SD=1.37$) along the liberal-conservative scale; $t(310)=14.808$, $p < .05$. Respondents considered Speaker Ryan more conservative than Donald Trump. This difference was statistically different: Ryan ($M=6.31$, $SD=1.13$) and Trump ($M=5.98$, $SD=1.30$); $t(291)= -3.8928$, $p < .05$.

The figure below provides a closer examination of where respondents placed Clinton, Sanders, Trump, and Ryan on the 1-7 ideology scale. Only seven percent (7%) of respondents placed Clinton at the “1 – Extremely Liberal” position on the scale, but fifty-nine percent (59%) placed Sanders at the “1” position. By contrast, fifty-nine percent (59.0%) and fifty-two percent (52%) of respondents, respectively, identified Ryan and Trump as being “7 – Extremely Conservative.”




Figure 3.2 Ideological Placement of Clinton, Ryan, Sanders, and Trump

Candidate support

We ascertained candidate support/preference from nearly 100 percent of respondents (N = 323, with 314 responses to candidate preference/support). However, the overwhelming majority reported support/preference for Hillary Clinton (76.16%), with a small portion indicating support for Bernie Sanders (19.5%). The remainder were unsure or decided not to support a candidate.

Perceptions about Party Platform Addressing Issues of Various Groups

As the table below shows, an overwhelming majority reported a belief that the 2016 Democratic Party platform adequately represented the issues of LGBTQ (88.8%), Women (86.6%), Labor (79.5%), and Hispanics/Latinos (74.8%). Many did not agree that the party platform adequately addressed the issues of Blacks (68.0%), Young People (61.8%), and Muslims (59.5%).

Table 3.1 Percentage Indicating Whether Party Platform Addressed Issues of Select Groups

Percentage Choosing Yes and No by Group			
Group	N	No	Yes
Labor	303	20.5%	79.5%
Blacks	300	32.0	68.0
Young People	304	38.2	61.8
Women	305	13.4	86.6
Environmentalists	298	26.5	73.5
LGBTQ	304	11.2	88.8
Hispanics/Latinos	298	25.2	74.8
Muslims	289	40.5	59.5

As the figure below shows, there were clear differences between Clinton and Sander supporters in perceptions about the party platform. For example, on average, Sanders supporters were more likely than were Clinton supporters to believe that the platform *did not* adequately represent the issues of Labor: 51.7% of Sanders supporters reporting “No” compared to only 11.7 % of Clinton supporters reporting “No”. An independent-samples t-test

showed that these differences were statistically significant, $t(290) = -5.83$, $p < .001$. On average, Sanders supporters were also more likely than were Clinton supporters to believe that the platform *did not* adequately represent the issues of Blacks: 55.9% of Sanders supporters reporting “No” compared to only 25.4 % of Clinton supporters reporting “No”. An independent-samples t-test showed that these differences were statistically significant, $t(287) = -4.28$, $p < .001$. Supporters of Sanders were also less likely to believe that the platform addressed the issues of Young People: 63.9% of Sanders supporters reporting “No” compared to 30.9% of Clinton; $t(291) = -4.79$, $p < .001$.




Figure 3.3 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Supporters Indicating “No” That Platform Adequately Addressed Issues of Select Groups

Such clear differences between Clinton and Sander supporters were understandable given three facets of the 2016 Democratic Party primary season: (A) the heightened outreach of the Sanders campaign toward young people (especially first-time voters); (B) the initial missteps by both campaigns on communicating the candidates’ stances on racial and social stratification; and (C) the response of young people and blue-collar laborers to the Sanders campaign.⁶

⁶ Pew Research Center, July, 2016, “In Clinton’s March to Nomination, Many Democrats Changed Their Minds”.

Opinions about U.S. Trade

We asked respondents about their perceptions about the growing trade and business ties between the United States and other countries (N=305). Nearly three-fourths of respondents (74.1%) thought that trade was a “very good” or a “somewhat good thing” for America. The differences in perception across Clinton and Sanders supporters were not unexpected. As the table below shows, Sanders supporters differed significantly from Clinton supporters. We employ a Welch’s t-test to examine the groups because the groups differed in sample size and because the variance of support was unequal across groups. According to Welch’s t-test, $t(85.16) = 6.794$, $p < .001$, on average, Sanders supporters perceived that trade was a “somewhat bad thing for America”, while Clinton supporters perceived that trade was a “somewhat good thing for America.” This result held when examining results by delegate status (N=178): Clinton (M=1.89, SD=.679) and of Sanders (M=2.75, SD=.806); Welch’s t-test, $t(85.71) = 6.797$, $p < .001$.

Table 3.2 Perceptions of Trade as a ‘Good Thing’ or ‘Bad Thing’ for America by Candidate Preference

	Overall (N=305)	Clinton (N = 231)	Sanders (N=61)
Very good thing for America	23.3%	27.3%	6.6%
Somewhat good thing for America	50.8	55.8	32.8
Somewhat bad thing for America	19.7	13.9	41.0
Very bad thing for America	6.2	3.0	19.7

Agreement That College in America Should be Free

We asked respondents to indicate their strength of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “College in American should be FREE to all citizens” on a 1 to 5 scale, where “1” represented ‘I completely agree’ and “5” represented ‘I completely disagree’ (N=309). A little over four out of every ten respondents indicated complete agreement with the statement (41.1%). Nearly eight percent indicated complete disagreement with the statement (7.7%).

The Center for Information & Research on Civic Learning & Engagement, *Donald Trump and Young Voters*, June 2016. Collier Meyerson, “Clinton, Sanders, and the Myth of a Monolithic ‘Black Vote’”, *The New Yorker*, April 15, 2016. Amy Davidson Sorkin, “Courting Black Voters,” *The New Yorker*, February 22, 2016

Degree of agreement tracked with candidate preference. Nearly sixty-three percent (63%) of Sanders supporters indicated complete agreement with the statement, whereas only thirty-five percent (35%) of Clinton supporters indicated complete agreement with the statement.

Nearly nine percent of Clinton supporters were in complete disagreement with the statement. Zero percentage of Sanders supporters were in complete disagreement with the statement.




Figure 3.4 Support for Free College Tuition Among Clinton and Sanders Supporters

Opinion about Nomination Fight

Respondents were asked to indicate their strength of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “The nomination fight has WEAKENED the party” on a 1 to 5 scale, where “1” represented ‘I completely agree’ and “5”




Figure 3.5 Agreement with Statement That Nomination Fight Weakened

represented ‘I completely disagree’ (N=314). A quarter of respondents (25%) indicated

complete or partial agreement with the statement, while little more than half indicated complete or partial disagreement with the statement (53.57%).

Although the degree of agreement tracked with candidate preference, these differences were not statistically significant when examining responses from delegate/alternates (N=195). Six out of ten Sanders delegates/alternates (60%) completely or partially disagreed with the statement. A greater percentage of Sanders delegates/alternates reported complete disagreement with the statement than did Clinton delegates/alternates.

Table 3.3 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Delegates/Alternates Agreeing that Nomination Fight Weakened Party

Percentage Agreeing that Nomination Fight Weakened Party		
	Sanders (N=55)	Clinton (N=132)
Completely Agree	10.9%	9.1%
Somewhat Agree	9.1	14.4
Neither Agree/Disagree	20.0	19.8
Somewhat Disagree	16.4	28.3
Completely Disagree	43.6	29.4

Support for Vice-Presidential Choice

A Respondents were asked to indicate their strength of agreement or disagreement with the following statement: “The VP nominee was the WORST possible choice.” Less than twenty percent of respondents completely or partially agreed with the statement. However, Sanders delegates/attendees were less enthusiastic about Virginia U.S. Senator Tim Kaine being the VP nominee; these differences were statistically significant, Welch’s t-test, $t(89.31)=-6.308$, $p < .001$.

Table 3.4 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Delegates/Alternates Agreeing with VP Nominee Choice

Percentage Agreeing That VP Nominee Was the Worst Possible Choice		
	Sanders (N = 54)	Clinton (N=133)
Completely Agree	13.0%	3.0%
Somewhat Agree	29.6	8.3
Neither Agree/Disagree	25.9	12.0
Somewhat Disagree	16.7	24.0
Completely Disagree	14.8	52.6

Explanations for Racial and Gender Inequality

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they thought racial and gender inequality were due to individual circumstances or structural circumstances. The first question asked: “Studies have found that on the average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to: Discrimination; Educational Opportunity; Natural Intelligence; Will or Motivation; or Spokespersons for Black Rights?” Respondents could choose ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and could skip any question. The figure below shows the percent of respondents choosing “Yes” to the presented items.




Figure 3.6 Opinions about What Explains Racial Inequality

The overwhelming majority of respondents (94.2%) answering the question on Discrimination (N=313) indicated that they believed it explained differences between African Americans and whites. Answers to the question about “Educational Opportunity” show a similar pattern (N=311), with more than nine out of ten respondents (91.3%) selecting “Yes”. There was almost uniformity in rejecting “Natural Intelligence”. Only about twenty percent of respondents selected “Will and Motivation” and “Spokespersons for Black Rights” as explanations.

The second question asked: “Studies have found that on the average women have lower paying jobs than men. Do you think these differences are mainly due to: Discrimination; Educational Opportunity; Natural Intelligence; Will or Motivation; or Spokespersons for Women’s Rights?” Respondents could choose ‘yes’ or ‘no’ and could skip any question. The figure below shows the percent of respondents choosing “Yes” to the presented items.




Figure 3.7 Opinions about What Explains Gender Inequality

The overwhelming majority of respondents (96.5%) answering the question on Discrimination (N=311) indicated that they believed it explained differences between men and women. Answers to the question about “Educational Opportunity” show quite a different pattern (N=308), with more than half of the respondents (52.6) selecting “Yes”. As with the question about racial inequality, there was universal rejection of “Natural Intelligence” an explanation. About sixteen percent chose women’s leadership as an explanation for gender inequality.

Opinion about Dealing with Illegal Immigration

Respondents were asked to choose amongst three statements about what actions should be prioritized when dealing with illegal immigration.

The figure depicts results for delegates/attendees (N = 190). A majority selected “Pathway to citizenship” as the preferred priority (64%) and only two percent selected “Better border security and enforcement.” More than seventy percent (72.7%) of Sanders delegates/alternates chose “Pathway to Citizenship”, whereas only sixty-

percent (60.3%) of Clinton/alternates chose this answer. Nearly forty-percent (38.2%) of Clinton delegates/attendees selected “Both equally” compared to only twenty-seven percent (27.3%) of Sanders delegates/attendees. These differences were statistically significant at the 90% confidence interval, Welch’s t-test $t(119.45)=1.836$; $p = 0.07$).

Priority for dealing with Illegal Immigration




Figure 3.8 Opinions about Dealing with Illegal Immigration

Support for Black Lives Matter

Clinton supporters were less likely than were Sanders delegates/alternates to choose “Black Lives Matter” when asked about the statement. These differences were statistically significant, Welch’s t-test $t(164.62)=3.617$; $p < 0.001$.

Table 3.5 Percentage of Delegates/Alternates Choosing “Black Lives Matter” Statement by Candidate Preference

Support for Black Lives Matter Statement		
	Sanders (N = 55)	Clinton (N = 129)
All Lives Matter	5.5%	30.2%
Black Lives Matter	89.1	63.6
Neither Statement	5.5	6.2

PART IV: THEMES FROM OPEN-ENDED QUESTIONS

We asked each respondent a series of open-ended questions about the 2016 Democratic primary contest, the nominating convention, and the Obama Administration. We examined transcripts from these questions and coded them for predominant themes.

Most Important Thing at Convention

The first table below depicts the clustering of respondent opinion on the following question: “What is the MOST IMPORTANT THING you want to see accomplished at this Convention?” In answering this question, most of the declared Sanders supporters gave an answer related to a specific issue (e.g., immigration reform, TPP, campaign finance), on the general theme of being progressive, or on continuing to say Sanders should be nominated while most declared Clinton supporters gave an answer related to party unity. Nonetheless, the predominant theme expressed was “Unity” or unifying the party behind one candidate.

Table 4.1 Themes from Open Ended Question “Most Important Thing to Be Accomplished at Convention”

MOST IMPORTANT THING RESPONDENTS WANTED TO SEE ACCOMPLISHED AT THE CONVENTION	
•	Party Unity
•	Strengthening the Progressive Movement
•	Showcasing the Diverse Wishes of the Electorate

The following quotes are emblematic of answers given to the “Most Important Thing” question:

“I’m from ... [state omitted], where there’s a lotta turmoil between delegates. I support Hillary Clinton. Seventy-three percent of conference-goers supported Bernie Sanders. Some of the delegates elected to support Bernie Sanders are here intentionally to agitate and cause trouble. And what you’re going to see is some of them are going to, uh, their credentials are going to be revoked, and they’re not going to make it on the floor. And that’s going to be very damaging to the Bernie Sanders supporters who have been partners with us to create a positive convention experience for as many people as possible. This is going to lower their faith in the party, and what I would like to see accomplished is building bridges between Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders people outside of the Democratic Party so that they still believe there is good.”

- Clinton Supporter, Male, 19, Asian, LGBT Status unknown

"I want to make sure that when we come out on the other side, we are united, so that we can defeat Donald Trump."

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 20, Black/African American, not LGBT

"It'd be great for me to see the party come together on a consensus platform and full support behind its nominee Hillary Clinton, and be ready and fully prepared for the upcoming election cycle."

- Clinton Supporter, Male, 19, Black/African American, LGBT

"I would like to see my candidate's delegation come together and work on ideas for moving our progressive movement forward."

- Sanders Supporter, Female, 30, White/Caucasian, LGBT

"So, the most important thing I wanted to see accomplished was- at this convention was to, ah, be able to, uhm, implement a progressive party platform, which it what- what- you know, I believe we were able to accomplish. You know, through being able to at least try and get rid of superdelegates- I know we didn't quite get there, but we were able to reduce that significantly, uhm, to the number of superdelegates, uhm, that we have in the current system. And so, uhm, that's one of the things we wanted to accomplish. And also, uhm, talk about some of the- implement some of the thing that Sanders had proposed, uh, for example, uhm, you know, more acquitting, a system that would reconcile the differences between, uhm, Palestine and Israel that, uhm, was one of the things in the party platform. As well as a ban on fracking, so you know, I'm glad those things were implemented in the party, within the party platform. So that's really what I wanted to accomplish as a national delegate, which we were able to."

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 19, Asian, not LGBT

Biggest Issue During 2016 Democratic Primary Contest

The table below depicts the clustering of respondent opinion on the following question:

"What was the BIGGEST issue for you during the 2016 Democratic Primary contest?" Many decried how Clinton and Sanders were mistreated by the media and by party leaders, respectively, Others talked about disenfranchisement, inequality, and the role of big money in American politics.

Table 4.2 Themes from Open Ended Question “Biggest Issue During 2016 Democratic Primary”

BIGGEST ISSUE DURING 2016 PRIMARY
• Big Money in Politics
• Voter Disenfranchisement
• Divided Party
• Mistreatment of Clinton and Sanders
• Racial, Gender, and Economic Inequality

The following quotes are emblematic of answers given to the “Biggest Issue” question:

“The fact that the Democratic Party is an oligarchy controlled by Wall Street and disrespectful to the rank-and-file members.”

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 48, American Indian or Alaska Native, Not LGBT

“Bernie Sanders. You want me to explain that? [Chuckles.] Bernie Sanders raised many issues that were important, but he has gone back to being an independent. So, as the result of his campaign, he has cost the Democratic Party, cost them to make millions of dollars, and he used the...he disassembled two democrats as he was running as a democrat when he wasn’t a democrat, and I found that pitiful. Um, I don’t have respect for that. Now that’s separate from issues he raised [inaudible] -- he never really had a plan that, frankly, could be passed in any Congress, even if he got a straight Democratic Congress because, for example, if you want to have free education, you are going to have to pay for it and the way that you pay for our education is through taxes. Plus, education--most public college facilities are owned and controlled by the states, so the federal government cannot tell the states what to do, and even if we were giving them blocked grants to pay for public education, to ensure that whoever wanted to go to higher education facility, you know, college-level, technical school or any--something in between, you are still dealing with a public school that the federal government does not have control of. So, I thought that--that the issue which would lead to be outrageous -- but it was totally unrealistic, and it was something that led people to believe that they would get, uh, education for nothing. Um, I’m 74, and I’m telling you that you can’t get something for nothing.”

- Clinton Supporter, Female, 74, White/Caucasian, Not LGBT

“....a good friend of mine is a Congresswoman, and I was working on her campaign, um, watching how the folks treated Hillary and her...and what it's like is a character assassination. So, to run against this false narrative about who you are because these are the kinds of things you can't put your hands on. And for me it's very disappointing to me because I am a Pollyanna about politics and the Democratic party. So, for us to use those--to me, what they are doing, what the Democratic party is doing to Hillary we cannot do to other candidates. Those kinds of things in politics hurt the future and disillusion young people. Why would people want to run, and you be attacked because you're not trustworthy? You're a liar, you're mean to people. So, that to me for the 2016 primary, I think is uh the most troubling.”

- Clinton Supporter, Female, 63, Black/African American, not LGBT

“Ok, so my biggest issue during the 2016, you know, primary contest was, you know, just to see, uhm, the amount of people that simply were not, uhm, able to vote. You know, they were registered and yet somehow their registration form had somehow gotten displaced and so, you know, we have, you know, haven't created a system in which we make it easier for people to vote. And that's one of the biggest concerns, you know: making it so everyone's able to, you know, be able to vote, regardless of what their party affiliation is. And also making sure that we don't have caucuses - we switch to primaries instead. And also, you know, create an extended length in time in which someone is able to vote, so you know, concern for, you know, simply being able to help people get to vote because, you know, voting should not be a frustrating process. We need more people to be able to vote in a democratic process.”

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 19, Asian, not LGBT

General Impressions of the Obama Administration

The table below depicts the clustering of respondent opinion on the following question:

“What are your GENERAL IMPRESSIONS of the Obama Administration?”. Many respondents praised President Obama for championing ‘progressive values’ and particular policies. Some respondents however expressed some frustration that Obama did not do more.

Table 4.3 Themes from Open Ended Question “Impressions about Obama Administration”

IMPRESSIONS ABOUT OBAMA ADMINISTRATION	
	• Champion of Progressive Values
	• Responsive to Voters
	• Wished More Was Done

The following quotes are emblematic of answers given to the “Impressions About Obama Administration” question:

“I love that I have a black president, currently. And that I was able to see one in my lifetime. And that my grandfather, who is alive and participated in sit-ins, was able to see an African American president as well. But I was hoping that he would do more for people who look like me. And I understand that there was a lot of roadblocks and obstacles, but I still did yearn for more than what we got.”

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 20, Black/African American, not LGBT

“The Obama Administration has been the most incredible, high -- high profile, and highly responsive administration. A teacher who has taught 36 years of U.S. history, government, and econ -- I have never, ever seen a president deal with so much diversity and controversy with such elegance. Truly an intelligent architect of class.”

- Clinton Supporter, Female, 63, Black/African American, LGBT

“...reducing...the achievement gap...by funding underperforming schools in many states and also his *Every Student Who Succeeds Act* did a lot to do that.”

- Sanders Supporter, Male, 19, Asian, not LGBT


“The Obama Administration is accomplished and has definitely addressed many of the issues. I understand as the political world that everything cannot be fixed. Everything cannot be addressed at one time. Things have- have been bad before him and will be bad after him. That does not represent how an administration is and how effective an administration is. I believe that the Obama Administration has done a wonderful job.”

- Clinton Supporter, Male, 35, Black/African American, not LGBT

“I think that it’s one of the administrations that we can be most proud of. Despite of all the challenges that the president had, he continued to move forward with all of his ideals. I think of all of the issues he had to deal with, not being supported by Congress, being told no on every hand, and having to use executive orders, and having to really speak to the nation -- I think a record number of times against violence taking place in our community. Violence that has been derived from terrorist, as well as internal sources, and just having to continuously deal with that kind of issue, and to keep people together and trying to make them feel that they live in a safe country and they do not have to live in fear.”

- Clinton Supporter, Female, 62, Black/African American, not LGBT

The word cloud below offers a visual depiction of the key terms emerging from responses to the open-ended questions. Each word represents the number of times respondents used that word when answering one of the questions. The size of the word shows the frequency of its use by respondents; the larger the size, the more frequent it was employed.



PART V: POST-ELECTION AND POST-INAUGURATION VIEWS

We fielded a 2017 follow-up survey to the 2016 *Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Study* for the purposes of ascertaining opinion from convention attendees and a cross-section of self-identified Democrats. We interviewed two sets of individuals: (1) prior interviewees from the Democratic National Convention who consented to a follow-up interview [hereafter Convention Follow-Up Panel] and (2) new respondents from a cross-sectional survey of U.S. adults [hereafter National Panel]. The latter respondents were drawn from a Qualtrics panel constructed to ensure a quota-based nationally representative (the quota was devised in relation to sex, age, education, and race and based upon the 2010 Census). All respondents were contacted via email and completed an online survey.⁷ For purposes of comparison with the face-to-face survey in Philadelphia, we only report findings for Democrats in the National Panel [N=308]. Participation in the Convention Follow-Up Panel was less than stellar [N=55].⁸

RESULTS FROM NATIONAL PANEL

Primary Preference

Out of the 285 Democrats who identified a preferred candidate in the 2016 party primary, nearly seven out of ten reported a preference for Clinton (68.4%). Almost twenty-four percent reported a preference for Sanders (23.5%). Recall that the face-to-face survey in Philadelphia found that a little more than three out of four attendees supported Clinton.

Did Primary Contest between Sanders and Clinton Make the Party Better?

A majority agreed with the statement that the Sanders-Clinton contest made the party better. However, the intensity of agreement slightly depended on candidate preference ($p < .05$).

⁷ 2017 *Post-2016 National Election Study* [UMBC IRB #: Y17TKM18168]. Surveys fielded from 2/16/17 to 4/18/17.

⁸ We collected 190 usable emails for the Convention Follow-Up Panel and sent out five solicitations. A poor response prompted us to suspend collection efforts and begin anew in February. We received 56 completes (RR= 29%).

Table 5.1 Percentage Agreeing that 2016 Primary Made the Party Better by Candidate Preference

Percentage Agreeing that Primary Made Party Better		
	Sanders (N = 67)	Clinton (N=195)
Strongly Agree	17.9%	21.0%
Somewhat Agree	22.4	26.2
Neither Agree/Disagree	17.9	33.3
Somewhat Disagree	22.4	13.8
Strongly Disagree	19.4	5.6

Impact of Clinton Candidacy on Democratic Party

We gauged respondent perception about the impact of the Clinton campaign on the Democratic Party by asking “How good or bad do you think the candidacy of Clinton was for the Democrats?” Six out of ten respondents (60.6%) believed that the Clinton candidacy was either “extremely good” or “somewhat good” for the Democratic Party. Only twenty percent selected “somewhat bad” or “extremely bad”. As could be expected, Sanders primary supporters viewed the Clinton candidacy differently; Less than a third (31.4%) of Sanders supporters indicated that the Clinton candidacy had a positive impact on the party. A t-test showed that these differences between Sanders and Clinton supporters were statistically significant, $t(99.620) = 6.550$, $p < .001$.

Table 5.2 Perception that Clinton Candidacy Had Good or Bad Impact on Democratic Party

Perception about Impact of Clinton Candidacy on Democratic Party			
	Total (N = 259)	Clinton (N = 192)	Sanders (N = 67)
Extremely Good	28.2%	34.4%	10.4%
Somewhat Good	32.4	36.5	20.9
Neither Good nor Bad	18.9	17.2	23.9
Somewhat Bad	15.1	10.4	28.4
Extremely Bad	5.4	1.6	16.4

Note: Calculations exclude non-voting respondents and those who indicated a vote choice for another candidate.

Perception of Unity in Democratic Party and Republican Party

We gauged respondent perception about whether the two major parties were unified in the wake of the Clinton loss and the Trump victory by asking “Would you describe the [Democratic Party/Republican Party] today as unified or divided?” Respondents were asked each question. Forty-six percent (46%) believed that the Democratic Party was divided (N=237) and seventy-six percent (76%) believed the Republican Party was divided (N=233).




Figure 5.1 Perception of Unity in Each of the Two Major Parties, First Quarter 2017

Evaluation of President Trump on Three Issues


We asked Democrats to evaluate the Trump Administration’s handling of three issues: (1) job creation; (2) foreign affairs; and (3) health care reform. Overwhelming majorities believed that President Trump was mishandling issues involving foreign affairs and health care reform. Slightly more than a majority (53.3%) believed that President Trump was mishandling the issue of job creation.

Table 5.3 Evaluation of Trump's Handling of Job Creation, Foreign Affairs, and Health Care Reform

Evaluation of President Trump's Handling of Three Issues			
	Job Creation (N = 272)	Foreign Affairs (N = 286)	Health Care Reform (N=286)
Not Well at All	53.3%	69.2%	67.9%
Somewhat Well	12.1	8.7	7.5
Slightly Well	16.2	7.3	8.6
Fairly Well	9.2	6.6	8.6
Very Well	9.2	8.0	7.5

Presidential Vote Choice by Candidate Preference in Primary

We ascertained the extent to which candidate preference in the Democratic primary tracked with presidential vote choice. Sixty-seven percent (67%) of Sanders supporters reported voting for Clinton. Fifteen percent (15%) reported voting for Trump.



Note: The “Neither category” includes those who did not vote or did not vote for Clinton or Trump.

Figure 5.2 Presidential Vote Choice in 2016 by Candidate Preference in 2016 Democratic Primary

RESULTS FROM CONVENTION FOLLOW-UP PANEL

Primary Preference

Out of the 51 respondents answering this question, seventy-one percent reported a preference for Clinton (70.6%). Twenty-nine percent reported a preference for Sanders (29.4%). These results were not dissimilar from what emerged out of the face-to-face interviews conducted at the Convention and out of the responses to the online National Panel.

Did Primary Contest between Sanders and Clinton Make the Party Better?

A slight majority disagreed with the statement that the Sanders-Clinton contest made the party better. These impressionistic cross-tabulation results should be interpreted with caution.

Table 5.4 Percentage Agreeing that 2016 Primary Made the Party Better by Candidate Preference

Percentage Agreeing that Primary Made Party Better		
	Sanders (N=15)	Clinton (N=36)
Strongly Agree	33.3%	5.6%
Somewhat Agree	20.0	30.6
Neither Agree/Disagree	13.3	5.6
Somewhat Disagree	13.3	16.7
Strongly Disagree	20.0	41.7

Impact of Clinton Candidacy on Democratic Party

We gauged respondent perception about the impact of the Clinton campaign on the Democratic Party by asking “How good or bad do you think the candidacy of Clinton was for the Democrats?”. An overwhelming majority of Sanders supporters (80%) believed that the Clinton candidacy was either “extremely bad” or “somewhat bad” for the Democratic Party.

While these percentages are not dissimilar from those emerging from the National Panel, these impressionistic cross-tabulation results should be interpreted with caution.

Table 5.5 Perception that Clinton Candidacy Had Good or Bad Impact on Democratic Party

Perception of Impact of Clinton Candidacy on Democratic Party			
	Overall (N=51)	Clinton (N=36)	Sanders (N=15)
Extremely Good	31.4%	44.4%	0%
Somewhat Good	21.6	27.8	6.7
Neither Good nor Bad	15.7	16.7	13.3
Somewhat Bad	15.7	8.3	33.3
Extremely Bad	15.7	2.8	46.7
N=	51	36	15

Presidential Vote Choice by Candidate Preference in Primary

We ascertained presidential vote choice of convention attendees. Sixty-three percent (74%) of Sanders supporters reported voting for Clinton. Twenty-seven percent (25%) reported voting for a Third-Party candidate. One hundred percent of Clinton supporters reported voting for Clinton.

Perception of the Contest for Leadership of the Democratic National Committee

We asked respondents their thoughts about the 2017 contest for the leadership of the DNC. Two themes emerged from the open-ended responses: (1) the leadership contest rehashed the Sanders-Clinton primary; and (2) the results of the leadership contest could unify the Party.⁹

Table 5.6 Themes from Open Ended Question “Perceptions about Contest for Leadership of DNC”

Perceptions about Contest for Leadership of DNC
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proxy for Clinton and Sanders Contest • Divided Party Might Become a Unified Party

The following are excerpts from the open-ended responses:

⁹ Fifty-seven percent of the Convention Follow-Up Panel indicated that the Democrats were “divided.”

“I supported Keith Ellison. Tom Perez is a good man, but will not lead the party to the change it requires to succeed.”

- White Female

“I supported Perez. However, this was the primary fight all over again.”

- Black Male

“I thought that Perez and Ellison were both good candidates and capable of leading the DNC moving forward. That said, I preferred Perez over Ellison.”

- Asian Male

“I supported Keith Ellison he could've really united the party and made it stronger with his grassroots approach to organizing, progressive advocacy, and personal integrity.”

- Black Female

“The compromised solution worked well. Expanding the Democratic Party objective should reap benefits...My dream team failed to materialize at DNC”

- White Male

PART VI: CONCLUSION

This report has detailed select findings of the *2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Study* (ERCAS), a research study designed to collect attitudinal, perceptual, and political experience information from delegates, alternates, and general attendees of the 2016 Democratic Party's presidential nominating convention which was held in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, July 25-28, 2016. The study was commissioned by the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc. and was implemented by a multi-university faculty-student research team, led by faculty affiliated with the National Conference of Black Political Scientists (NCOBPS). The Research Team, which consisted of representatives from the Foundation, students, and faculty, designed the questionnaire, research protocols, and administered the face-to-face intercept survey. In addition, a 2017 follow-up survey of select convention attendees and self-identified Democrats across the nation was fielded to ascertain perceptions about the 2016 nominating convention in Philadelphia, the 2016 presidential election, and the administration of President Donald Trump.

Results from the ERCAS reveal a wide range of opinions from convention attendees on issues related to internal party dynamics, the ideological placement of American politicians, globalization, the Movement for Black Lives, immigration, and inequality in America. Findings from both the 2016 face-to-face intercept survey and the 2017 follow-up survey provide insight into how convention attendees and self-identified Democrats viewed and view, respectively, the future of the Democratic Party in wake of the 2016 primary and November presidential election.

In this regard, results from the *2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Study* confirm the diversity of opinions within the Democratic Party about representation and citizen advocacy, both within and beyond the party organization. Despite some consensus around policy goals, there was little consensus about political strategy. On average, Hillary Clinton's supporters embraced policy positions and attitudinal perspectives which were quite different from the positions embraced by Senator Bernie Sanders supporters. On average, Sanders supporters did not believe that the Clinton candidacy had a positive impact on the party. Nonetheless, both Sanders supporters and Clinton supporters interviewed at the convention expressed deep concerns about party unity and the ability for the party to reflect the diverse

interests of its members. These sentiments expressing concerns about party disunity – and its relationship to undermine representation and action in Washington, D.C. – were echoed by Democrats in 2017. Undoubtedly, concerns about whether Clinton or Sanders could and would represent the diverse interests of the Party – and the nation – influenced which candidate respondents chose to endorse, to campaign with, and to become delegates for during the 2016 presidential primary cycle. Those concerns also influenced whether convention attendees believed that the party platform adequately addressed the issues of many Americans. Those concerns, among others, shaped presidential vote choice as well as shaped support for specific individuals contending to be the leader of the Democratic National Committee.

It is likely such issues will reemerge during the 2018 midterm elections and the 2020 election cycle. It remains unclear how these issues will affect the future of black politics and the relationship of black Americans to the two major parties. Nonetheless, the 2016 election cycle certainly elevated conversations about gender, racial, and economic inequality in America. That these conversations took on a decidedly different tone – and often strident tone – during the second-term of the first American president of African American descent is particularly noteworthy.

The battle for the 2016 Democratic presidential nomination also reinvigorated conversations about the degree of inclusiveness in the country. From debates about the import of social and racial identity to the role of superdelegates to the intersections of race, gender, class, and age cohort (generation), the 2016 presidential election cycle, like the 2008 and 2012 cycles before it, revealed much about the dynamism of American electoral politics.

The presidential nomination of Hillary Clinton will remain one of many watershed moments in the 2016 cycle. Clinton became the first woman in the modern era of *de jure* inclusive politics (i.e., post-Voting Rights Act of 1965) to be nominated for president by a major party. Vermont U.S. Senator Bernie Sanders became the first formerly non-affiliated candidate in the modern era to secure a large number of delegates at a major party's nominating convention. Business executive Republican Donald Trump became the first person in the modern era who had not previously served as an elected or appointed official to be nominated for president by a major

party. The 2016 Democratic nominating convention, therefore, provided an excellent perch from which to observe America at the crossroads of history.

This report summarizes the views of a select few, attendees to the 2016 Democratic National Convention and self-identified Democrats in 2017, who are positioned to reflect on (a) what it meant to be on that perch in 2016 and (b) what the 2017 presidential inauguration of Republican Donald Trump could mean for the future of Democratic Party politics in America.

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect any position of the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation, Inc.

APPENDIX A: STUDENT FIELD REPORTS

The Student Members of the Research Team were deeply appreciative of the opportunity to experience the 2016 Democratic National Convention, to talk with attendees, and to witness aspects of citizen advocacy and representation in various forms. Below are excerpts from the *Student Field Reports*:

- ❖ “My experience preparing for and conducting research at the 2016 Democratic National Convention was astounding...My experience definitely broadened my perspective on elections and citizen advocacy in that I was able to hear the thoughts of many delegates and see for myself how much the Democratic party was split through responses and citizens who marched/protested for their preferred candidate or cause. Being so up close to events that I usually ever only see on television was remarkable. Through this research project I felt included in the decision-making process that occurred that week, instead of only a viewer. Another aspect that I learned was to have fun. I went into this research project very serious and determine to yield the best results possible. I soon realized that although the data retrieval should be our utmost importance, we should also revel in this experience and enjoy our time here. This was made known several times by the lead researchers in the group which I believe relaxed the group to a point where we became attendees of the DNC instead of only researchers. I took pictures with almost every delegate I interviewed, went to events held at the Convention, and even met celebrities. The entire research project taught me a lot about work and play in that it is important to do both, especially during such a historical time in history....[t]his research project allowed to me to experience something that many students my age may not receive the chance to partake in until later in life. The advantages from being a part of this research project are innumerable and I cannot thank Dr. King-Meadows and the CBCF for allowing me to participate in such a historical and compelling research project during my time as an undergraduate student [at UMBC].”
- ❖ “During my experience at the 2016 Democratic National Convention, I honestly couldn't have learned more about both myself and others. At the forefront, my (or our) time in Philadelphia helped me realize that people are extremely passionate in what they believe in, which is truly amazing. But, it also helped me realize (in talking to others while surveying) that there are so many different views/perspectives of the world, which helped me open my eyes a little more and become more positive and respective of other views/perspectives. . . .When it comes to the ideas including elections, representation, and/or citizen advocacy though, I found out some really interesting things. On a strong note, people may be divided at their views but, we all know deep down that we are one – people and country. We may stand for what we believe in (which doesn't make us right) but we do still understand the importance of unity...Using research, knowing how to depict the quality of research, and understanding what good research is have all been impacted due to my experience. I now understand how meaningful it is for quality data to be able to generalize about a population. So, in doing my own research for classes [at the University of Ohio Lancaster], I have been so much more focused on using others' (quality) work to

better my own and it has improved both my grades and quality of work altogether. Additionally, my experience has enlightened me as I can introduce others in academia to go outside their comfort zone – to push them to do something ‘different’ than what they are used to or already know. Furthermore, during my experience at the 2016 [DNC], I was shown that I can and do have the wherewithal to be something better and bigger than I am today – in academia, my career, and in the world – so, I continue to push myself to be ‘bigger and better’ every day.”

- ❖ “Attending the 2016 DNC made me appreciate the importance of compromise and representation in U.S. elections. Because of the competitive and, at times, contentious nature of the 2016 Democratic presidential primaries, it was especially important for the DNC to send a message of party unity, especially to co-partisans. Many individuals I interviewed expressed the sentiment that they wish for the Democratic Party to unite during the convention. There were also a few that felt unrepresented by their party. These perspectives illuminate the tension that can sometimes emerge between party-centered and candidate-centered politics. They also show the challenges that confront political parties when they are trying to rally support behind one candidate. Before working for the 2016 CBCF DNC Research Team, my only experience with face-to-face interviews [at the University of California Santa Barbara] was from reading about how others use this method in their research and analyzing data gathered by others. This research experience allowed me to learn about the challenges surrounding face-to-face interviews first-hand. . . . I intend to use what I learned in the field if I ever decide to utilize face-to-face interviews for future research projects. Before the DNC, I was hesitant to try face-to-face interviews in my own research because I am more comfortable working with secondary observational data and non-face-to-face surveys. Working with the DNC Research Team gave me the confidence to try a different methodological tool that I would not otherwise use.”
- ❖ “My experience preparing for and conducting research at the 2016 Democratic National Convention taught me how receptive attendees/delegates at the convention were to the idea of citizen advocacy, especially during this election when polarizing social and economic issues split the country. Many attendees expressed interest in the survey experiment and asked questions about how we planned on using the exercise to further our research. Furthermore, it broadened my perspective on the complexity of the election process and the number of moving parts that goes into setting the stage for selecting our representatives. . . . Many delegates/attendees spoke about unity and how the convention had to unify the Democratic Party but the convention demonstrated how fractured the party is and even more so how far apart we are as a country. This speaks to how important citizen advocacy can be in terms of educating a wide range of people on issues that may not specifically pertain to their own circumstances. Throughout my experience at the 2016 [DNC], my interactions with delegates/attendees and witnessing the convention broadened my understanding of the entire election process and the importance of citizen advocacy. . . . I hope that this experience will provide a reference for me to continue learning and possibly serve as a jumpstart to a graduate career [after UMBC] involving citizen advocacy and survey research”

- ❖ “My participation in the project was of particular significance to my current doctoral studies in political science [at Howard University], especially in the areas of Black Politics and American Government. The project provided me the opportunity to observe the research design process, as well as implementation techniques for collecting original data. In particular, the pre-trip orientation connected my knowledge of the benefits and challenges of collecting data, and the necessity in preserving its integrity, with a real-life example that I was able to participate in collecting. . . .The project also shed light on the importance of data collection that captures the electoral experience of African Americans, whose voices are often underrepresented and undermined in mainstream research. In such, the 2016 DNC project inspired me to continue being active in the presidential election. . . .As I continue my journey into the academy, I will take the experience and lessons learned in the DNC project to continue to enrich my academic pursuits as they pertain to representation and political freedoms within the African American community.”

- ❖ “One of things that was extremely impactful to me as a student [at UMBC] with minimal experience with political research is the method of sampling that we used. People could only have their voices heard in our study if we, as field researchers, found our way to them. In this way, our physical location was extremely important. We were very intentional about sampling marginalized voices and had teams placed at a variety of caucuses throughout the week. I personally was able to conduct interviews at the Black Caucus Meeting, the Women’s Caucus Meeting, the Disability Caucus Meeting, the Labor Caucus Meeting, and the LGBT Caucus Meeting. I loved learning about how direct action from researchers can make sure that the voices of those who could be silenced are heard. I had the opportunity to interview transwomen, disabled veterans, labor activists, and party leaders alike. When researching politics and elections in particular, it is clear from the results of the election that being careful to sample from all types of people, to make sure that a variety of voices are heard. Otherwise, the public opinion will not be understood effectively. . . . I have since been recruited to be an interviewer for a qualitative study about the coping strategies of survivors of [intimate partner violence], and was only qualified to do this work because of my interviewing experience at the DNC.”

- ❖ “This experience opened my eyes to the election process. . . .When I was discussing the election with my family, everyone was for one person and that was Hillary Clinton... Thus, our conversation would be about Hillary’s background and how she would be able to help our people. When I began surveying people at the convention about the elections, I noticed that everyone was not happy about the preemptive democratic candidate. When I would ask them why they were not supportive of Clinton, they would say that they believed that Bernie Sanders would have been a better candidate. Then they would go back and say ‘do not get me wrong, Clinton is ok but I connected better with Sanders.’ They said that they felt like Sanders really understood the people. That is when I realize that even though they were at the convention that does not mean they were truly for that chosen candidate. . . . This research experience helps me to now see things a little differently. . . .I truly believe that the democratic

convention has changed my life for the better. . . . The DNC experience has made me a better student [at Mississippi Valley State University].”

- ❖ “When I was invited to participate in the 2016 DNC Research Team, I was a doctoral candidate in political science at Howard University. With my research focus on race and politics, citizen engagement, and public opinion, a study of this nature is directly in line with my research interests and pursuits. Further, the joint-project offered a unique opportunity to collaborate with a diverse group of students, scholars and practitioners all dedicated to furthering our understanding of citizen engagement and advocacy. To interview delegates and convention attendees during a pivotal time in America’s political history was a once in a lifetime opportunity. The 2016 DNC Research Team was my first experience in a team-based research. As I advance in my career, the ability to collaborate efficiently and effectively with other researchers will be critical to my professional trajectory...Shortly after the 2016 DNC Research project, I accepted a tenure track position in the Department of Political Science at Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania and successfully defended my dissertation in December 2016. As a member of the faculty, I instruct two introductory courses to U.S. government with students whose majors span the university’s four colleges. As such, I am always looking for new ways to attract *somewhat* politically apathetic students to current issues in American politics and some exciting aspects of our field. Being able to share my experience with the 2016 DNC Research Team has enriched my class discussions around citizenship, public opinion, political participation, and elections.”

APPENDIX B: PEDAGOGICAL IMPACT STATEMENTS

The Faculty Members obtained an invaluable array of experiences and teachable moments from their time in Philadelphia. Each will use the 2016 field experience to add further depth to teaching and research on citizen advocacy, gender politics, and representation. Faculty have also provided their libraries with select convention materials. Below are excerpts from the *Pedagogical Impact Statements*:

- ❖ “I intend to utilize the 2016 convention paraphernalia, photographs, and aggregate survey findings in lower-division and upper-division undergraduate courses in American politics, urban politics, community leadership, and political parties and elections. Students will also explore the ways in which public opinion, delegate action, and voting behavior align with or contradict theories about representation and elite-mass congruence. Other assignments will ask students to compare and contrast the platforms of the major and independent parties vying for the presidency; to construct video campaign advertisements from the convention material; and to participate in role-playing scenarios where they take on the role of Clinton and Sanders delegates debating various platform positions related to wage equality, reproductive rights, civil rights, energy policy, immigration, and criminal justice.”

- Dr. Tyson King-Meadows
University of Maryland Baltimore County

- ❖ “As a member of the 2016 DNC Project Research Team, I was afforded an opportunity to engage in an academic activity that served to refresh my knowledge base and research skills, which had not been used extensively over the course of the last three years. The pre-convention training and discussions around survey design and length of questionnaire prompted me to think more deeply about project goals and objectives, which have relevance for the validity and reliability of the end product. The practice sessions were proved to be useful in the refinement of specific survey questions that might have become problematic during the interview process, allowed for the identification of likely timing issues, and enabled team members to become better acquainted with each other. The Team’s on the ground activities, including conducting interviews reminded me of various ways by which interest group politics impact elections, the importance of broad representation and the art of compromise and negotiations within campaigns and elections. Importantly, in comparing the 2016 experience with that of 2008, I have come to the conclusion that candidates’ personalities might be as critical to campaigns and elections as their public stances on issues that matter to the citizenry. . . . The 2016 DNC research experience has been shared/discussed with colleagues and students at my institution. This coming fall (2017), I will return to teaching, after a 3-year hiatus or sorts. The course that I will teach is a practicum in rural public policy and planning, which is in many ways ideal for incorporating the experience. Among the requirements for the practicum paper are addressing the nexus between theory and practice, the role of advocacy in the making of public policy and the culture of organizations. Lectures and reading about the 2016 DNC that encompass these elements will be incorporated into the mandated classroom sessions.”

o *Dr. Kathie Stromile Golden*
Mississippi Valley State University

❖ “Participation in the 15-member research team for the 2016 Democratic National Convention was an invaluable experience which has been central to enhancing my pedagogical strategies in both my introductory and upper-level courses in American Politics. Experiential knowledge and participation in the activities and interviewing process at the DNC promoted enrichment of substantive course content, deeper integration of visual literacy within courses, and further development and refinement of my ‘practical paradigm’ of teaching. Observation of important processes, occurrences and outcomes at the DNC has been very impactful in enhancing the breadth and depth of important content in key topical sections of American politics including political participation and campaigns and elections. Personal interactions with delegates and conference attendees provided important insights about the delegate selection process, primary roles and responsibilities. Delegate perspectives about political activism, citizen advocacy and representation were informative and interesting. In my courses, I specifically emphasize the high levels of awareness and competence of the younger cohorts who served as delegates during the DNC. During the interviewing process, they demonstrated an impressive understanding of the political campaign and issues. A principal motivation for sharing these stories with students is to encourage civic participation and activism. I believe my students have benefited enormously from real-life accounts and stories derived from my active engagement in the DNC research project. Through descriptive analyses of the DNC, they have gained greater insight into the inner-workings and details of convention politics and the electoral process. . . . Post- convention I modified my course content to reflect a more graphical and visual presentation of key information obtained at the DNC. Interacting with key DNC leadership and politicians presented a unique opportunity to capture pictorial images to embed in lectures.”

o *Dr. Linda M. Trautman*
Ohio University-Lancaster

❖ “History was made again at the 2016 DNC in Philadelphia. Former First Lady, Hilary Clinton was the first woman to be nominated by a major party to run for the Presidency of the US. I, again, was there to witness another first at a Democratic National Convention. As a woman, I felt Clinton’s nomination moved the nation a bit closer to not only recognizing the ability of women to lead and serve at the highest levels, but also to affirming the capabilities of women in all public and private societal roles. The excitement was hard to contain. With scholarly interests in visual culture, trade, and gender, the 2016 project offered a unique opportunity to participate in a multi-organizational, inter-university, research-based domestic travel experience. The dynamic and diverse research team was comprised of undergraduate and graduate students and faculty from four institutions and research fellows from a non-profit, non-partisan political organization. As a previous convention attendee and 2008 DNC Study team member, I provided continuity, training, and logistical support...I conducted training on interviewing techniques for all participants during the two-day orientation, during which I also assisted with other aspects of the on-site training and with the

development of training materials for the team. Having attended the DNC in 2008 provided me with a unique perspective and insight into the nature of the event, attendees, their attitudes and patterns, etc. I also designed the logo for the 2016 project [and the badges which identified team members]. . . . During the 2016 convention, I collected memorabilia, surveyed attendees, and provided logistical support, as necessary. Memorabilia was an important part of the visual landscape at the convention. Signs, images, clothing, buttons, newspapers, and other items serve as reminders of the landmark event. The materials will be an important part of US history for years to come. [t]his was an excellent opportunity both personally and professionally. Beyond just being at the convention to observe, record, and to participate in history, attending the DNC has broadened my activities and perspectives as an academician. It was indeed a once-in-a-lifetime experience that I will always cherish! I participated in scholarly activities, provided extracurricular learning experience for students, donated materials [to the Moorland-Spingarn Center at Howard University] for observation and potentially future research, and enhanced teaching materials. I look forward to 2020 and being able to participate in the Democratic and Republican National Conventions in a similar fashion. I am particularly grateful to the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation for providing funding for this opportunity.”

o *Dr. Elka M. Stevens*
Howard University

APPENDIX C: SELECT PICTURES



Figure 1. Research team members meet with Sen. Cory Booker.



Figure 2. Howard University student Gabrielle Gray interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 3. Supporter, presidential candidate Hillary Clinton.



Figure 4. CBCF researcher Jalen Alexander interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 5. Research team orientation meeting in Philadelphia, Pa.



Figure 6. Mississippi Valley State University's Dr. Kathie Stromile Golden interviews attendee at Md. Delegation Breakfast.



Figure 7. Ohio University-Lancaster research team members.



Figure 8. CBCF's Maurice Starks interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 9. National Urban League President Marc Morial meets research team members.



Figure 10. Mississippi Valley State University's Maya Murry and University of Maryland Baltimore County's Allie Mann and Arnita Heathington head to the Wells Fargo Center.



Figure 11. Presidential candidate Martin O'Malley meets with research team members.



Figure 12. Maya Murry interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 13. Research team members look on as former First Lady Michelle Obama speaks at the Wells Fargo Center.



Figure 14. University of Maryland Baltimore County's Shawn Tang interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 15. Sample signage at DNC Convention.



Figure 16. CBCF team members.



Figure 17. Interviewer Training Session at University of Maryland Baltimore County.



Figure 18. Gabrielle Gray, Dr. Elka Stevens, and Carley Shinault of Howard University; and CBCF's Dr. Harold Watkins.



Figure 19. Research team members affiliated with the University of Maryland Baltimore County.



Figure 20. Research team on Day 1 of the DNC at the Wells Fargo Center.



Figure 21. Research team members at the CBCF's reception.



Figure 22. Mississippi Valley State University's Dr. Kathie Golden and Maya Murray.



Figure 23. Research team's closing breakfast.



Figure 24. Research team members at the Wells Fargo Center.



Figure 25. Ohio University- Lancaster's William Howard interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 26. Sen. Bernie Sanders supporters at impromptu rally.



Figure 27. University of Maryland Baltimore County's Allie Mann and CBCF's Jalen Alexander interview attendee at Md. Delegation Breakfast.



Figure 28. Howard University's Carley Shinault interviews DNC attendee.



Figure 29. Research team members photograph and interview attendees at the DNC's African American Caucus meeting.



Figure 30. Research team members look on during Rep. Nita Lowey's speech.

APPENDIX D: LIST OF FIGURES AND TABLES

Figures (Convention Respondents)

- Figure 2.1 Racial Identification
- Figure 2.2 Gender Identification
- Figure 2.3 Prior Convention Experience by Gender Identification
- Figure 2.4 Age Cohort
- Figure 2.5 2015 Household Income
- Figure 3.1 Ideological Self-Placement and Placement of Select Officials
- Figure 3.2 Ideological Placement of Clinton, Ryan, Sanders, and Trump
- Figure 3.3 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Supporters Indicating “No” That Platform Adequately Addressed Issues of Select Groups
- Figure 3.4 Support for Free College Tuition Among Clinton and Sanders Supporters
- Figure 3.5 Agreement with Statement that Nomination Fight Weakened Party
- Figure 3.6 Opinions about What Explains Racial Inequality
- Figure 3.7 Opinions about What Explains Gender Inequality
- Figure 3.8 Opinions about Priority for Dealing with Illegal Immigration
- Figure 4.1 Word Cloud of Key Terms Emerging from Responses to Open Ended Questions

Tables (Convention Respondents)

- Table 3.1 Percentage Indicating Whether Platform Adequately Addressed Issues of Select Groups
- Table 3.2 Perceptions of Trade as a “Good Thing” or “Bad Thing” for America by Candidate Preference
- Table 3.3 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Delegates/Alternates Agreeing that “Nomination Fight Weakened Party”
- Table 3.4 Percentage of Clinton and Sanders Delegates/Alternates Agreeing with VP Nominee Choice
- Table 3.5 Percentage of Delegates/Alternates Choosing “Black Lives Matter” by Candidate Preference
- Table 4.1 Themes from Open Ended Question “Most Important Thing to Be Accomplished at Convention”
- Table 4.2 Themes from Open Ended Question “Biggest Issue During 2016 Democratic Primary”
- Table 4.3 Themes from Open Ended Question “Impressions about Obama Administration”

Figures (2017 National Panel, Democratic Respondents)

- Figure 5.1 Perception of Unity in Each of the Two Major Parties, First Quarter 2017
- Figure 5.2 Presidential Vote Choice in 2016 by Candidate Preference in 2016 Democratic Primary

Tables (2017 National Panel, Democratic Respondents)

- Table 5.1 Percentage Agreeing that 2016 Primary Made Party Better by Candidate Preference
- Table 5.2 Perception that Clinton Candidacy Had Good or Bad Impact on Democratic Party
- Table 5.3 Evaluation of Trump’s Handling of Job Creation, Foreign Affairs, Health Care Reform

Tables (2017 Convention Follow-Up Panel)

- Table 5.4 Percentage Agreeing that 2016 Primary Made Party Better by Candidate Preference
- Table 5.5 Perception that Clinton Candidacy Had Good or Bad Impact on Democratic Party
- Table 5.6 Themes from Open Ended Question “Perceptions about Contest for Leadership of DNC”

UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRATION AND ELECTION 2016: AN ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION POLICY PREFERENCES

REPORT

Niambi M. Carter, Ph.D.
Howard University
May 1, 2017

OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY

Undocumented immigration achieved a new level of salience in the wake of September 11, 2001 as concerns regarding domestic security reached an all-time high (Johnson, 2002; Johnson and Trujillo, 2007). According to the Pew Hispanic Center, there are an estimated 12 million undocumented persons currently residing in the United States (Passel and Cohn, 2009). Until 2016, half of this population came from Mexico; the numbers of unauthorized Mexicans has been declining in recent years (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, 2017). Still, undocumented immigration from Mexico dominated the debate during the 2016 presidential election as then candidate Trump vowed to “build that wall,” in order to fortify our southern borders and prevent undocumented immigration from Mexico to the United States (Preston, Rappeport, and Richtel, 2016).

This fiery rhetoric stoked fears that immigrants have come to the United States and take the few jobs that exist for Americans (Gramlich, 2016). Yet, as successful as this language was for ginning up support for candidate Trump, it ignores some important facts. The population of undocumented people in the United States grew rapidly from 1990 until about 2006 when the economy was strong and expanding. In the wake of the economic recession, however, the numbers of new arrivals stabilized. The numbers of undocumented persons have steadily decreased as the economy contracted and the posture toward this group became more inhospitable in traditional, metropolitan immigrant gateways (Krogstad, Passel, and Cohn, 2017; Passel and Cohn, 2008, 2010; Singer, 2014).

Moreover, there are regional differences in the spatial and temporal patterns of immigration. While California is home to the majority of undocumented persons, immigration has slowed in

the state though it has intensified across the southeastern United States (McClain et al., 2006). This movement of immigrant out of traditional metropolitan areas to smaller cities and rural areas is largely due to the availability of employment. The agricultural sector has used guest worker policies and extra-legal hiring practices to attract immigrant workers. Immigrant workers have become integral to agricultural operations in North Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and other states with extensive rural economies because of a lack of interest from domestic laborers (Hertz and Zahniser, 2012). In 2011, using North Carolina as a case, it was found immigrant workers were an absolute necessity for the sustainability of the agricultural economy because native workers did not fill those jobs (Clemens, 2013). Data supplied by the North Carolina Growers Association (NCGA) demonstrated there were more than enough unemployed North Carolinians to fill the industry's vacancies, however, there were virtually no applicants from the native population. Of those that applied, over 90% were accepted for employment, but only about 66% showed up for the first day of work. At the end of the growing season, only 7 native workers remained of the 6,500 workers hired for the growing season (Clemens, 2013). Clemens found these dismal numbers unchanged by the severity of the economic crisis wrought by the Great Recession.

Though there is not a consensus, the work of Clemens (2013) and others (Powers, 2005; Zota, 2008) support the hypothesis that immigrants help local economies more than they harm native workers. Generally speaking, immigrants are not competing with native-born workers for employment, they pay taxes, and they have little bearing on the wages of native-born workers (Berenson, 2016; National Academies of Sciences and Medicine, 2017). The ability for immigrants to “take jobs” away from native-born workers are dependent on hiring practices that are out of their control. Yet, the belief persists that immigrants are harmful to the job prospects of Americans, particularly the least educated and least employable

(Richwine, 2016). Employment is a highly fraught issue, particularly for those at the margins of American society. African Americans are at, or near, the bottom on most measures of quality of life. Blacks are more likely to live in poverty, be unemployed, have higher infant mortality, and have poorer health overall (National Urban League, 2017). Due to a history of racial discrimination, Blacks are behind on most measures of economic, social, and political well-being (Desilver, 2014). Thus, the idea that undocumented immigrants “take” employment opportunities that Blacks sorely need given their high unemployment rates, even when controlling for their education and skill-levels, would suggest that Blacks have more at stake economically with respect to undocumented immigration than other groups (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004; White, 2015).

RACE AND PUBLIC OPINION ON IMMIGRATION


Though this brief is not limited to the opinions of Blacks, it has been clear this community has felt aggrieved as reporting of police shootings, harassment, and abuse have become more prominence. As such, lawmakers are tasked with addressing the issue concerns and crafting policies that will assist all Americans both immigrant and native-born. While the issue of immigration is multi-faceted, legislators have a stake in this issue as they represent states that have diverse constituencies that include undocumented persons. Moreover, given the current status of immigration reform in this country, it is important to create policy based on evidence. To date, the potential border wall President Trump favors is occupying much of the conversation, but it is far from the only possible policy that could be devised. Ensuring an equitable immigration policy that is sensitive to the representatives’ mission of being conscientious while protecting the interests of their communities requires a nuanced understanding of undocumented immigration and its relationship to Americans across racial

groups. For example, Blacks are a loyal, predominantly Democratic constituency whose voter turnout has risen in recent presidential elections, but have not fared well on most social, political, and economic indicators (Krogstad and Lopez, 2017; Noonan, Velasco-Mondragon, and Wagner, 2016).

As a group, Blacks face an unemployment rate higher than their White peers (Oyedele, 2017; White, 2015). These numbers have improved since the Great Recession, but Black labor force participation remains below the national average (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2017; Krause and Sawhill, 2017). Because undocumented immigrants may be competing with low-skilled native-born workers, many of whom are Black, one might infer a level of economic anxiety regarding undocumented immigration. This intimates Blacks may also be concerned about undocumented immigration given their vulnerabilities as the least employed Americans.

Black immigrants are a bit different from other immigrant groups given they tend to be better educated and more employable than U.S.-born Blacks. Further, Black immigrants are more likely to be naturalized and English proficient than their immigrant peers with most having arrived since 2000 (Anderson, 2015). Thus, Black immigrants belie many of the common tropes associated with immigrants, more generally, and undocumented immigrants, more specifically. Despite the general education of this group, approximately 20% of Black immigrants are in poverty, which is lower than the rate for native-born Blacks (28%), but still higher than for other immigrant groups, like Asians. Though Black immigrants are not native to the United States, they are generally grouped with African Americans (Greer, 2014; Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, Waters, and Holdaway, 2008). Because of this, Black immigrants often find themselves living in neighborhoods with other Blacks, facing discrimination, and under surveillance. In cases, where Black immigrants are undocumented, they are more likely to

have contact with police and face detention (Ndugga-Kabuye, 2017). Thus, increased efforts to capture undocumented immigrants are entwined with the increased presence of law enforcement in Black communities.



Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Department of Labor, *The Economics Daily*, Unemployment Rate and Employment-Population Ratio Vary by Race and Ethnicity.

If Black employment prospects are harmed by undocumented immigration, it would seem their investment in regulating the issue would be paramount. While it may be the case that Blacks are interested in the issue of undocumented immigration, it has not been an issue they have typically organized around (Carter and Pérez, 2015). In fact, while Blacks indicate some concern about job prospects with respect to immigrants, Blacks hold fewer negative opinions on immigrants relative to Whites, and few indicate they have lost a job or know of someone who has lost a job to an immigrant (Brader, Valentino, Jardina, and Ryan, 2010; Doherty, 2006). In fact, Blacks were more likely than Whites to favor allowing undocumented immigrants access to social services and attend schools despite their social circumstances

(Doherty, 2006). Whites, in general, register more restrictionist policy preferences with respect to immigration (Diamond, 1998; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina, 2013). Latino public opinion on the issue is more mixed depending on group attachment, nationality, and length of residence in the United States (Sanchez, 2006). Taken together, it seems race should be considered as an important determinant of public opinion with regard to undocumented immigration.

ELITE FRAMING OF (UNDOCUMENTED) IMMIGRATION

Undocumented immigration occupied much of the 2016 election cycle with public opinion largely breaking along party lines. The rancor around the issue obscures the fact that, since 2015, according to Gallup polling, most Americans have favored some form of a pathway to citizenship for undocumented immigrants (Jones, 2015). This number has only increased in the months since the election (McClatchy-Marist Poll, 2017).

Heading into convention season, much ado was made of the public perception on the issues, which makes sense given the importance of voters for election victories. It seems media outlets may have mistaken elite frames as a proxy for public opinion. In general, the public approves of some pathway to citizenship, but political elites are still arguing over the merits of immigration reform (Goo, 2015; Jones, 2016). Thus, the contestation around immigration seems to be happening among lawmakers rather than with ordinary citizens. This is not to suggest undocumented immigration is a settled issue for Americans. Rather, there seems to be enough public support for Congress to provide some sort of immigration reform legislation.

There is a wide-ranging literature detailing the importance of elite opinion on public opinion that may help us better understand this seeming disconnect between elite and mass opinion on undocumented immigration (Converse, 1962; Zaller, 1992). Issue framing refers to how an issue is presented to the public; the frame is constructed in such a way to elicit the most support. It has been argued that most people do not have true opinions on most issues. It is believed that individuals construct opinions based on the saliency of an issue. Issue salience is achieved, in part, by what issues make it on the political agenda (Zaller, 1992). Political elites are most in control of the political agenda and to the extent that an issue is part of the political lexicon of the day, the public has opinions on that issue(s). Thus, citizen opinion is partially formed by elite discourse. The public receives messages from political elites regarding some issue; elites frame the issue for the public which tell the public how to think about an issue, not necessarily what to think about. The most politically engaged members of the public will be able to receive these elite cues and sort through these messages to choose the message that most comports to their beliefs. If an individual is able to successfully assimilate these messages, they are able to turn them into opinions (Zaller, 1992). While the elite model of opinion formation has been contentious, it is significant for helping to understand the ways in which political elites influence opinion formation.

This framing is particularly important with respect to the issue of immigration. On the issue of immigration, multiple frames have been used. Lakoff and Ferguson (2007) demonstrate that by defining immigration as a “problem,” political elites were able to limit discourse around the issue. While immigration encompasses more than legality or illegality, they note a majority of the frames used refer to “illegal aliens, illegals, undocumented workers, undocumented immigrants, guest workers, temporary workers, amnesty, and border security,” which are all highly charged terms (Lakoff and Ferguson, 2007). The “immigration-as-problem,” frame

therefore confines the conversation and its solutions to the realm of criminal justice (Cisneros, 2008). As such, there is little room left to grapple with the economic, social, and other realities that give rise to undocumented immigration and may open other ways for thinking through solutions to the issue (Huber, 2008). While it is not the case the public takes all of its cues from elites, it is nonetheless true that elites have the power to set the agenda, such that some issues become important, and because of their access to mass media, these same elites have the power to frame the issue. Immigration is one such issue and one where there exists a gap between elite framing of the issue and how the general public understands the issue. Toward this end, this policy brief addresses the opinions of conference attendees with regard to immigration policy. The aim of this brief is to provide clarity and context for better understanding this fraught issue.

PARTICIPANTS

Participants in this study were in attendance at the 2016 Democratic National Convention in Philadelphia. Given the nature of this political gathering, the participants tended to be among some of the most politically engaged citizens. Of those sampled, 55.7% (n=180) were Delegates. As delegates come from state and local party organizations it stands to reason these individuals are fairly well informed on some of the most vital political issues at stake in the 2016 election. There was no variation on party identification, given all respondents were. In total, there were 314 respondents. Because of the relatively small-n the analysis in this brief relies primarily on crosstabulations, chi-square tests of independence, and binomial logistic regression.

FINDINGS

The survey asked “What should be the PRIORITY for dealing with illegal immigration”.

Respondents had the option of choosing: “better border security,” “pathway to citizenship,” or “both equally”. Of those who responded to the question, 56.6% stated they favored a path to citizenship; 42.4% stated the government should focus equally on border security and a pathway to citizenship; and the remaining 1% favored better border security and enforcement. While this is the view of the sample, it may be important to control for whether an individual is a Delegate as Delegates may have a more partisan view given their status within the political party apparatus.

On the issue of immigration, Delegates (64.6%) were more likely than Alternate Delegates (53.3%) and general attendees (46%) to support a pathway to citizenship; this pattern holds for pledged Delegates. Further testing confirms a link between Delegate status and attitudes regarding immigration. Regardless of Delegate status, however, increasing border security and enforcement was the least favorable option.

To further parse this issue, it is important to consider an individual's preferred candidate. At the Convention, there were numerous Bernie Sanders supporters. Thus, the survey includes an item asking attendees whether they support Hillary Clinton or Bernie Sanders. This is an important intervention because Sanders was characterized by some as the most progressive, Democratic candidate (Phillips-Feinn, Postel, Greene, and Kazin, 2016; Riotta, 2017). Given Sanders' public pronouncements with respect to immigration, it is hypothesized those who support candidate Sanders would be most in favor of a pathway to citizenship. For example, Sanders wanted to allow undocumented immigrants to purchase insurance under the Affordable Care Act, reduce deportations, and provide visas for those persons who reported employer abuse (berniesanders.com, 2016). According to survey responses, 74.6% of

Sanders supporters favor a “pathway to citizenship,” versus 51.3% of Clinton’s supporters. These differences are significant.

Given the role of demographics in this election, it is important to assess how identity played a role in individual opinions regarding immigration. Ideology, gender, and race, were all at play in this election. This was an election where demographics were viewed as pivotal to the outcome; the votes of women and racial/ethnic minorities were critical to the outcome (Junn, 2017). This next section investigates these identity components to better understand their role in opinion formation.

Ideology is often used synonymously with party identification. There is a long literature, however, that delineates the difference between how one chooses to cast their ballot and how one believes the government should act (Abramowitz and Saunders, 1998; Carsey and Layman, 2006; Feldman, 1988; Goren, 2005; Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Krosnick and Berent, 1993). Thus, it is not the case that one’s political ideology and party identification move together, though they are closely aligned concepts. In the case of those in attendance at the Democratic convention, those who self-identify as *most liberal* favor a “pathway to citizenship” by 58.4% and another 41.1% favor “both equally”. Ideological moderates are similarly in favor of a “pathway to citizenship”. There are only three strong conservatives, and they tend to favor the “both equally” response or a “pathway to citizenship”. These results are only suggestive, however, given the small sample size of conservatives. The level of association, however, between ideology and attitudes on immigration is weak.


Looking across gender lines, a clear majority of women (59.3%) and men (52.3%) favor a pathway to citizenship for undocumented persons. Followed by “both equally”. Virtually no

men or women favor enhancing border security and enforcement as a way to manage immigration. Gender, however, is only party of the story. It is also necessary to look at racial differences in opinion with respect to immigration.

Given the racial implications of the debate, it is unwise to ignore race as a potential determinant of individual attitudes with respect to immigration. From the literature, race is noted as a significant, consistent predictor on attitudes toward immigration policy (Alba, Rumbaut, and Marotz, 2005; Berg, 2009; Hood and Morris, 1998; Wong, 2007). Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain what, if any, relationship exists between race and opinions on immigration policy. In this sample, there are 149 Blacks; 101 Whites; 26 Hispanics/Latinos; 21 Asians; 12 American Indian/Alaska Natives; and 2 Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander. Blacks (n=148)¹ are most in favor of the “both equally” option with virtually no Blacks favoring enhancing border security or enforcement. The remaining respondents favor a path to citizenship. Whites largely favor creating a path to citizenship for immigrants with 72% responding affirmatively to this option; the remaining responses favor “both equally,” with no respondents choosing “better border security and enforcement”. Similarly, 70% of Asians favor creating a pathway to citizenship while 30% favor “both equally” approach focusing on some combination of citizenship and enhanced border security. Latinos are clearly in favor of creating a pathway to citizenship (61.5%) over both equally (38.5%); no Latinos favored increasing border security and enforcement. Overall, a pathway to citizenship is the most favored option for all groups. Blacks were the only group not to give a majority of their support to creating a pathway to citizenship. This finding, however, is not alarming because Blacks have typically not organized against immigration and they also are not giving a majority

¹ Crosstabulations require respondents to answer both the race question and the question regarding immigration. Any change in number of respondents indicates that an individual answered one question or the other, but not both. Therefore, respondents that do not answer both questions are excluded from this analysis.

of their support to better border security and enforcement. Moreover, if we consider the race and gender implications of election 2016, it seems these findings cannot and should not be read as anti-immigrant affect on the part of Blacks (Carter and Pérez, 2015). Rather, Blacks are more ambivalent with respect to the issue of immigration.



Black women are not only a significant part of the Democratic constituency, they also have consistently high turnout. In the elections of Barack Obama and Hilary Clinton Black women had a voter turnout that rivaled their White counterparts. On the issue of immigration, Black women and men ($n=148$) were more likely to favor “both equally” with approximately 40% of this group favoring a pathway to citizenship. Overall, Asians ($n=20$) were in favor of creating a pathway to citizenship. Asian men (80%) are particularly in favor of a pathway to citizenship; Asian women were less sanguine in their support as 44.4% favor both equally and 55.6% favor pathway to citizenship. Identical proportions of Latino woman and men (61.5%) were in favor

of creating a pathway to citizenship. While 83.6% of White women favor creating a pathway to citizenship only about 56.8% of White men favor this option. Though the majority of White respondents favor creating a pathway to citizenship, it is fair to say White women are pushing the larger White community toward this policy preference.

In order to assess which predictors make it more likely that a respondent will prefer either the option “both equally” or “pathway to citizenship,” a binary logistic regression is employed.

This method was chosen because few respondents ($n=3$) chose increased border security as an option. For the aforementioned reasons, the dependent variable of *Immigration Policy Preference* is coded as either “both equally” (0) or “pathway to citizenship” (1).

Table 1: Binomial Logistic Regression Assessing Immigration Policy Preference

<i>Independent Variables</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Odds Ratio</i>
Male	-.360	.697
Income	.002	1.002
Education	.121	1.129
White/Caucasian	.744	2.104
Black/African American	-.694	.499
Asian	.499	1.647
Hispanic/Latino	.162	1.176
Delegate	.959	2.610***
Clinton	-.418	.658
Constant	-.286	.752
<i>N</i>	307	

* $p < .10$ ** $p < .05$ *** $p < .01$

According to these results, men are .697 times more likely to favor “both equally” than women. Likewise, when we examine race, all groups were more likely to favor a “path to citizenship” than Blacks who are less sanguine with regards to this option. In similar fashion, those who hold clear preferences for Clinton were less certain about a “path to citizenship.” Having higher education increases one’s support of “pathway to citizenship”. All of these results are interesting and seem to support the ideas presented earlier. None of the predictors discussed, however, proved statistically significant.

The only exception was a person’s status as a Delegate. Being a Delegate means a person is 2.6 times more likely to support a “path to citizenship”. This is heartening and may explain the previous findings. It could be Delegates’ identities as party members are more salient than their other identities when in attendance at the convention. This is important because it intimates that there are possibilities to create policy on complicated topics like immigration that unify the party. While party elites are not like the general public in their understanding and interest in politics, they are members of various publics and this has implications for disseminating information and creating policy convergence among partisans at the state and local levels. That Delegate identity is the only significant predictor implies policy can be generated that will be agreeable to the majority and this may be the place where the party can begin to build supportive coalitions on the issue of immigration, which is not as divisive in this group of partisans as it is often represented in the larger public.

POLICY PROPOSALS

The survey results reflect that attendees are fairly consistent in their preference for finding a “pathway to citizenship” for immigrants. Unfortunately, we do not have a way of

disaggregating their individual policy preferences. The implication, however, is that our current system of naturalization is inadequate for handling the demands of those persons who may be in the country without proper authorization. The current naturalization process has significant associated costs which can act as barriers to the majority of immigrants who seek naturalization (Gonzalez-Barrera, Lopez, Passel, and Taylor, 2013). Despite the significant rights undocumented persons will gain upon naturalization, the financial costs of the application, civics testing, lengthy wait periods, and language requirements can be a deterrent for some. Indeed, the fear that one will face a ban on naturalization when trying to convert their undocumented status keeps many from attempting permanent residence via legal means.

Acknowledging these issues, however, does not have to be a barrier to creating the types of policies that can ease some of the burdens faced by undocumented persons and the agencies responsible for managing the issue. Given the lack of popularity of increasing border security, it seems that allowing undocumented persons to register as provisional immigrants and increasing the waiting period to naturalization is a favored policy among this sample. First proposed by S.744 in 2013, this comprehensive reform bill gives immigrants a way to get into the immigration system without returning home. By engaging the naturalization process individuals must comply with all requirements, such as paying taxes and remaining employed, before adjusting their status. While this process increases the time to naturalization, this is policy addresses several issues.

The conversion of the status program is desirable because it allows the United States to have a better sense of who is in the country while allowing those immigrants with firmly established roots in the country to remain while naturalizing. The majority of the respondents in this

study cite a pathway to citizenship as their clear preference. Though they are not representative of the larger public, their opinions comport with other nationally representative polls that show American opinions firmly in favor of creating a pathway to citizenship for the undocumented.

Moreover, a naturalization policy protects children who were brought to the United States as children. Mixed-status families are far more common than appreciated and deportations only increase the stresses faced by families, particularly children, and their communities. (Fix, Zimmerman, and Passel, 2001; Romero, 2008). Not only is losing a parent traumatic, it is also traumatic for children raised in America to face deportation despite not having familial, or even linguistic, connections to their native country (Gulbas, Zayas, Yoon, Szlyk, Aguilar-Gaxiola, and Natera, 2015; Hagan, Castro, and Rodriguez, 2009). In many ways, these families are American and it is unclear what interests are served by deportations.

Most Americans support is some type of system that allows undocumented persons to become citizens rather than penalizing undocumented persons for being in violation of federal laws. Generally speaking, extending the time to naturalization, having an employment requirement, and paying taxes and/or other penalties seems to satisfy most Americans concerns for domestic security with the practical issues surrounding immigration. For sure, certain industries, such as agriculture and food service, and the localities that depend on these industries are invested in having a system that respects the routines of their everyday lives.

In closing, undocumented immigrants and citizens have similar interests. Undocumented immigrants want to naturalize and most Americans support a policy that leads toward citizenship. There are a number of policies Americans approve that address the country's

interest in domestic security and those of undocumented persons. It seems that on immigration there is policy convergence and this presents an opportunity for policy makers to reframe the agenda and meet the needs of multiple constituencies.

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PERCEPTIONS OF TRADE AND EVIDENCE OF POPULIST CANDIDATE SUPPORT AMONG 2016 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION ATTENDEES

REPORT

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May 9, 2017, Revised October 6, 2017

Overview of the Study

In many ways, “populism” was the theme of the 2016 US presidential election. While Donald Trump was galvanizing support for his presidential bid with one form of populism, Democratic candidate Bernie Sanders was galvanizing a progressive base of support with a different form of populism. What unifies them—and makes them both populists—is their framing of national politics as dominated by out-of-touch elites who deserve to be thrown out of office. That populism can be married with other liberal or conservative philosophies reflects what Cas Mudde would describe as the “thin[ness]” of the ideology: that populism calls for revolutionary change but does not clearly define the policy agenda that would emerge if the people, however they are defined, do manage to gain political power (Friedman 2017).

While it is important to acknowledge the differences in the types of populism both men espoused—now President Trump clearly appealed to racial resentment in ways that Sen. Sanders repudiates—there were some common threads.¹ For instance, both candidates critiqued globalism and the ways in which neoliberal free trade policies had left many poor, working and lower middle class Americans behind. They even shared some policy similarities—namely, their opposition to the United States’ joining the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, a multilateral trade agreement with other Pacific Rim countries (See Sarlin 2016).

In this white paper, I explore the ways in which attitudes about the Democratic Party’s platform on labor issues reflect perceptions of the US’s trade policy and support for Bernie Sanders’ presidential bid. I am most interested in understanding whether citizens who think that Democrats could do more to support unions and who oppose free trade policies (like the Trans-Pacific Partnership) are more likely to support Bernie Sanders. Using data from a convenience sample of attendees to the 2016 Democratic National Convention, I find that attitudes about the Democratic Party’s treatment of the labor movement do predict attitudes toward US trade policy. Moreover, the data shows a relationship between perceptions of trade and support for Bernie Sanders’ presidential candidacy. While we observe these relationships, it is important to note that those who held pessimistic views about trade and the Democratic Party’s platform on labor were a minority of those who were interviewed. Given the fact that this sample was a convenience sample, future studies should explore the extent to which populist views dominate Democratic thought using a statistically representative sample of Democrats.

¹ For an excellent, pithy description of the evolution of our understanding of “populism,” see Michael Kazin’s (2016) essay in *The New York Times Magazine*.

Data and Methods

To explore these questions, I use data collected from the study “Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy at the 2016 Democratic National Convention” (hereafter known as the 2016 DNC Study). The 2016 DNC Study was an intercept survey organized by scholars at the University of Maryland-Baltimore County, Mississippi Valley State University, and the Congressional Black Caucus Foundation. The principal investigators trained student survey takers to interview delegates to the 2016 Democratic National Convention. The survey instrument was a 10-15 minute survey of approximately 26 questions, which asked respondents to express their attitudes on a number of different political issues, ranging from economic to social issues.

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 outlines the basic demographic frequencies of the survey universe. This survey was intended to capture the universe of black delegates to the convention. To achieve this goal, student survey takers interviewed respondents at state delegation breakfasts and at caucus meetings that were held during the day before the nightly televised plenaries. Survey takers were able to interview 323 respondents, not all of whom gave complete interviews.

As Table 1 shows, the 323 respondents represent an older, more affluent, and better educated segment of Democratic Party politics. As the table shows, the sample skews heavily female and older. Nearly half of the sample indicated that their primary² racial identification was African American or Black. As is perhaps not surprising, a majority of respondents to the survey identified as strong Democrats, though we did have a few independent and Republican respondents. While respondents were more likely to veer toward the liberal end of the ideological spectrum, a third of respondents indicated that they were moderate or slightly liberal.

² Respondents were able to list multiple racial identities. Respondents are coded based on the first category which they chose. No respondents who listed Black or African American as one of their ancestries listed it twice. Those who indicated a multiracial identity who had no black ancestry were coded as nonwhite.

Table 1: Demographic Frequencies of Respondents at State Delegation Events, 2016 DNC Survey


		Valid Percentage
Gender		
	Male	139 (43.8%)
	Female	178 (56.2%)
Age		
	18-36 (Millennials)	89 (29.6%)
	37-52 (Gen Xers)	74 (24.6%)
	53 and above (Boomers +)	138 (45.8%)
Party Identification		
	Strong Democrat	227 (70.3%)
	Weak Democrat	50 (15.5%)
	Other	46 (14.2%)
Ideology		
	Extremely Liberal	89 (28.2%)
	Liberal	101 (32.0%)
	Slightly Liberal	59 (18.7%)
	Moderate	49 (15.5%)
	Conservative	18 (5.7%)
Primary Racial/Ethnic Identification		
	Black	151 (48.6%)
	White	100 (32.2%)
	Other Nonwhite	60 (19.2%)
Educational Attainment		
	Less than a Bachelor's Degree	53 (16.9%)
	Bachelor's Degree	114 (36.5%)
	Graduate or Professional Degree	146 (46.6%)
Annual Household Income		
	Under \$50,000	68 (23.1%)
	\$50,000-99,999	101 (34.2%)
	\$100,000 and above	126 (42.7%)

Delegate Status		
	Yes	195 (60.4%)
	No	128 (39.6%)

The sample is also skewed socioeconomically. Nearly 85% of respondents reported having earned at least a bachelor's degree, with the plurality having earned a graduate or professional degree. In addition, a plurality of respondents who answered the question (47%) reported household incomes of \$100,000 or greater.

Non-delegates were liberally represented in the sample. About 60% of respondents were delegates and alternates, while nearly 40% were not delegates.

The goal of the sampling had been to interview the universe of Black delegates to the Democratic convention. This sample falls short of that goal. Graph 1 shows the demographic breakdown of the 180 delegates who participated in the sample. Of the delegates surveyed, slightly less than half of delegates (48% or 80) in this sample were African American. In total, 1182 delegates to the Democratic National Convention were Black (Meyerson 2016).



The 2016 DNC Survey asks four substantive questions that will be of relevance to this paper. The frequency of responses to those questions are outlined in Table 2. Two primary questions probe respondents' attitudes toward labor and trade. Respondents were first asked whether they thought trade with foreign countries was good or bad for the USA. Overall, most respondents had a positive view of trade. About 23% of respondents thought that trade was very good for the USA, and just over 50% of respondents thought it was somewhat good for the USA. About 25% of respondents thought that trade was somewhat or very bad for the USA.

The survey also asked respondents whether they thought that the Democratic Party platform adequately addressed labor issues. Labor issues came up in various forms during the platform debate in the weeks leading up to the 2016 Democratic convention. News coverage of the day suggests that the outcome of platform debates could have been disappointing for Sanders supporters. For instance, The Washington Post noted that Sanders supporters lost their motion to add an explicitly anti-TPP plank to the platform in part because pro-Clinton labor leaders voted against it (Weigel 2016). In addition, Daily Kos criticized the Democratic National Committee from excluding labor leaders on the platform committee (SphericalXS 2016). While it is unclear how knowledgeable rank and file Democrats (both delegate and nondelegate) were about the minutiae of the platform debate, these kinds of discussions—along with general impressions about elitism within Democratic ranks or perceived lack of effectiveness in producing jobs—can inform individual impressions of whether the party is doing enough on labor issues.

Table 2 shows that respondents to the 2016 DNC Survey overwhelmingly supported the Democratic Party's stance on labor issues. When asked if they thought labor issues were adequately addressed in the platform, nearly 80% of respondents said yes.


Table 2: Frequencies of Attitudes toward Trade, Labor and the Obama Administration

		Valid Percentage
Perceptions of Trade between US and Foreign Countries		
	Very Bad for USA	19 (6.2%)
	Somewhat Bad for USA	60 (19.7%)
	Somewhat Good for USA	155 (50.8%)
	Very Good for USA	71 (23.3%)

Does the Democratic Party Help Labor?		
	Yes	241 (79.5%)
	No	62 (20.5%)
“Obama Did Not Help Blacks”		
	Completely Disagree	113 (36%)
	Disagree	90 (28.7%)
	Neither Agree Nor Disagree	44 (14.0%)
	Agree	42 (13.4%)
	Completely Agree	25 (8.0%)

The survey also asked respondents for their perceptions of President Barack Obama’s performance vis a vis the African American community. A majority of respondents (64.7%) disagreed or completely disagreed with the idea that Obama had not helped blacks. About 21% of respondents agreed or completely agreed with the idea that Obama had not helped blacks. Fourteen percent of respondents neither agreed nor disagreed.

Because candidate preference may also be correlated with attitudes toward trade, it is also a relevant variable here. Graph 2 breaks down support for the Democratic candidates among respondents. A small number of respondents indicated that they supported neither candidate, said that they were unsure or did not answer the question (Because a nonanswer may be a deliberate response to this vote question, I do not perform a listwise deletion on responses to this question). More than three-quarters of respondents indicated that they supported Hillary Clinton. About 20% of respondents supported Bernie Sanders. It should be noted that overall, about 40% of the delegates to the 2016 Democratic Convention were Sanders supporters (Meyerson 2016).



I crosstabulate key variables of interest (e.g. perceptions of trade and vote choice) with other variables of interest. I start by crosstabulating the key variables of interest with each other. As Table 3 shows, there appears to be a correlation between perceptions of trade and vote choice. Respondents who thought that trade was bad for America were more likely to support Sanders, while those who supported trade were more likely to support Hillary Clinton for the Democratic nomination.

Table 3: Crosstabulations of Relevant Variables with Perceptions of Trade and Democratic Candidate Preferences, 2016 DNC Survey

	Perceptions of Trade for USA				Preferred Democratic Candidate		
	Very Bad	Somewhat Bad	Somewhat Good	Very Good	Hillary Clinton	Bernie Sanders	Neither/Unsure/Missing
Perceptions of Trade?							
Very Bad for USA					7 (36.8%)	12 (63.2%)	0 (0%)
Somewhat Bad for USA					32 (53.3%)	25 (41.7%)	3 (5.0%)
Somewhat Good for USA					128 (82.6%)	20 (12.9%)	7 (4.5%)
Very Good for USA					64 (90.1%)	4 (5.6%)	3 (4.2%)
Do Democrats Help Labor?							
Yes	6 (2.8%)	33 (14.3%)	129 (56.1%)	62 (27.0%)	203 (84.2%)	29 (12.0%)	9 (3.7%)
No	12 (19.7%)	24 (39.3%)	21 (34.4%)	4 (6.6%)	27 (43.5%)	31 (50.0%)	4 (6.5%)
Obama Did Not Help Blacks?							
Completely Disagree	6 (5.6%)	13 (12.1%)	54 (50.5%)	34 (31.8%)	101 (89.4%)	7 (6.2%)	5 (4.4%)
Disagree	2 (2.4%)	17 (20.2%)	49 (58.3%)	16 (19.0%)	67 (74.4%)	20 (22.2%)	3 (3.3%)
Neither Agree Nor Disagree	2 (4.5%)	11 (25.0%)	19 (43.2%)	12 (27.3%)	30 (68.2%)	13 (29.5%)	1 (2.3%)
Agree	4 (9.8%)	13 (31.7%)	19 (46.3%)	5 (12.2%)	27 (64.3%)	13 (31.0%)	2 (4.8%)
Completely Agree	5 (20.0%)	5 (20.0%)	11 (44.0%)	4 (16.0%)	13 (52.0%)	10 (40.0%)	2 (8.0%)
Delegate Status							
Delegate/Alternate	13 (7.1%)	37 (20.2%)	96 (52.5%)	37 (20.2%)	136 (69.7%)	55 (28.2%)	4 (2.1%)
Not a Delegate	6 (4.9%)	23 (18.9%)	59 (48.4%)	34 (27.9%)	110 (85.9%)	8 (6.3%)	10 (7.8%)
Age							
18-36 (Millennials)	6 (6.9%)	16 (18.4%)	49 (56.3%)	16 (18.4%)	56 (62.9%)	30 (33.7%)	3 (3.4%)

37-52 (Gen Xers)	6 (8.1%)	14 (18.9%)	35 (47.3%)	19 (25.7%)	55 (74.3%)	14 (18.9%)	5 (6.8%)
53 and above (Boomers +)	5 (3.9%)	27 (20.9%)	63 (48.3%)	34 (26.4%)	114 (82.6%)	19 (13.8%)	5 (3.6%)
<i>Education</i>							
Less than a Bachelor's Degree	4 (8.2%)	13 (26.5%)	21 (42.9%)	11 (22.4%)	37 (69.8%)	14 (26.4%)	2 (3.8%)
Bachelor's Degree	10 (9.2%)	24 (22.0%)	53 (48.6%)	22 (20.2%)	78 (68.4%)	30 (26.3%)	6 (5.3%)
Graduate or Professional Degree	4 (2.8%)	23 (16.1%)	79 (55.2%)	37 (25.9%)	122 (83.6%)	19 (13.0%)	5 (3.4%)
<i>Annual Income</i>							
Under \$50,000	7 (10.9%)	10 (15.6%)	35 (54.7%)	12 (18.8%)	52 (76.5%)	12 (17.6%)	4 (5.9%)
\$50,000-99,999	6 (6.5%)	18 (19.4%)	48 (51.6%)	21 (22.6%)	73 (72.3%)	23 (22.8%)	5 (5.0%)
\$100,000 and above	6 (5.0%)	28 (23.1%)	54 (44.6%)	33 (27.3%)	95 (75.4%)	26 (20.6%)	5 (4.0%)

We see a weaker pattern of support when we look at the relationship between assessments of Democratic Party performance on labor and vote choice. Those who thought that the Democratic Party platform inadequately addressed labor issues were nearly evenly split in their support of Hillary Clinton and Bernie Sanders. The overwhelming majority (84%) of those who thought that the Democratic platform did adequately address labor issues supported Hillary Clinton.

While the relationship is less strong, there appears to be a relationship between perceptions of Democratic support of organized labor and perceptions of trade. About 59% of those who thought that the Democratic platform did not adequately address labor issues had a negative perception of trade, while 83% of respondents who perceived the Democratic platform to be pro-labor had a positive view of trade. Most of these respondents thought that trade was somewhat good, though.

There does not appear to be a strong relationship between perceptions of Obama helping the Black community and perceptions of trade. However, perceptions of Obama's record on helping blacks does appear to be correlated with vote choice. Respondents who disagreed with the notion that Obama had not helped Blacks overwhelmingly supported Clinton. A plurality of respondents who strongly agreed that Obama had not helped Blacks supported Sanders.

There are also some correlations between demographic variables and our variables of interest. Delegates and non-delegates were indistinguishable in their views toward trade. However, non-delegates were more likely to be Clinton supporters (86%, compared to 70% of delegates).

I did categorize age into three broad generational groups: millennials (those born in 1980 or after), Generation Xers (those born from 1964-1979), and Baby Boomers and older (those born before 1963). There does not appear to be a statistically significant relationship between generation and perceptions of trade. And while millennials appear to be more likely to support Bernie Sanders than their elders, it should be noted that a majority of millennial respondents supported Hillary Clinton.

As with age, education and income also do not appear to be correlated with attitudes toward trade. Income also does not appear to be correlated with candidate choice. However, I do

notice that respondents with graduate degrees were about 14 percentage points more likely than those with less education to support Hillary Clinton.

Multivariate Analysis

To explore statistical relationships further, I present two regression models. The first is a linear³ model where trade attitudes serve as the dependent variable. Here, attitudes toward trade are coded on a 0 to 1 scale. Those who think trade is bad for America are coded as zero. Those who think trade is somewhat bad or somewhat good are coded at .33 and .67 respectively. Those who think trade is very good for America are coded as 1. The second model is a logistic regression model where support for Bernie Sanders is coded as 1. I code support for all other candidates as 0.

The regression models are outlined in Table 4. The first model (where perception of trade is the dependent variable) shows a significant (at the 95% confidence level), negative correlation between support for Sanders and support for trade. That is, Sanders supporters were more likely to think that trade was bad for the US than those who supported Clinton, someone else, or no one. Conversely, those who indicated that they thought that the Democratic Party platform adequately addressed labor issues were more likely to view trade between the US and other countries more positively.

Certain demographic variables were also significantly correlated with support for US trade. Compared to those with bachelor’s degrees, those without degrees were significantly less likely to view trade positively. Similarly, whites and blacks were less likely to support trade compared to those whose primary racial identity was neither white nor black.

Table 4: Regression Analysis of Factors Predicting Support for Trade and Support for Bernie Sanders

<i>Variables (Unless otherwise mentioned, variables are binary)</i>	Model 1 (OLS) DV=Perceptions of Trade	Model 2 (Logit) DV=Support Sanders for Dem Nomination
Constant	.626 (.080)**	1.443 (1.411)
Supports Sanders for nomination	-.203 (.047)**	
Perceptions of trade (0-1 scale		-3.365 (.990)**

³ I ran the same model using ordinal logistic regression and get similar results. I include linear coefficients because they are easier to read.



where 1=trade very good for USA)		
Believes Dems help labor	.198 (.043)**	-2.221 (.600)**
Believes Obama didn't help blacks (-1 to 1 scale)	-.012 (.025)	1.028 (.405)**
Convention delegate or alternate	-.017 (.035)	3.294 (.750)**
Strong Democrat	.012 (.048)	-2.048 (.784)**
Weak Democrat	-.079 (.055)	-1.292 (.876)
Ideology (-1 to 1 scale)	-.020 (.056)	1.891 (1.016)*
Male	-.033 (.031)	-.422 (.494)
Millennial Generation	.049 (.039)	.618 (.607)
Generation X	-.001 (.039)	-.051 (.668)
No Bachelor's Degree	-.079 (.045)*	-.102 (.662)
Postgraduate Degree	.027 (.035)	-.836 (.573)
Black	-.105 (.042)**	-2.182 (.657)*
White	-.092 (.045)**	-.003 (.600)
Income under \$50,000	-.010 (.041)	-.292 (.663)
Income \$50,000-90,000	.008 (.035)	.117 (.556)
(Nagelkerke) Adjusted R ²	.277	.665
F-Test	p<.05	
N	248	248

*p<.1; **p<.05

In the second model, the dependent variable was support for Bernie Sanders to be the Democratic nominee for president. Here, our previous dependent variable (attitudes toward trade) becomes one of our independent variables, along with all of the aforementioned variables. I find that perceptions of trade are significantly and negatively correlated with support for Sanders. That is, people who thought that trade between the US and other countries was good were less likely to support Bernie Sanders compared to other options. Strongly supporting trade decreased a person's likelihood of supporting Sanders by almost 97%.

In addition, those with jaundiced views of the Democratic Party and Barack Obama were also more likely to express support for Bernie Sanders. Those who believed that the Democratic Party platform adequately addressed labor issues were about 89% less likely to support Sanders. Those who thought that Barack Obama's presidency had not helped blacks were nearly three times as likely to support Sanders.

In addition to the aforementioned relationships, certain demographic characteristics were also associated with support for Sanders. In this sample, delegates were significantly more likely to be Sanders supporters. Given the fact that Hillary Clinton had secured enough delegates to win the nomination more than a month before the Democratic Convention, her supporters would be more likely to be in attendance at the convention, even if they were not delegates. Unlike non-delegate Sanders supporters, they would have likely been more motivated to spend time and resources to travel to Philadelphia to attend a convention.

In addition to delegate status, race and strength of party identification were also predictive of candidate support. African American respondents were significantly less likely to be Sanders supporters (by nearly 90%). Finally, strong Democrats were about 87% less likely (compared to non-Democrats) to support Sanders as the Democratic nominee.

Analysis and Conclusion

The preceding analysis reveals a number of interesting patterns that warrant further study with a larger, more representative sample. First, the data suggests a correlation between disappointment in the Democratic Party's platform on labor issues and attitudes towards trade. Those who did not think that the platform adequately addressed labor issues were more likely to view foreign trade negatively.

Not surprisingly, we see similar patterns when we look at the variables which correlate with support for Bernie Sanders' nomination to be the Democratic nominee. Those who had a negative view of trade were more likely to support Sanders, as well as those who were disappointed with the Democratic platform's responsiveness to labor issues. In addition, those who thought that President Obama had not helped blacks were more likely to support Sanders.

Collectively, the findings here suggest, not surprisingly, a correlation between perceptions of labor and perceptions of trade. The more interesting findings here are about how these

perceptions relate to candidate choice. Sanders voters in this sample were not only anti-trade and disappointed with the Democratic Party's response to labor issues; they also tended to be highly critical of President Obama's performance and felt that he had not helped the Black community.

There are a few more items of note with respect to the Sanders coalition. Despite prominent endorsements from African Americans such as Michelle Alexander, Ta-Nehisi Coates and Killer Mike, most of the blacks who participated in this survey did not support the Sanders candidacy. In addition, strong Democrats were less likely to support the Sanders campaign. These findings suggest that when thinking about the role of populism in Democratic Party politics, one must consider which potential Democratic voters are more likely to express populist ideas. The data here suggest that it is non-Democratic identifiers and nonblacks, particularly other racial and ethnic minorities, who were the most likely to support Sanders; and in the case of nonblack minorities, to express skepticism about trade. With a larger, more representative sample of black respondents, future work should explore the role of generation in predicting support for populist ideas and populist candidates, as the age of our sample (mean age=48) made it difficult to detect generational differences.

To be sure, this dataset has its limitations. What was intended to be a survey of the universe of Black delegates turned out to be a small convenience sample of delegates and attendees. The findings in this report are only suggestive. Future studies should seek to survey a larger, statistically representative sample of Democratic voters to gain a clearer sense of the factors which predict support for trade.

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POLITICAL ELITES' EXPLANATIONS FOR **RACE AND GENDER INEQUALITIES**

REPORT

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Introduction

Scholars have long questioned to what extent Americans' views about public policy may be constrained by people's perceived explanations for inequality.¹ Especially, because the media and political elites have framed race and gender in the American public, often in negatively stereotypical and behaviorally assailing ways,² we see less favorable policy responses that, inadvertently, reflect attitudes toward social groups that are over-characterized and negatively portrayed as policy beneficiaries.³ This link among policy issues, policies, and attitudes toward perceived beneficiaries proves to be detrimental to policy issues that, ordinarily, Americans would favor addressing, in order to stem inequality in society.⁴

For example, while Americans have an interest in curbing poverty, the exaggerated portrayal of Black Americans as the majority of poor persons in America during the 1960s-1990s has had the complicated consequence of reducing support for social welfare policies, like welfare, that attempt to address the larger issue of poverty.⁵ Several factors account for a reduction in support for such policies, including the impact of negative stereotyping which leads to the mischaracterization of diversity among social welfare beneficiaries.⁶ Furthermore, these negative stereotypes contribute to additional classifications of beneficiaries into those who are perceived as “deserving” versus “undeserving” of receiving government assistance.⁷ Such negative stereotypes have had disparate effects on racial groups' public opinion about social welfare policies.⁸

¹ Herbert McCloskey and John Zaller. *American Ethos: Public Attitudes toward Capitalism and Democracy*

² Hancock, Ange-Marie. *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen* (New York: New York University Press, 2004); Nicholas J.G. Winter. *Dangerous Frames: How Ideas about Race and Gender Shape Public Opinion* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008).

³ Paul M. Kellstedt. “Media Framing and the Dynamics of Racial Policy Preferences.” *American Journal of Political Science* 44(2): 245-260, 2000.

⁴ Paul M. Kellstedt. *The Mass Media and the Dynamics of American Racial Attitudes* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁵ Martin Gilens. *Why American Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Anti-Poverty Policy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999);

⁶ In other words, the way that people respond to social welfare policies, like welfare and universal health care, in more recent years has reduced support. The framing of political issues evocative of racial and gender stereotypes often further reduces support. For example, the “welfare queen” stereotype is a combination of two thoughts meant to negatively portray blacks, women, and black women. See Carly Hayden Foster. “The Welfare Queen: Race, Gender, Class, and Public Opinion.” *Race, Gender & Class* 15(3): 162-179, 2008; Winter, *Dangerous Frames: How Ideas about Race and Gender Shape Public Opinion*, 2008.

⁷ Gilens, *Why American Hate Welfare: Race, Media, and the Politics of Anti-Poverty Policy*, 1999.

⁸ Michael Hughes and Steven A. Tuch. “How Beliefs about Poverty Influence Racial Policy Attitudes: A Study of Whites, African Americans, Hispanics and Asians in the United States. In *Racialized Politics: The Debate about*

Hence, scholars have also questioned how such policies, like affirmative action, become associated solely with racial groups and not groups like women, who also can benefit from such redressive policies.⁹ Acknowledging these relationships, scholars have turned to race, and hence, racial attitudes, to study the interconnections that either being a member of a racial group or even having attitudes about racial groups can have on public policy support.

Nevertheless, whether racial prejudice or principled and ideological perspectives have more predictive power in determining, particularly, Whites' attitudes about addressing inequality has been debated within the public opinion literature, and such research questions have been largely conducted to determine Whites' mass opinions on these issues.¹⁰ Ultimately, in the conflation of racial attitudes with perceptions of policy beneficiaries, inequality becomes less of an issue to address as a societal woe and more of an issue to be explained and removed from policy redress because of perceived socially-unacceptable behaviors of the beneficiaries. Put differently, rather than addressing the social policy issue to improve societal conditions, the focus shifts to punitive, policy reforms.¹¹

Studying explanations for inequality as a focus among political elites, however, is more remote. Scholar, Ange-Marie Hancock, a political scientist, however, offers a critical analysis of the influence of political elites' discourses on shaping the "public identity" of the beneficiaries of social welfare policies. In her research, Hancock attributes opposition to welfare as a consequence of political elites' discursive distortions of poor Black women's social behaviors to shape welfare reform policies.¹² Similar elite attitudes can possibly shape other policy issues related to addressing inequality. Because elites are believed to be so

Racism in America, edited by Donald O. Sears, James Sidanius, and Lawrence Bobo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), pp. 165-190.

⁹ Donald Kinder and Lynn Donald. *Divided by Color: Racial Politics and Democratic Ideals* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996); Michael Tesler. "The Spillover of Racialization into Health Care: How President Obama Polarized Public Opinion by Racial Attitudes and Race." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3): 690-704, 2012. Michael Tesler. "The Return of Old-Fashioned Racism to White Americans' Partisan Preferences in the Obama Era." *Journal of Politics* 75(1): 110-123, 2013.

¹⁰ Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo, *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*, 1999.

¹¹ Dorothy Roberts. *Killing the Black Body: Race, Reproduction, and the Meaning of Liberty* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1997).

¹² Ange-Marie Hancock. *The Politics of Disgust: The Public Identity of the Welfare Queen* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

heavily influential in shaping mass public opinion and political discourses,¹³ examining their political attitudes is important. Thus, focusing on elite opinions about explanations for inequality, as this study does, serves as an important intervention in opinion research and the potential effects of opinions on elite agenda-setting, decision-making, and information sharing with the mass public.

Approach and Methods

Racial inequality opinion research has predominately focused on the study of mass public opinion and less so on the opinions of political elites, who are “at the table” to be able to make decisions about the scope of party platforms and represent those platforms.¹⁴ Thus, studying elite opinions about explanations for inequality becomes integral for an analysis of ideas represented in political contexts that set political agendas and act on them like the Democratic National Convention. This is why studying the Convention is important, because it comprises representation by a formal delegation (and alternates, who serve when delegates are unable) selected by the Democratic Party to make decisions at the Convention. Attendees of the Convention are also active party-goers, who are the most fervently participatory in the party’s activities at various levels of government.

In order to understand how political elites and those who have the most immediate access to the ears of those who make national party decisions think about inequality, the analysis, herein, examines the responses to a questionnaire on how people explain inequality for two groups—Black Americans and women. Both groups experience societal discrimination, which only through public policies like the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and affirmative action, have they been able to make advances in their representation in spaces where they were formerly under-represented. However, if opinions of elites turn to old-fashioned, negative stereotypes (e.g., lack of intelligence and motivation) about the continuing inequalities of these groups’ access to areas like education and employment, as opposed to more systemic explanations (e.g., racial and gender discrimination and unequal access to quality education), then the

¹³ Benjamin I. Page and Robert Y. Shapiro. *Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy Preferences* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992); John Zaller. *Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

¹⁴ Sears, Sidanius, and Bobo, *Racialized Politics: The Debate about Racism in America*, 1999.

struggle for equality for these groups may be compromised by political elites, who are resistant to seek societal and policy changes.

Similarly, attitudes about leadership for Black Americans' rights and/or women's rights groups may encourage or strain the potential for mobilizing on behalf of each group's interests. Therefore, the Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire (ERCAQ; N = 323) and its questions on explanations for racial and gender inequality serve a special purpose in our understanding the perceptions that can undergird political elites' discourses about policies, either directly or indirectly, affecting these social groups. Black Americans and women (without specification of their intersecting race) are the center of the questions and analysis for this report.

The ERCAQ asked respondents attending the 2016 Democratic National Convention. The survey consisted of questions about whether they considered differences about the socioeconomic statuses of African Americans and women to be rooted in *systemic barriers* (racial or gender discrimination; educational opportunities), *personal or cultural proclivities* (natural intelligence; will or motivation), or *leadership* (spokespersons for Black rights; spokespersons for Women's rights).

More specifically, with respect to Black Americans, the survey asked, "Studies have found that on average African Americans have worse jobs, income, and housing than white people. Do you think these differences are mainly due to [(a) discrimination; (b) educational opportunity; (c) natural intelligence; (d) will or motivation; (e) spokespersons for Black rights]?" For women, the main question was, "Studies have found that on the average women have lower paying jobs than men. Do you think these differences are mainly due to [(a) discrimination; (b) educational opportunity; (c) natural intelligence; (d) will or motivation; (e) spokespersons for Women's rights]?" Respondents were asked to consider each of the differences "a" through "e" and to comment either "yes" or "no," as far as their explaining the differences in Black Americans' and women's socioeconomic statuses.

Results

Explanations for Inequality among Black Americans: Bivariate Analysis

Turning to Table 1, which provides bivariate results of respondents' views about explanations for Black Americans' inequality, we see support for most respondents' believing in systemic barriers to this group's socioeconomic status. Overwhelmingly, respondents across several social categories attribute black inequalities to discrimination and educational opportunities in explaining the socioeconomic disparities among Blacks. Very few people consider old-fashioned, racist stereotypes about Blacks' behavior—intelligence and will or motivation (also akin to laziness), as being explanations. As far as assessments of Black leadership, it is notable that almost a quarter of the respondents feel that spokespersons for Black Americans' rights may inhibit Blacks' progress.

**Table 1: 2016 Democratic National Convention:
Explanations of Black Americans on Average Having Worse Jobs, Income, and Housing
Than White Americans**

	Discrimination	Educational Opportunity	Natural Intelligence	Will or Motivation	Spokespersons for Rights
All Respondents	94% (N=313)	91% (N=311)	3% (N=309)	17% (N=307)	18% (N=304)
American Indians	92% (N=12)	92% (N=12)	17% (N=1)	18% (N=11)	27% (N=11)
Asian Americans	95% (N=20)	89% (N=19)	0% (N=19)	11% (N=19)	15% (N=20)
Blacks	97% (N=148)	89% (N=130)	6% (N=146)	21% (N=143)	24% (N=143)
Latinos	96% (N=26)	92% (N=26)	0% (N=25)	24% (N=25)	5% (N=25)
Native Hawaiians	100% (N=2)	100% (N=2)	0% (N=1)	50% (N=2)	50% (N=2)
Whites	92% (N=98)	95% (N=99)	0% (N=99)	9% (N=100)	6% (N=96)
Millennials^a (Age 18-35)	98% (N=86)	95% (N=84)	2% (N=83)	11% (N=83)	16% (N=81)
Non-Millennials (Age 36 – 84)	92% (N=211)	89% (N=211)	4% (N=210)	18% (N=209)	18% (N=207)
Delegation^b	95% (N=188)	91% (N=187)	3% (N=185)	13% (N=186)	20% (N=182)
Attendees	94% (N=125)	92% (N=124)	3% (N=170)	22% (N=121)	16% (N=122)

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: Responses indicate “Yes” responses to each explanation for inequality. ^a The Pew Research Center defines “Millennials” as those persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b “Delegation” refers to those formally selected by the Democratic Party to make decisions at the Convention, including the delegates and those serving as alternates, when the delegates are unable to serve

Explanations for Inequality among Women: Bivariate Analysis

Table 2 indicates, across various social groups, that an overwhelming number of people view discrimination as a barrier for women in their, on average, having lower paying jobs than men. However, unlike Black Americans, people are more divided in their thinking about educational opportunities affecting women's pay differences in employment, in comparison to men's. Similar to the case of Black Americans, respondents are less likely to subscribe to old-fashioned stereotypes about women's intellect or stalled motivation to advance themselves. Nonetheless, the bivariate results elucidate possible contestation about the perceived role that access to educational opportunities may have in decreasing women's employment and incomes compared to men's.

**Table 2: 2016 Democratic National Convention:
Explanations of Women on Average Having Lower Pay Than Men**

	Discrimination	Educational Opportunity	Natural Intelligence	Will or Motivation	Spokespersons for Rights
All Respondents	96% (N=311)	53% (N=308)	2% (N=308)	7% (N=310)	16% (N=306)
Women	97% (N=169)	55% (N=168)	2% (N=169)	9% (N=170)	15% (N=167)
Men	96% (N=138)	49% (N=135)	1% (N=135)	4% (N=136)	18% (N=135)
American Indian Women	80% (N=4)	60% (N=5)	0% (N=5)	0% (N=5)	0% (N=4)
American Indian Men	100% (N=7)	71% (N=7)	0% (N=6)	0% (N=7)	43% (N=7)
Asian American Women	100% (N=9)	56% (N=9)	0% (N=9)	11% (N=9)	22% (N=9)
Asian American Men	100% (N=10)	50% (N=10)	0% (N=10)	20% (N=10)	10% (N=10)
Black Women	97% (N=88)	41% (N=87)	2% (N=87)	10% (N=88)	23% (N=88)
Black Men	95% (N=59)	42% (N=57)	2% (N=57)	0% (N=57)	18% (N=57)
Latinas	100% (N=13)	62% (N=13)	0% (N=13)	8% (N=13)	23% (N=13)
Latino Men	92% (N=13)	31% (N=13)	8% (N=12)	0% (N=13)	23% (N=13)
Native Hawaiian Men^a	100% (N=2)	100% (N=2)	0% (N=2)	50% (N=2)	50% (N=2)
White Women	98% (N=53)	74% (N=53)	2% (N=54)	9% (N=54)	0% (N=52)
White Men	96% (N=45)	57% (N=44)	0% (N=45)	4% (N=45)	9% (N=44)
Millennials^b (Age 18-35)	97% (N=86)	63% (N=84)	0% (N=83)	8% (N=84)	13% (N=82)
Non-Millennials (Age 36 – 84)	96% (N=211)	49% (N=209)	2% (N=211)	7% (N=212)	17% (N=210)
Delegation	96% (N=187)	51% (N=184)	2% (N=184)	5% (N=186)	16% (N=183)
Attendees	97% (N=124)	55% (N=124)	1% (N=124)	11% (N=124)	16% (N=123)

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: Responses indicate “Yes” responses to each explanation for inequality. ^aThere are no Native Hawaiian women in the sample. ^b “Millennials” represent persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997).

Explanations for Inequality among Black Americans: Defining the Odds

Appendix A includes results of logistic regression analyses that include controls for the several social groupings and background information about the respondents that may make a difference in how they think about Black Americans, on average, having jobs, income, and housing worse than White Americans, or hence, what can be considered racial inequality in the United States.¹⁵ The table elucidates the responses of various race-sex groups in comparison to Black men’s and Black Women’s responses on the effect of (d) will or motivation of Blacks and (e) spokespersons for Black rights.

The statistically significant results (at least 90 percent confidence level) of the logistic regressions also help us to understand the odds of believing certain explanations for black inequality. Odds ratios indicate the ratio of the odds of supporting the explanation for inequality (versus not) for one category in comparison to the same ratio for another category. For example, Table 3 shows Black women having greater odds than Black men of feeling that Black Americans lack *will or motivation* to advance (90 percent confidence, however). This translates into Black women having almost a 3 to 1 odds compared to Black men of feeling that a lack of will or motivation influences Black Americans’ inequality, compared to whites’. White women also have lower odds (.221) than Black women of believing that motivation explains Black Americans’ inequality.

¹⁵ The statistical models reported are those with statistically significant chi-square values, which offer how many chances out of 1000 that the model would be predicted if there were actually no statistical differences in the variables in the model.

**Table 3: Odds Ratios for Logistic Regression Models of Explanations for Black Americans on Average Having Worse Jobs, Income, and Housing Than White Americans
(Comparisons to Black Men and Black Women)**

	Comparison to Black Men ^b			Comparison to Black Women ^c		
	Will or Motivation	95% Confidence Interval	Spokespersons for Black Rights	95% Confidence Intervals	Spokespersons for Black Rights	95% Confidence Intervals
Non-Black and Non-White Men	3.069 (2.234)	.7367 12.78	2.028 (1.144)	.6714 6.127	4.603 (4.561)	.7128 29.72
Non-Black and Non-White Women	.2173 (.2067)	.0336 1.403	.1321** (.1289)	.0195 .8949	.6667 (.4203)	.1938 2.294
White Women	.2206 (.2220)	.0307 1.585	.3718 (.4973)	.0270 5.115	.2214** (.1536)	.0568 .8627
White Men	1.004 (.7502)	.2320 4.343	.2231* (.1814)	.0454 1.098	4.533 (4.561)	.6309 32.57
Black Women	2.955* (1.672)	.9748 8.960	1.011 (.2324)	.4132 2.474	-- ^c	-- ^c
Black Men	-- ^b	-- ^b	-- ^b	-- ^b	.3384* (.1915)	.1116 1.026
Millennials^a	.4144* (.2035)	.1583 1.085	.7549 (.3299)	.3206 1.778	4.144* (.2035)	.1583 1.085
Education	1.564** (.3371)	1.025 2.386	1.012 (.2324)	.6450 1.587	1.564** (.3371)	1.025 2.386
Income	.9810 (.0987)	.8054 1.195	1.160 (.1189)	.9487 1.418	.9810 (.0987)	.8054 1.195
Attendee (Non-Delegation)	1.867 (.7128)	.8834 3.946	.7183 (.2798)	.3347 1.541	1.867 (.7128)	.8834 3.946
Sanders Supporter	.2028** (.1589)	.0437 .9415	.5757 (.3128)	.1985 1.670	.2028** (.1589)	.0437 .9415
N =	250	250	247	247	250	247
Pseudo R²	0.132	0.132	0.128	0.128	0.132	0.128
Prob. >chi²	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: ^a“Millennials” include persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b Black men comprise the omitted category for comparing race-sex groups. ^c Black women comprise the omitted category for comparison. Statistical significance: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01. Odds ratios less than “1” indicate a decrease in odds.

In addition, as Table 3 shows us, among all respondents, if they have higher levels of education, then there is an increased belief that will or motivation influences Black progress. That is, with each unit increase in one's education, one has almost a 2 to 1 odds of believing that motivation influences Blacks' socioeconomic outcomes, when compared to whites' outcomes. Meanwhile, being a Millennial (persons age 18-35)¹⁶ or being a Sanders supporter decreases the odds of believing this old-fashioned stereotype about Blacks' motivation, compared to non-Millennials (age 36 and up) and Clinton supporters, respectively.

In questioning civil rights spokespersons' roles in black inequality, non-Black and non-White women (American Indians, Asian Americans, and Latinas) and White men have lower odds than Black men to believe that *spokespersons for Black rights* have some effect on Blacks' inequitable status. The effects of race and gender change, however, when comparing Non-Black and Non-White men to Black women. Instead, American Indian, Asian American, and Latino men have a 7 to 1 odds (compared to Black women) of believing that spokespersons for Black rights affect blacks' inequality. For White women, their odds of pointing to Black rights spokespersons as contributors to black inequality are lower (.0830) in comparison to Black women.

Explanations for Inequality among Women: Defining the Odds

As for explaining pay inequities among women (Appendix B; questions [b] educational opportunity [d] will or motivation, and [e] spokespersons for women's rights), different results emerge, with respect to the relationship between race-sex groups' perceptions about will and motivation among women. On one hand, as noted in Table 4, Non-Black and non-White men, White men, and Black women have much greater odds than Black men to ascribe to stereotypic beliefs about women's *will or motivation* in explaining their having lower paying jobs than men. On the other hand, White women have much lower odds than Black men (closer to 0) to perceive women's will or motivation as affecting women's pay.

¹⁶ Richard Fry. "Millennials Overtake Baby Boomers as America's Largest Generation." Pew Research Center, 25 April 2016. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/04/25/millennials-overtake-baby-boomers/> (May 5, 2017).

In comparison to Black women, Asian American, American Indian, and Latina women have less odds (.4475) than Black women in seeing women's will or motivation playing a role in their employment and income inequality. Black men's odds ratio of believing will or motivation being a valid explanation versus not also is much smaller than the odds ratio of Black women. Attendees of the National Convention, however, have an almost 4 to 1 odds over official delegates and alternates in believing that will or motivation affect women's employment outcomes.

White women and Millennials, moreover, have greater odds than Black men and non-Millennials, respectively, of sensing that *educational opportunities* have disparate effects for women's incomes. That is, compared to Black men, White women have a 3 to 1 odds of believing that educational opportunities interfere with women's economic outcomes, and Millennials have a 2 to 1 odds over non-Millennials in attributing educational opportunities to women's socioeconomic disparity in employment. In comparison to Black women, American Indian, Asian American, and Latina women have a 2 to 1 odds of believing that educational impediments affect women's employment and resultant lower-paying incomes, juxtaposed to men's. The odds are 5 to 1 for White women (relative to Black women) believing that impediments in educational opportunities explain women's lower-paying jobs (compared to men).

As noted in Table 2, White women (74 percent) and Black women (41 percent) have differing views about the influence of systemic barriers on women's pay disparities. Table 4 shows us that White women have greater odds than Black women of seeing the influences of educational opportunities for women on their income. Yet, comparatively, despite more White men (57 percent) reporting than Black women an acknowledgement of the role of educational opportunities in women's lower pay than men, White men have lesser odds than Black women (although with a weaker statistical relationship) of agreeing with this systemic barrier's influence.

Black men and women do not perceive differently the circumstances of women's incomes, due to their education opportunities, which is the same case for Non-Black and Non-White (American Indian, Asian American, Latino, Native Hawaiian [with no women]) men, who share Black women's perspective. However, Non-Black and Non-White women and White women have greater odds than Black women (2 to 1 and 5 to 1, respectively) of perceiving educational

opportunities affecting women's employment. Interestingly, Millennials also have almost 2 to 1 odds over non-Millennials in believing that impediments in educational opportunities affect women's income and employment inequality.

**Table 4: Odds Ratios of Logistic Regression Models of Explanations of Women on Average Having Lower Pay Than Men
(Comparisons to Black Men and Black Women)**

	Comparison to Black Men ^b				Comparison to Black Women ^c			
	Will or Motivation	95% Confidence Interval	Educational Opportunity	95% Confidence Interval	Will or Motivation	95% Confidence Interval	Educational Opportunity	95% Confidence Interval
Non-Black and Non-White Men	8.97e+07*** (7.85e+07)	1.61e+07 4.99e+08	1.172 (.5844)	.4411 3.114	-- ^d	-- ^d	.5249 (.3624)	.1357 2.031
Non-Black and Non-White Women	-19.12 ^d	-- ^d	1.905 (1.315)	.4923 7.372	.4475*** (.3918)	.0805 2.489	2.233* (1.089)	.8582 5.809
White Women	1.86e-08*** (2.57e-08)	1.24e-09 2.80e-07	3.164* (2.019)	.9057 11.05	.6931 (.4634)	.1869 2.570	5.019*** (2.299)	2.045 12.32
White Men	3.72e+07*** (4.92e+07)	2.779827 4.98e+08	1.586 (.7284)	.6450 3.901	5.37e+07 (7.42e+07)	3.577750 8.05e+08	.3161* (.2017)	.0905 1.104
Black Men	-- ^b	-- ^b	-- ^b	-- ^b	1.04e-08*** (1.05e-08)	1.43e-09 7.57e-08	.9820 (.3832)	.4570 2.110
Black Women	9.60e+07*** (9.72e+07)	1.32e+07 6.98e+08	1.018 (.3974)	.4739 2.188	-- ^c	-- ^c	-- ^c	-- ^c
Millennials^a	1.571 (.8259)	.5609 4.402	1.759* (.5472)	.9564 3.237	1.571 (.8259)	.5609 4.402	1.759* (.5472)	.9564 3.237
Education	.9035 (.2768)	.4957 1.647	.9537 (.1572)	.6903 1.318	.9035 (.2768)	.4957 1.647	.9537 (.1572)	.6903 1.318
Income	1.182 (.1666)	.8962 1.558	1.052 (.0775)	.9109 1.216	1.182 (.1666)	.8962 1.558	1.052 (.0775)	.9109 1.216
Attendee (Non-Delegation)	3.572** (1.831)	1.308 9.757	1.054 (.3054)	.5977 1.860	3.572** (1.831)	1.308 9.757	1.054 (.3054)	.5977 1.860
Sanders Supporter	1.542 (1.001)	.4320 5.505	1.016 (.3614)	.5062 2.040	1.542 (1.001)	.4320 5.505	1.016 (.3614)	.5062 2.040
N =	255	255	252	252	255	255	250	250
Pseudo R²	0.135	0.135	0.072	0.072	0.135	0.135	0.074	.074
Prob. >chi²	0.034	0.034	0.005	0.005	0.034	0.034	0.005	0.005

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: ^a “Millennials” include persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b Black men comprise the omitted category for comparing race-sex groups. ^c Black women comprise the omitted category for comparing race-sex groups. ^d Dropped from the estimation due to collinearity. Statistical Significance: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01. Odds ratios less than “1” indicate a decrease in odds.

As for how Black women and White women view differently the *spokespersons for women's rights*, as noted in Table 5, White women have much less odds (actually, 0) than Black women of perceiving women's advocates as the reason for women's disparate incomes. In fact, as Table 2 illustrates, there were no White women participating in the study (N=52), who turned to women's rights leadership as an explanation of women's inequitable employment. Alternatively, Non-Black and Non-White men have greater odds than Black women (almost 5 to 1) for centering women's employment and pay disparities in being the influence of spokespersons for women's rights.

Table 5: Odds Ratios of Logistic Regression Models of Explanations of Women on Average Having Lower Pay Than Men (Comparison to Black Women)

	Spokespersons for Women's Rights	95% Confidence Interval
Non-Black and Non-White Men	4.494* (3.888)	.8247 24.49
Non-Black and Non-White Women	.7924 (.4806)	.2413 2.602
White Women	2.26e-08*** (1.95e-08)	4.18e-09 1.22e-07
White Men	2.06e+07 ^b	-- ^b
Black Men	.4756 (.2553)	.1661 1.362
Black Women	-- ^c	-- ^c
Millennials^a	.4816 (.2393)	.1819 1.275
Education	1.334 (.3078)	.8488 2.097
Income	1.085 (.1158)	.8803 1.338
Attendee (Non-Delegation)	.8320 (.3411)	.3725 1.858
Sanders Supporter	.6395 (.3722)	.2044 2.001
N =	251	251
Pseudo R²	0.141	0.141
Prob. >chi²	0.001	0.001

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: ^a "Millennials" include persons who were "age 34 and under in the year 2015" (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b Dropped from the estimation due to collinearity. ^c Black women comprise the omitted category for comparing race-sex groups. Statistical Significance: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01. Odds ratios less than "1" indicate a decrease in odds.

Conclusion and Recommendations

What is most notable for this analysis is that the political elites surveyed all share in the perceptions of systemic barriers for Black Americans via discrimination and educational opportunities. Even support for old-fashioned racist stereotypes, which lend themselves to pathological explanations for inequality among Black Americans have very minimal subscription. However, in comparison, political elites are more divided over the role that access to educational opportunities may have in translating women's employment into lower paying jobs than men. Rather, as political elites acknowledge gender discrimination being pertinent for women's lower pay, galvanizing an American public around issues in access to education may be more cumbersome, as far as linking employment outcomes, like disparities in women's salaries.

In addition, as Black Americans comprise the largest group surveyed in the sample, it is striking to note that almost a quarter of this group's members highlight the significance of Black rights spokespersons (24 percent; N = 143) and women's rights spokespersons (23 percent Black women [N= 88]; 18 percent Black men [N=57]) in affecting inequitable outcomes for both Black Americans and women. Race-sex differences as far as will or motivation among Blacks, civil rights spokespersons, educational opportunities, and spokesperson's for women's rights, in particular, were most notable between Black women and white women. With the exception of educational opportunity as an explanation for inequality among women's job-pay, wherein White women perceived with greater odds than Black women that education access serves as a barrier for women's pay, White women had less odds than Black women in perceiving will or motivation among blacks, civil rights spokespersons for blacks, and spokespersons for women's rights as being explanations for inequality among these groups' members.

In sum, the results, herein, indicate that the political elites (e.g., delegates and attendees) at the 2016 Democratic National Convention ward themselves against subscription to old-fashioned, negatively-stereotypical assertions about Black Americans' and women's progress. However, in considering how best to lead activism related to Blacks and women, people express some concern about the role that leadership plays in stymying the progress of groups.

As political elites, themselves, this critical eye of leadership may highlight differing views about what progress and strategies toward progress may entail for these groups. Moreover, exploring why people perceive educational opportunities for women through different lenses than they do for Black Americans (despite their possible influences on socioeconomic incomes) may help political elites frame issues in ways that generate more support for addressing employment and pay inequities between women and men.

Appendix A

Logit Regression Models of Explanations of Black Americans on Average Having Worse Jobs, Income, and Housing Than White Americans

(Comparisons to Black Men and Black Women)

	Comparison to Black Men ^b		Comparison to Black Women ^c	
	Will or Motivation	Civil Rights Spokespersons	Will or Motivation	Civil Rights Spokespersons
Non-Black and Non-White Men	1.121 (.7280)	.7071 (.5641)	1.527 (.9516)	2.024** (.9762)
Non-Black and Non-White Women	-1.527 (.9516)	-2.024** (.9762)	-.4054 (.6304)	-1.317 (.8053)
White Women	-1.511 (1.006)	-.9895 (1.338)	-1.508** (.6939)	-2.489** (1.068)
White Men	.0038 (.7474)	-1.500* (.8128)	1.511 (1.006)	.9895 (1.338)
Black Women	1.084* (.5659)	.01105 (.4565)	-- ^c	-- ^c
Black Men	-- ^b	-- ^b	-1.084* (.5659)	-.0111 (.4565)
Millennials^a	-.8809* (.4910)	-.2812 (.4370)	-.8809* (.4905)	-.2812 (.4370)
Education	.4474** (.2155)	.0117 (.2297)	.4474** (.2156)	.0117 (.2297)
Income	-.0192 (.1006)	.1483 (.1025)	-.0192 (.1006)	.1483 (.1029)
Attendee (Non-Delegation)	.6243 (.3818)	-.3309 (.3896)	.6243 (.3818)	-.3309 (.3896)
Sanders Supporter	-1.596** (.7833)	-.5522 (.5434)	-1.596** (.7833)	-.5522 (.5437)
Constant	-2.722*** (.8070)	-1.650** (.7523)	-1.638** (.6699)	-1.639** (.6888)
N =	250	247	250	247
Pseudo R²	0.132	0.128	0.132	0.128
Prob. >chi²	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: Black Men represent the omitted category for comparative analyses. Standard errors are in parentheses. ^a“Millennials” include persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b Black men comprise the omitted category for comparison. ^c Black women comprise the omitted category for comparison. Statistical significance: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01

Appendix B

Logit Regression Models of Explanations of Explanations of Women on Average Having Lower Pay Than Men

(Comparisons to Black Men and Black Women)

	Comparison to Black Men ^b		Comparison to Black Women ^c		
	Will or Motivation	Educational Opportunity	Will or Motivation	Educational Opportunity	Spokespersons for Women's Rights
Non-Black and Non-White Men	18.31*** (.8755)	.1588 (.4986)	19.12*** (1.382)	-.6304 (.6907)	1.503* (.8651)
Non-Black and Non-White Women	-19.12 ^d	.6445 (.6904)	-.8041 (.8755)	.8033* (.4878)	-.2328 (.6066)
White Women	-17.80*** (1.382)	1.152* (.6382)	-.3667 (.6686)	1.613*** (.4580)	-- ^d
White Men	17.43*** (1.324)	.4614 (.4592)	17.80 ^d	-1.222* (.6467)	16.84*** (.8616)
Black Men	-- ^b	-- ^b	-18.38*** (.9024)	-.0181 (.3902)	-.7432 (.5368)
Black Women	18.38*** (1.012)	.0181 (.3902)	-- ^c	-- ^c	-- ^c
Millennials^a	.4520 (.5256)	.5650* (.3110)	.4520 (.5256)	.5650* (.3110)	-.7307 (.4969)
Education	-.1015 (.3063)	-.0474 (.1649)	-.1015 (.3063)	-.0474 (.1649)	.2883 (.2307)
Income	.1668 (.1410)	.0511 (.0737)	.1668 (.1410)	.0529 (.2896)	.0816 (.1067)
Attendee (Non-Delegation)	1.273** (.512/)	.0529 (.2896)	1.273** (.5127)	.0529 (.2896)	-.1839 (.4100)
Sanders Supporter	.4331 (.6493)	.0161 (.3556)	.4331 (.6493)	.0161 (.3556)	-.4470 (.5820)
Constant	-21.79*** (1.352)	-.7090 (.5620)	-3.406*** (1.039)	-.6908 (.5015)	-1.846*** (.7004)
N =	255	252	255	250	251
Pseudo R²	0.135	0.072	0.135	0.074	0.141
Prob. >chi²	0.034	0.005	0.034	0.005	0.001

Source: 2016 Examining Representation and Citizen Advocacy Questionnaire

Note: Black Women represent the omitted category for comparative analyses. Standard errors are in parentheses. ^a “Millennials” include persons who were “age 34 and under in the year 2015” (generally, born 1981 through 1997). ^b Black men comprise the omitted category for comparison. ^c Black women comprise the omitted category for comparison. ^d Dropped from the estimation due to collinearity. Statistical Significance: *p ≤ .10; **p ≤ .05; ***p ≤ .01

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