The Legal Landscape

Executive Order 14149: Restoring Freedom of Speech and Ending Federal Censorship

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14149 primarily seeks to underscore First Amendment speech protections.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • As stated in its introduction, the Trump Administration issued Executive Order 14149 in part motivated by claims that the “[Biden] administration trampled free speech rights by censoring Americans’ speech on online platforms, often by exerting substantial coercive pressure on third parties, such as social media companies, to moderate, deplatform, or otherwise suppress speech . . . .”[1] However, private companies largely control how content is regulated on their platforms—without direction from the federal government—because they “have a First Amendment right to control the content of their publications.”[2]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • The Supreme Court has recognized platforms’ First Amendment right to regulate content on their platforms—despite attempts by states to impose restrictions on their content moderation.[3]
  • There have also been recent challenges to who has standing (i.e., ability to bring a lawsuit) to challenge content moderation restrictions and, in 2024, the Supreme Court held that two states and five social media users did not have standing to sue executive branch officials and agencies over their claims that “the Government pressured the platforms to censor their speech in violation of the First Amendment.”[4] This decision could affect the types of plaintiffs that challenge attempts by the government to regulate platforms’ content.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14149 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14155: Withdrawing the United States from the World Health Organization

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • By statute, the U.S. can withdraw from the World Health Organization with two conditions: the U.S. (1) must give one-year notice and (2) must continue its financial obligations to the World Health Organization “in full for the Organization’s current fiscal year.”[1] Executive Order 14155 instructs the Secretary of State and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to “take appropriate measures, with all practicable speed, to . . . pause the future transfer of any United States Government funds, support, or resources to the [World Health Organization].”[2] While the Executive Order does not make clear if withdrawal with “all practicable speed” will happen before the U.S.’ obligations are paid by the end of fiscal year, if the U.S. withdraws prematurely, this could contradict federal law that sets out withdrawal procedure.[3]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • The U.S. is authorized to withdraw from the World Health Organization by statute, but it is not clear whether congressional approval is required for withdrawal or if the President can withdraw unilaterally.[4] When President Trump attempted to withdraw the U.S. from the World Health Organization in July 2020, some members of Congress introduced legislation to prevent withdrawal.[5] To date, Democrats have not yet introduced similar legislation in the 119th Congress, but there have been several bills introduced by Republicans related to the U.S.’ withdrawal from the World Health Organization including H.R. 54, which would “require[] the President to immediately withdraw the United States from the World Health Organization (WHO) and prohibit[] using any federal funds to provide for U.S. participation in the WHO,” and H.R. 401, which would “prohibit[] the United States from providing any assessed or voluntary contributions to the World Health Organization.”[6]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • We did not identify any legal precedents that could affect the enforceability of Executive Order 14155.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14155 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14156: Declaring a National Energy Emergency

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • We did not identify any existing federal laws or regulations that this Executive Order departs from, modifies, expands, or contradicts. Executive Order 14156 appears primarily to depart from prior policy positions.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Section 2 of Executive Order 14156 directs the heads of agencies to “identify and exercise any lawful emergency authorities available to them, as well as all other lawful authorities they may possess, to facilitate the identification, leasing, siting, production, transportation, refining, and generation of domestic energy resources, including, but not limited to, on Federal lands.”[1] The agencies are responsible for making an “emergency” determination under their statutory authority, and these statutes (e.g., the Defense Production Act, Endangered Species Act, Clean Water Act) set forth different criteria for declaring an emergency. Agencies will likely have discretion in determining how their emergency authority is used to carry out this Executive Order. Executive Order 14156 will also implicate the federal permitting and contracting process for energy-related activities.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • During the first Trump Administration, President Trump used emergency authority to construct funds on the US-Mexico border. There were several cases filed in response challenging President Trumps authority to do so under the National Emergencies Act and other statutory authority to try to divert funds to fund the boarder wall.[2] Notably, in July 2020, the Ninth Circuit held that 10 U.S.C. § 2808, which grants the President with emergency military construction authority, did not authorize eleven boarder wall construction projects.[3] In another 2020 case concerning the use of President Trump’s use of the National Emergencies Act, a D.C. District Court acknowledged that an agency’s finding of an emergency could be struck down as arbitrary and capricious.[4] Scholars have also argued that an agency finding of an emergency solely because an executive order directed the agency to find such an emergency may not be sufficient to comply with the underlying statute.[5]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14156 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14160: Protecting the Meaning and Value of American Citizenship

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Yes, Executive Order 14160 departs from a long-standing interpretation of the plain language of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Citizenship Clause, which says that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside.” For over 150 years, courts have interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as conferring citizenship to anyone born on U.S. territory regardless of the immigration status of the individual’s parents.[1]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • The federal government has broad power to regulate immigration. Under existing Supreme Court precedent, Congress has “plenary” power over immigration, “giving it almost complete authority to decide whether foreign nationals.”[2] The Executive Branch has the power to enforce the laws, including those related to immigration, where Congress has delegated authority to the President.[3] Section 103 of the Immigration and Nationality Act gives the Secretary of Homeland Security power to administer and enforce the statute and “all other laws relating to immigration and naturalization of aliens.”[4] The Alien Enemies Act of 1798 also gives the President power to detain and deport “alien enemies” during wartime.[5]
  • States play a more limited role in immigration enforcement than the federal government, but the federal government has delegated some authority to states related to the enforcement of immigration laws.[6] For example, Section 287(g) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 “authoriz[es] U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) to delegate to state and local law enforcement officers the authority to perform specified immigration officer functions under the agency’s direction and oversight.”[7]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • U.S. courts have said that the Constitution grants birthright citizenship since the Supreme Court’s 1898 decision in United States v. Wong Kim Ark. In Wong Kim Ark, the Supreme Court held that an individual who was born in the U.S. to parents of Chinese descent was a U.S. citizen.[8]
  • In February 2025, when granting plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction to enjoin enforcement of Executive Order 14160, a federal judge pointed to Wong Kim Ark for the constitutionality of birthright citizenship saying: “Executive Order [14160] directly conflicts with Wong Kim Ark. Under Wong Kim Ark, a person ‘born in the United States’ and ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ encompasses every person born in this country save specific classes of people. The Executive Order purports to expand the classes of people that are not ‘subject to the jurisdiction thereof’ and thus to deny citizenship by birth to people who are entitled to it under the Constitution.”[9]
  • The language of Wong Kim Ark was codified in the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which says that “a person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof” is a U.S. citizen.[10]

• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • There are several cases challenging Executive Order 14160 including[11]:
    • State of New Jersey et al v. Donald J. Trump et al., 1:25-cv-10139 (D. Mass.)
      • On April 23, 2025, the First Circuit denied appellants’ motion to intervene for “lack of a substantial question” and denied all other pending motions as moot.[12]
      • On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court held that “[u]niversal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts” and “grant[ed] the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.”[13] Here, the Supreme Court was asked whether district courts had power to impose universal relief and did not raise the question of whether Executive Order 14160 violated the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act.[14] The Supreme Court reasoned that the “issuance of a universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such power.”[15] As a result of the Court’s decision, the injunctions issued by the district courts concerning Executive Order 14160 were stayed “to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue” and “[t]he injunctions are also stayed to the extent that they prohibit executive agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about the Executive’s plans to implement the Executive Order.”[16]
    • State of Washington et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., 2:25-cv-00127-JCC (W.D. Wash.)
      • On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court held that “[u]niversal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts” and “grant[ed] the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.”[17] Here, the Supreme Court was asked whether district courts had power to impose universal relief and did not raise the question of whether Executive Order 14160 violated the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act.[18] The Supreme Court reasoned that the “issuance of a universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such power.”[19] As a result of the Court’s decision, the injunctions issued by the district courts concerning Executive Order 14160 were stayed “to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue” and “[t]he injunctions are also stayed to the extent that they prohibit executive agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about the Executive’s plans to implement the Executive Order.”[20]
    • Casa Inc., et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 8:25-cv-00201-DLB (D. Md.)
      • On June 27, 2025, the Supreme Court held that “[u]niversal injunctions likely exceed the equitable authority that Congress has given to federal courts” and “grant[ed] the Government’s applications for a partial stay of the injunctions entered below, but only to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue.”[21] Here, the Supreme Court was asked whether district courts had power to impose universal relief and did not raise the question of whether Executive Order 14160 violated the Citizenship Clause or Nationality Act.[22] The Supreme Court reasoned that the “issuance of a universal injunction can be justified only as an exercise of equitable authority, yet Congress has granted federal courts no such power.”[23] As a result of the Court’s decision, the injunctions issued by the district courts concerning Executive Order 14160 were stayed “to the extent that the injunctions are broader than necessary to provide complete relief to each plaintiff with standing to sue” and “[t]he injunctions are also stayed to the extent that they prohibit executive agencies from developing and issuing public guidance about the Executive’s plans to implement the Executive Order.”[24]
    • New Hampshire Indonesian Community Support v. Donald J. Trump, 1:25-cv-38 (D.N.H.)
      • On April 10, defendants appealed the district court’s decision granting plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.[25]
    • O. Doe; Brazilian Worker Center, Inc; La Colaborativa v. Donald J. Trump et al, 1:25-cv-10135-LTS (D. Mass.)
      • On July 3, 2025, the First Circuit considered whether there should be supplemental briefing in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. __ (2025), given the oral argument scheduled for August 1, 2025 in this case.[26] The First Circuit denied the motion and held that, “to the extent the Motion seeks the order of supplemental briefing for the purpose of securing interim relief from us as to the preliminary injunction pending our resolution of the appeal, it provides no basis for the order as it provides no basis for this court to act with respect to the provision of any such relief in the first instance.”[27] The First Circuit also remanded to the district court “for the limited purpose of enabling the District Court to consider the bearing, if any, of that guidance in CASA on the scope of the preliminary injunction in No. 25-1170 and to act accordingly.”[28]

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14162: Putting America First in International Environmental Agreements

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • No, Executive Order 14162 primarily deals with the United States’ international environmental commitments.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • In response to Executive Order 14162, state governments committed to meeting certain climate targets to try to address the void resulting from the U.S.’ withdrawal from the Paris Climate Agreement. The bipartisan United States Climate Alliance, which is a “coalition of two dozen governors representing nearly 60 percent of the U.S. economy and 55 percent of the U.S. population,” committed to “continue America’s work to achieve the goals of the Paris Agreement and slash climate pollution.”[1] On January 20, 2025, the Alliance wrote a letter to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change expressing their commitment to climate action to meet the Paris goals, underscoring their “broad authority” as states “under the U.S. Constitution to . . . advance the climate solutions we need” and that “[t]his does not change with a shift in federal administration.”[2]
  • Executive Order 14162 also does not withdraw the U.S. from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change—a 1992 treaty that was adopted “to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations ‘at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic (human-induced) interference with the climate system’”[3]—because a two-thirds vote from the Senate would likely be required to withdraw the U.S. from this treaty obligation.[4]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • We did not identify any legal precedents that could affect the enforceability of Executive Order 14162.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14162 is not currently facing legal challenges. 

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14163: Realigning the United States Refugee Admissions Program (USRAP)

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14163 likely contradicts the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), (later amended by the Refugee Act of 1980), which created a “permanent and systematic procedure” for refugee admissions and gave the president the ability to set ceilings for the number of admitted refugees (while requiring the president to consult Congress when creating admission and resettlement plans).[1] Executive Order 14163 suspends all refugee admissions under USRAP until the Secretaries of Homeland Security and State determine that the admission of refugees “under the USRAP would be in the interests of the United States.”[2]
  • The executive’s authority under Executive Order 14163 is 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f), which provides that if the President determines that “the entry of any aliens or of any class of aliens into the United States would be detrimental to the interests of the United States, he may by proclamation, and for such period as he shall deem necessary, suspend the entry of all aliens or any class of aliens as immigrants or nonimmigrants, or impose on the entry of aliens any restrictions he may deem to be appropriate.”[3] However, the blanket suspension of all refugee admissions under the USRAP does not contain any time period or other bounds, and refugee admission is paused indefinitely, to include “statutorily created programs [under the] USRAP.”[4]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Under existing Supreme Court precedent, Congress has “plenary” power over immigration, “giving it almost complete authority to decide whether foreign nationals,” to include asylum seekers and refugees, can enter into the United States.[5] Here, the Refugee Act “reflects Congress’s intent that refugee admission decisions involve both political branches, not unilateral executive action.”[6] The Refugee Act provides for an overarching legislative policy of “a permanent and systematic procedure for the admission to this country of refugees of special humanitarian concern to the United States, and . . . comprehensive and uniform provisions for the effective resettlement and absorption of those refugees who are admitted.”[7] Executive Order 14163 threatens to circumvent this congressional policy altogether by removing all procedures for admission to the United States.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • The scope of the executive branch’s power in immigration enforcement using 8 U.S.C. §§1182(f) and 1185(a) of the INA was challenged following President Trump’s 2017 “Travel Ban” Executive Order 13,769, which “placed entry restrictions on the nationals of eight foreign states.”[8] In the Travel Ban case, the Supreme Court considered the President’s authority through § 1182(f) of the INA and noted that “[the existing statutory framework] does not give the President authority to countermand Congress’s considered policy judgments.”[9] While the President did not try to “expressly override particular provisions of the INA” with the Travel Ban Executive Order, the Supreme Court suggested that there may be limits to executive action on immigration enforcement where the action “expressly override[s]” a provision of federal law (here, potentially the Refugee Act and statutorily created refugee admissions programs).[10] Furthermore, in the Travel Ban case, the Supreme Court allowed President Trump to suspend entry temporarily for certain classes of immigrants, not indefinitely, as Executive Order 14163 does.[11]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Pacito v. Trump, No. 2:25-CV-255-JNW (W.D. Wash.)
    • On April 3, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion to enforce the preliminary injunction. According to plaintiffs’ motion, a month after the preliminary injunction was granted by the court which “enjoined Defendants from enforcing their unlawful suspension of refugee processing, decisions, and admissions,” defendants “continu[ed] that suspension in full.”[12] According to plaintiffs’ motion, plaintiffs said they “will continue to suffer the significant and compounding irreparable harms that the preliminary injunction is intended to prevent” and asked the court to “order Defendants to show cause why they should not be found in violation of the first preliminary injunction and order them to restore, within five days of the Court’s order, the status quo ante litem of refugee processing and admissions.”[13]
    • On April 8, 2025, defendants filed their reply arguing that “Plaintiffs read the Ninth Circuit Stay Order too narrowly.”[14]
    • On April 11, 2025, the district court granted in part plaintiffs’ motion finding that “[t]he record shows that the Government has not complied with the First Injunction as it applies to individuals conditionally approved for refugee status before January 20, 2025.”[15] As part of the district court’s order, the judge required the parties to file a joint status report that would (1) “[i]dentify specific compliance measures that Defendants must undertake to restore ‘refugee processing, decisions, and admissions’ for individuals who were conditionally approved for refugee status by USCIS before January 20, 2025”; (2) “[p]ropose specific deadlines for each compliance measure, accounting for the Supreme Court’s guidance to show “due regard for the feasibility of any compliance timelines”; (3) “[p]ropose a reporting schedule for Defendants to provide updates to the Court on their compliance efforts”; and (4) “[a]ddress specific obstacles to compliance identified by either party.”[16] The district court also said that—until the court issues a compliance-framework order—defendants were ordered to “[i]mmediately cease implementation of any suspension of refugee processing, travel, admissions, and domestic resettlement support for individuals who were conditionally approved for refugee status by USCIS before January 20, 2025; “[i]mmediately resume processing, travel, admissions, and domestic resettlement support for individuals who were conditionally approved for refugee status by USCIS before January 20, 2025”; and “[i]mmediately cease implementation of any suspension of funding to USRAP partner agencies, including organizational Plaintiffs, as necessary to facilitate compliance with the Court’s orders.”[17]
    • On April 21, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued an order clarifying the first preliminary injunction, saying that “[t]he preliminary injunction remain[ed] in effect for these individuals only, and the government must resume their processing, facilitation of travel to the United States, admission, and provision of resettlement benefits after admission.”[18] The Ninth Circuit stayed the preliminary injunction in all other respects.[19]
    • On April 28, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss the first supplemental complaint.[20]
    • On May 5, 2025, the district court judge issued its compliance framework order, which outlined several steps the government must take to comply with the court’s order, set forth reporting requirements, and outlined the procedure for addressing feasibility concerns.[21]
    • On May 9, 2025, the Ninth Circuit issued an order which “clarified that the limited carveout from the stay “should be interpreted narrowly, on a case-by-case basis, so to apply to individuals with a strong reliance interest arising prior to January 20, 2025, comparable to Plaintiff Pacito.”[22] On May 15, 2025, the district court judge rescinded the compliance framework order in light of the Ninth Circuit’s clarification order.[23]
  • United States Conf. of Cath. Bishops v. U.S. Dep’t of State, No. 1:25-CV-00465 (TNM) (D.D.C.)
    • On April 21, 2025, defendants filed a motion to dismiss arguing that the government had not waived sovereign immunity, plaintiff’s claim was essentially a contract claim, and that plaintiff’s claims are moot.[24]
    • On April 24, 2025, plaintiffs moved to dismiss the appeal and, on May 2, 2025, the DC Circuit Court of Appeals granted the motion.[25]
    • The court has not yet ruled on defendant’s motion to dismiss.[26]

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14164: Restoring the Death Penalty and Protecting Public Safety

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • The U.S. has a federal death penalty that allows the federal government to seek the death penalty for a list of federal crimes.[1] While the Biden Administration issued a moratorium on carrying out federal death sentencings, Executive Order 14164 instructs the U.S. Attorney General to “pursue the death penalty for all crimes of a severity demanding its use.”[2] Executive Order 14164 also instructs the U.S. Attorney General to seek the death penalty, “where consistent with applicable law,” for “every federal capital crime involving (i) [t]he murder of a law-enforcement officer; or (ii) [a] capital crime committed by an alien illegally present in this country.”[3]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Each state has its own legislation related to the death penalty. Currently, 23 states have abolished the death penalty, while 27 states still have the death penalty.[4] However, even in states that have abolished the death penalty, the federal government can seek the death penalty for individuals convicted of federal crimes that permit a death penalty sentence.[5]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • While Executive Order 14164 directs the Attorney General to “take all appropriate action to seek the overruling of Supreme Court precedents that limit the authority of state and federal governments to impose capital punishment,” there are several Supreme Court precedents that impose constitutional limits on the death penalty. Notably:
    • In 1972, the Supreme Court held in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), that Georgia’s death penalty scheme violated the Eighth Amendment as cruel and unusual punishment because it gave juries “complete sentencing discretion” over whether to issue the death penalty, which could lead to “arbitrary sentencing.”[6] This decision “effectively voided 40 death penalty statutes” (but many states subsequently rewrote their death penalty statutes to address the issues identified in Furman).[7]
    • In 2002, the Supreme Court in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), held that sentencing intellectually disabled individuals to death was unconstitutional cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.[8]
    • In 2005, the Supreme Court held in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments prohibited sentencing to death individuals who were convicted of crimes that occurred when they were under age 18.[9]
  • Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
    • Executive Order 14164 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14168: Defending Women from Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • We did not identify any existing federal laws or regulations that this Executive Order departs from, modifies, expands, or contradicts. Executive Order 14168 appears primarily to depart from prior policy positions.[1]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Executive Order 14168 applies only to federal agencies, not private employers. The executive branch has broad latitude and discretion over federal agencies, provided it is not directing agencies to engage in unconstitutional or otherwise illegal activity.
  • Executive Order 14168 indicates that the White House will draft “proposed bill text to codify the definitions in this order,” indicating that the executive branch agrees that the underpinning authority comes from Congress. Congress may or may not agree to bring up such a bill for debate and vote.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In 2020, the Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County that an employer violates Title VII of the Civil Rights Act “when it intentionally fires an individual employee based in part on sex.”[2] Executive Order 14168 directs the Attorney General to “issue guidance to agencies to correct the misapplication of the Supreme Court’s decision” in Bostock.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges? [3]
  • Doe v. McHenry, 1:25-CV-286-RCL (D.D.C. Feb. 4, 2025)
    • On January 30, 2024, three transgender women in prison sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14168’s provisions requiring Plaintiffs to be moved into a men’s facility and cease any medical procedures related to gender dysphoria violate the Eighth Amendment, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, and the Administrative Procedure Act.
    • On February 4, 2025, a District Court granted Plaintiff’s motion for a temporary restraining order on the “narrow” grounds of plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment claim.[4] The Court noted that, for the Eighth Amendment claim to proceed, “the plaintiff must be confronted with an ‘objectively intolerable risk of harm,’ and prison officials must knowingly or recklessly subject the plaintiff to such a known risk” and, here, Plaintiffs successfully showed they were likely to succeed with their argument that transgender inmates are at a higher risk of physical and sexual violence when housed in facilities of the opposite gender, and that the government was aware of this heightened risk.[5]
    • The Court declined to grant the temporary restraining order on the plaintiff’s other grounds, noting that the government “may be correct that [the Prison Litigation Reform Act] foreclose[s] any APA challenges to facility designations and transfer decisions.”[6] The Court said that, while the Bureau of Prisons has significant discretion in creating policies, including as related to transgender inmates, the transfer and restriction of hormonal treatments was not a policy created by the Bureau because it was ordered by the Executive Branch.[7]
    • On February 18, 2025, the Court granted a preliminary injunction on the same grounds as the temporary restraining order.[8] Plaintiffs then moved to amend their complaint to add additional plaintiffs and seek the injunction on behalf of those additional individuals; the motions were granted.
  • Maria Moe v. Donald Trump, et al., 1:25-cv-10195 (D. Mass. January 26, 2025)
    • On January 26, 2025, a transgender woman in the custody of the federal Bureau of Prisons, who received hormone therapy and was housed in a female prison, sued the Trump Administration arguing that, under Executive Order 14168, she was unlawfully transferred to a male prison.[9] That same day, the District Court granted Plaintiff a temporary restraining order, directing the prison officials to continue Plaintiff’s hormone treatment and not transfer her to the male facility.[10] On February 7, the Court transferred the case to the District Court for the district where the Plaintiff is presently confined.[11]
  • Orr v. Trump, 1:25-CV-10313-JEK (D. Mass. Mar. 18, 2025)
    • On February 7, 2025, seven transgender and nonbinary individuals sued the Trump Administration over Executive Order 14168’s provision directing the Secretary of State to limit U.S. passport sex designations options to “male” and “female”. Plaintiffs argued that Executive Order 14168 violates Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the Fifth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment’s right to travel, the Fifth Amendment’s right to privacy, and the First Amendment’s freedom of speech.[12] Plaintiffs argued that the passport restriction is unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of sex, and is depriving plaintiffs and transgender individuals the freedom of movement and travel into and outside of the United States.[13] Plaintiffs further argued that Executive Order 14168 violated the Administrative Procedure Act, as an arbitrary and capricious action. Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction enjoining the passport provision of the Order, which has not yet been ruled on.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14170: Reforming the Federal Hiring Process and Restoring Merit to Government Service

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • No, but Executive Order 14170 directs the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Director of the Office of Personnel Management, and the Administrator of the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) to review and potentially revise prior practices regarding federal employee hiring processes, including DEI hiring initiatives and considerations.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • While the executive branch has broad authority and discretion over its internal hiring practices, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance”[1], is still in effect and “likely would cover the vast majority of [employment discrimination] actions, except a[n employment] transfer that did not result in any harm to the employee.”[2]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14170 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14173: Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14173 revokes Executive Order 11246, which was a civil-rights era executive order that aimed to “enforce federal civil rights laws ‘for the benefit of all Americans’ . . . [by] establishing antidiscrimination requirements for federal contractors and subcontractors and in the administration of federally assisted construction contracts.”[1] Executive Order 11246 required federal contractors to, among other things, not discriminate against employees or applicants on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, sexual orientation, gender identity, or national origin.[2] Executive Order 11246 was in place for over 60 years before the Trump Administration rescinded it, and was enforced by the Department of Labor through its Office of Federal Contract Compliance Programs branch.[3]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance,”[4] is still in effect and “likely would cover the vast majority of [employment discrimination] actions, except a[n employment] transfer that did not result in any harm to the employee.”[5] Title VII also only covers employers with more than 15 employees, but there are also state laws that may have more expansive antidiscrimination protections.[6]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In 2019, the Supreme Court held in Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2019) that Title VII also prohibits an employer from discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation.[7] Certain labor laws, such as the National Labor Relations Act, may also protect employees who discuss compensation in some situations.[8]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Nat’l Assoc. of Diversity Officers in Higher Ed. et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., 1:25-cv-00333-ABA (D. Md.)
    • On March 14, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a motion to vacate the court’s preliminary injunction.[9] Plaintiffs said they “continue to believe that this Court’s Preliminary Injunction is well reasoned and correct” but said that “having all relief stayed pending appeal will contribute to the ongoing and escalating irreparable harm they and many others similarly situated are facing.”[10] Plaintiffs also said they “intend to seek additional relief based on developments that have occurred since the motion for preliminary injunction was filed on February 13, 2025.”[11] Specifically, plaintiffs said that “information about agencies’ reliance on the savings clause provisions in the Executive Orders and details about the Orders’ implementation was simply not available when the Orders were signed two months ago.”[12]
    • On May 1, 2025, the court denied Plaintiffs’ motion holding that “the Court concludes that Plaintiffs have not met their burden under Rule 59(e) to show that vacatur of the preliminary injunction is appropriate” because “Plaintiffs have not come forward with the type of new evidence or new claims that would justify vacatur of the preliminary injunction.”[13]
    • On May 7, 2025, plaintiff Restaurant Opportunities Center voluntarily dismissed their claims in full against all defendants; “the claims asserted by Plaintiffs National Association of Diversity Officers in Higher Education, American Association of University Professors, and Mayor and City of Baltimore [were] not dismissed.”[14]
  • National Urban League v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00471 (D.D.C.)
    • On May 2, 2025, the judge denied plaintiffs’ request for a preliminary injunction.[15] According to the court, plaintiffs fail to establish standing for half of the challenged provisions and, for the remaining provisions, the court said that “Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims falter for various reasons.”[16] With respect to the Fifth Amendment claim, the court said that “[p]laintiffs have failed to show that they are likely to succeed on their due-process challenge to the provisions for which they likely have standing” as “[t]hey have not identified a protected property or liberty interest that these provisions threaten[, n]or have they shown that the fair notice and arbitrary-enforcement concerns underlying the vagueness doctrine likely render these provisions unconstitutional, particularly because the provisions address how the government funds and contracts with entities rather than when it imposes civil or criminal liability.”[17] With respect to their First Amendment claim, the court said that plaintiffs “have not articulated how the provisions, taken together, create a profound chilling effect on their protected speech.”[18]

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14190: Ending Radical Indoctrination in K-12 Schooling

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14190 potentially modifies who can receive federal funding by requiring the Secretaries of Education, Defense, and Health and Human Services to recommend a strategy to eliminate federal funds for educational programs that promote “anti-American, subversive, harmful and false ideologies,” including resources based on “gender ideology” and “discriminatory equity ideology.”[1] Executive Order 14190 also potentially expands offensive legal action against K-12 educators who may “unlawfully facilitat[e] the social transition of a minor student.”[2]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • States generally regulate K-12 educational institutions and programs and direct curricula, although many institutions and programs rely upon federal funding in some capacity. Executive Order 14190 sets up a potential challenge testing the limits between state and federal authority. Notably:
    • The split between state and federal authority in the context of K-12 education and curriculum is codified in statute, and the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act, amended by the Every Student Succeeds Act says that “[n]o officer or employee of the Federal Government shall, through grants, contracts, or other cooperative agreements, mandate, direct, or control a State, local educational agency, or school’s specific instructional content, academic standards and assessments, curricula, or program of instruction developed and implemented to meet the requirements of this chapter.”[3]
    • The Department of Education Organization Act states that “no provision of a program administered by the Secretary [of Education] or by any other officer of the Department [of Education] shall be construed to authorize the Secretary or any such officer to exercise any direction, supervision, or control over the curriculum, program of instruction, administration, or personnel.”[4] Certain commentators have speculated that Executive Order 14190 may be considered such an exercise of direction, supervision, or control over educational curriculum and programming, which would be inconsistent with the Department of Education Organization Act and inconsistent with applicable state law regarding education.[5] States with laws codifying protections in K-12 institutions based upon gender, for example, may come into conflict with this Order, which could trigger litigation over whether the Order preempts inconsistent state law.
  • Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
    • Executive Order 14190 arguably impinges upon the First Amendment right to free speech.[6] This Executive Order instructs directed agencies (1) provide strategy for and reports relating to eliminating federal funding for “discriminatory . . . indoctrination” (including based on “gender ideology” and “discriminatory equity ideology”) in K-12 schools; (2) work with state officials to enforce the law and file action against school officials and teachers who, for example, unlawfully facilitate the “social transition” of minor students; and (3) prioritize funding for “patriotic education.”[7] Executive Order 14190 is already being implemented, including by the K-12 educational institutions that are run by the Department of Defense.
    • Courts have long agreed that the First Amendment extends onto school grounds to provide protection to students’ and teachers’ free speech rights.[8] Notably, the Supreme Court explained that an inherent corollary of the rights of free speech is the right to receive information and ideas.[9] This right flows both from the sender’s First Amendment right to send ideas and the recipient’s right to receive them in order to meaningfully exercise their own rights of speech.[10] This is particularly important in the context of schools: students must remain free to inquire, to study and to evaluate, and to gain new maturity and understanding.[11]
    • Limiting speech, expression, and dissemination of information/ideas in a manner that restricts certain viewpoints is “the most blatant and egregious form” of a First Amendment violation.[12]

• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14190 has not been directly challenged yet. However, on March 10, 2025, eight states sued the Department of Education for “arbitrarily terminat[ing] all grants previously awarded under the Teacher Quality Partnership . . . Program and the Supporting Effective Educator Development . . . Grant Program in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act.”[13] The states alleged that the Department took the actions in part as a result of Executive Order 14190, which directed the Department of Education to develop a plan to eliminate federal funding for “illegal and discriminatory treatment and indoctrination in K-12 schools.”[14]
  • On March 10, 2025, the states’ motion for a temporary restraining order was granted.[15] Plaintiffs sought an extension to the temporary restraining order, while the government sought a stay pending appeal. Defendants ultimately appealed the temporary restraining order to the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court granted a stay pending appeal on April 4, 2025, indicating that the case itself may need to be pursued in the Court of Federal Claims.[16]

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14191: Expanding Educational Freedom and Opportunity for Families

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • No, school vouchers have largely been regulated at the state level to date.[1]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • While Executive Order 14191 says that the Secretary of Education will issue guidance for states regarding “how States can use Federal formula funds to support K-12 educational choice initiatives,” states will still control how funds are spent. States also have varying programs regarding school choice, including programs for tax-credit scholarships, vouchers, and direct tax credits.[2]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • Yes, there have been a number of cases about school vouchers, both on the federal and state levels. Notably:
    • In 2002, the Supreme Court held in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), that vouchers could be used for both religious-affiliated and non-religious-affiliated schools.[3]
    • In 2020, the Supreme Court held in Espinoza v. Montana Department of Revenue, 591 U.S. __ (2020), that rule issued by the Montana Department of Revenue prohibiting families from using scholarships for private school tuition at religious schools was unconstitutional and in violation of the Free Exercise Clause, which “protects religious observers against unequal treatment,” because the rule “does not zero in on any essentially religious course of instruction but rather bars aid to a religious school ‘simply because of what it is’— a religious school” and the rule did not satisfy strict scrutiny review.[4]
  • Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
    • Executive Order 14191 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14206: Protecting Second Amendment Rights

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14206 directs the U.S. Attorney General to “examine all orders, regulations, guidance, plans, international agreements, and other actions of executive departments and agencies (agencies) to assess any ongoing infringements of the Second Amendment,” including the Biden Administration’s rules, regulations, plans, orders, and reports related to firearms.[1] The primary implication for existing federal laws and regulations related is whether the gov’t will abandoning its defense of certain firearm-related lawsuits.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Guns are regulated both on the federal and state levels. Key federal gun laws cannot be repealed by the executive without congressional action. Guns are also regulated on the state level, and many of these state regulations have been the subject of legal challenges that subsequently have shaped the scope of the Second Amendment.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • Under existing Supreme Court precedent, “modern firearm regulations that burden the right to keep and bear arms are constitutional only where they are consistent with history and tradition.”[2] The historical record must be presented by the parties and “the government, not the challenger, bears the burden of showing historical analogues that are relevantly similar to the modern regulation.”[3]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14206 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 4/17

Executive Order 14151: Ending Radical and Wasteful Government DEI Programs and Preferencing

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14151 directs federal agencies to end “illegal DEI and ‘diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility’ (DEIA) mandates, policies, programs, preferences, and activities in the Federal Government, under whatever name they appear,” without defining those terms.[1] By asserting there is “illegal DEI” without defining exactly what the Trump Administration views as “illegal,” the extent to which Executive Order 14151 departs from, modifies, expands, or contradicts existing laws or regulations is not yet clear.
  • Executive Order 14151 directs the Office of Management and Budget to terminate all DEI-related grants and federal funding, which could contradict current federal funding requirements depending how the Trump Administration chooses to apply the Executive Order.[2]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which “prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, and national origin in programs and activities receiving federal financial assistance,”[3] is still in effect and “likely would cover the vast majority of [employment discrimination] actions related to recipients of federal grants and funding, except a[n employment] transfer that did not result in any harm to the employee.”[4] Title VII also only covers employers with more than 15 employees, but there are also state laws that may have more expansive antidiscrimination protections.[5] Notably, Title VII also applies to the federal government as an employer.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • During the first Trump Administration, a group of nonprofits providing certain healthcare services to the LGBTQ+ community challenged Executive Order 13950, which targeted federal contractors who were given DEI trainings, stating that federal dollars would not support “divisive, un-American propaganda training sessions.”[6] Plaintiffs argued Executive Order 13950 was unconstitutional under the First and Fifth Amendments because it “impermissibly chill[ed] the exercise of the Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected speech based on the content and viewpoint of their speech,” infringed on Plaintiffs’ constitutionally protected right to free speech, and provided inadequate notice of the conduct it purports to prohibit.[7] Plaintiffs sought, and were granted, a nationwide preliminary injunction, although the scope of the preliminary injunction was limited to the provisions of the Executive Order that applied to federal contractors and grantees.[8] Similar claims have been made in litigation that Executive Order 14151 is so vague that it is unclear what conduct the order actually prohibits or criminalizes.[9]
  • In Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Treasury Dep’t, a political advocacy group challenged the Department of Treasury, related to a Bush Administration executive order that delegated authority to the Secretary of the Treasury to designate certain people and organizations as terrorists, and prohibited providing services to people and organizations who were “otherwise associated” with terrorists, which plaintiffs argued was unconstitutionally vague.[10]
    • The Ninth Circuit found that the challenged executive order was “neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad, on its face or as applied.”[11] However, this executive order included examples for the allegedly vague terminology, which the Ninth Circuit found persuasive and distinctive.[12] On the other hand, Executive Order 14151 does not provide examples of what the Trump Administration may consider illegal (but more clarifying examples may be provided in subsequent guidance from the Administration).
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?[13]
  • Nat’l Assoc. of Diversity Officers in Higher Ed. et al. v. Donald J. Trump et al., 1:25-cv-00333-ABA (D. Md. Feb. 23, 2025)
    • On February 3, 2025, organizations representing diversity officers and education professionals sued the Trump Administration arguing that, along with Executive Order 14173, Executive Order 14151 violates (1) the spending clause because “[t]he Constitution gives neither the President nor his subordinate executive branch officials authority to unilaterally terminate “‘equity-related’ grants and contracts” without express statutory authority” and (2) Fifth Amendment due process because it “fails to provide a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is prohibited and is so standardless that it authorizes or encourages seriously discriminatory enforcement.”[14] The court noted that Executive Order 14151 was vaguely drafted such that it creates a “very real possibility of arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement—both between and within executive agencies.”[15]
    • On February 21, a federal judge granted a preliminary injunction on plaintiffs’ First and Fifth Amendment claims, enjoining the Trump Administration from pausing, freezing, impeding, blocking, cancelling, or terminating any awards, contracts, or obligations on the basis of Executive Order 14151’s instruction to terminate “equity-related” grants or contracts.[16]
    • On February 24, the Trump Administration appealed to the Fourth Circuit and, on March 14, the Fourth Circuit granted the Trump Administration’s petition for stay of preliminary injunction pending appeal.[17]
  • National Urban League v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00471 (D.D.C. February 19, 2025)
    • On February 19, 2025, three nonprofits that identify as “committed to principles of diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility” sued the Trump Administration challenging Executive Orders 14151 “Ending Radical and Wasteful DEI Programs and Preferencing,” 14168 “Defending Women From Gender Ideology Extremism and Restoring Biological Truth to the Federal Government,” and 14173 “Ending Illegal Discrimination and Restoring Merit-Based Opportunity.”[18] Plaintiffs argued that the three Executive Orders violate their First Amendment rights by, among other things, “impermissibly burden[ing] and chill[ing] Plaintiffs’ exercise of constitutionally protected speech,” their Fifth Amendment rights because, among other things, the vagueness of the Executive Orders “fail[s] to provide reasonable and adequate notice as to which speech, advocacy, and activities may or may not be permitted,” the Equal Protection Clause, and that the Executive Orders “usurp” Congress’ legislative authority “by unilaterally terminating or modifying federal grants and contracts without congressional authorization for such actions.”[19] The court has not yet ruled on plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction.[20]
  • Doe v. U.S. Office of the Director for National Intelligence, 1:25-cv-00300 (E.D. Va. Feb. 17, 2025)
    • On February 17, 2025, group of civil servant employees of the Office of the Director for National Intelligence and Central Intelligence Agency sued their employers over Executive Order 14151, alleging that they were unlawfully placed on leave because of their “temporary assignments to personnel functions involving DEIA.”[21] Ultimately, plaintiffs’ arguments did not challenge the underlying merits of Executive Order 14151, but rather its application against them as career intelligence officials rather than “career DEIA officials.”[22]
  • San Francisco AIDS Foundation et al v. Trump, 3:25-cv-1824 (D.D.C. February 20, 2025)
    • On February 20, 2025, a group of nonprofits who promote LGBTQ+ policies and interests sued the Trump Administration over Executive Orders 14151, 14168, and 14173, arguing that the three Executive Orders (1) violate the First Amendment, (2) violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, (3) are ultra vires and beyond the President’s power, and (4) violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.[23] Plaintiffs seek to enjoin enforcement of all three Executive Orders.[24] As of the date of this memorandum, the court has not yet ruled on the matter.

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14154: Unleashing American Energy

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14154 revokes Carter-era Executive Order 11991, “Relating to protection and enhancement of environmental quality.”[1] In place since May 1977, Executive Order 11991 directed the Council on Environmental Quality to issue regulations to federal agencies for the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 including “procedures (1) for the early preparation of environmental impact statements, and (2) for the referral to the Council of conflicts between agencies concerning the implementation of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, as amended, and Section 309 of the Clean Air Act.”[2] Executive Order 14154 instructs the Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality to “propose rescinding CEQ’s NEPA regulations” within 30 days of January 20, 2025.[3]
  • Executive Order 14154 instructs all agencies to “adhere to only the relevant legislated requirements for environmental considerations and any considerations beyond these requirements are eliminated,” “strictly use the most robust methodologies of assessment at their disposal[,] and [to] not use methodologies that are arbitrary or ideologically motivated.”[4]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • While Executive Order 14154 instructs “[a]ll agencies [to] immediately pause the disbursement of funds appropriated through the Inflation Reduction Act of 2022 (Public Law 117-169) or the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (Public Law 117-58),” on January 21, 2025, the Office of Management and Budget has clarified that “[a]gency heads may disburse funds as they deem necessary after consulting with the Office of Management and Budget.”[5]
  • Executive Order 14154 “does not impact the $270bn in tax credits that make up the bulk of the funding that is available through the IRA” because the President is “unable to reform the tax credits or repeal the act without approval from Congress.”[6]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In January, a federal judge entered a temporary restraining order instructing the Trump Administration to “not pause, freeze, impede, block, cancel, or terminate Defendants’ compliance with awards and obligations to provide federal financial assistance to the States, and Defendants shall not impede the States’ access to such awards and obligations, except on the basis of the applicable authorizing statutes, regulations, and terms.”[7]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Butterbee Farms v. USDA, Case No. 125-cv-0737 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2025)
    • On March 13, 2025, a group of organizations that do environmental-related work sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14154 (1) exceeds the President’s authority by “directing agencies to withhold federal funding based on factors that are impermissible and arbitrary under the governing statutes”; (2) violates the Take Care Clause of the Constitution “[b]y freezing funding appropriated by Congress in the IRA and lawfully obligated to Plaintiffs without regard to statutes, regulations, and terms governing that funding”; (3) violates the Administrative Procedure Act by “refus[ing] to disburse those funds, implementing a categorical freeze on obligated funds appropriated by the [Inflation Reduction Act] regarding violation of statutes, regulation, and terms governing that funding”; and (4) violates the Administrative Procedure Act because the Trump Administration’s “refusal to disburse obligated funds is arbitrary and capricious” because the Administration “provided no reasoned basis for halting the payment of obligated funds to grant recipients without considering the consequences of those actions.”[8]

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14235: Restoring Public Service Loan Forgiveness

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14235 primarily seeks to narrow the scope of eligibility within the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program and eligibility.[1] The PSLF program was established under the College Cost Reduction and Access Act of 2007[2] and the Department of Education has issued regulations to carry out PSLF that, among other things, define “borrower eligibility” and qualifying employers.”[3] The order directs the Secretary of Education to “propose revisions” to the regulations related to PSLF, and the Department of Education has said that Executive Order 14235 will “restore the PSLF program to its statutory basis.”[4]
  • Executive Order 14235 directs the Secretary of Education to propose amendments to the existing PSLF regulations “that ensure the definition of ‘public service’ excludes organizations that engage in activities that have a substantial illegal purpose.”[5] PSLF currently defines eligible borrowers as those who work in fields such as law enforcement, education or social services, and those who work for nonprofits with 501(c)(3) status.[6] Until Secretary of Education Linda McMahon proposes such amendments, it is not clear to what extent the Order will depart from, modify, expand, or contradict existing federal laws or regulations, including the PSLF. The Department of Education has not yet made any changes to PSLF and its existing guidance states that “[t]here are no changes to PSLF currently.”[7]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Executive Order 14235 does not immediately change the PSLF program but instead initiates an often-lengthy rulemaking process, and “any new regulation that started this year would usually not take effect until 2027” at the earliest.[8]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14235 is not currently facing legal challenges.[9]

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14238: Continuing the Reduction of the Federal Bureaucracy

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Each of the seven federal entities identified in Executive Order 14238 were created by federal statute.[1] Executive Order 14238 says that the “non-statutory components and functions of the following governmental entities shall be eliminated to the maximum extent consistent with applicable law, and such entities shall reduce the performance of their statutory functions and associated personnel to the minimum presence and function required by law.”[2] On its face, Executive Order 14238 does not contradict existing federal law because it seeks to reduce the seven government entities to the minimum that is required by law, but the Executive Order seeks to eliminate or remove non-statutory aspects of these entities, which could include existing federal regulations implementing the statutes establishing these entities.
  • Executive Order 14238 is written such that the agency reductions occur within the boundaries of “applicable law.”[3] While statutes authorize the creation and existence of these entities, there is generally flexibility in the scope and operations of the entities, and the Executive Order appears to capitalize on that flexibility in directing the reduction of operations, but not outright elimination of the agencies.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Executive Order 14238 is written to such that the agency reductions occur within the boundaries of “applicable law,” however, the execution of the Order may raise questions if statutorily required functions of the entities are eliminated.
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In 2017, during the first Trump Administration, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) attempted to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program, which President Obama established through executive action in 2012.[4] The case progressed to the Supreme Court, where the Court held that the method of recession of DACA was arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act.[5] The Court noted that DHS could rescind DACA, but the issue lied in how it chose to rescind DACA, which was through memoranda that did not adequately justify the Department’s actions.[6] Here, the Supreme Court said that an “agency must defend its actions based on the reasons it gave when it acted.”[7]
    • The opinion in Regents may serve as relevant precedent relating to the implementation of Executive Order 14238 if the non-statutorily mandated programs and activities that have been rescinded under the Executive Order were done in a manner that is arbitrary and capricious.
  • Lawsuits challenging other executive orders issued by President Trump, which seek to eliminate or reduce responsibilities of federal agencies or entities, are pending against many of these actions, and depending on their outcomes, may serve as other relevant precedent related to the enforcement of Executive Order 14238.[8]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • State of Rhode Island, et al. v. Trump et al., 1:25CV00128 (D. R.I. Apr. 4, 2024)
    • On April 4, 2024, twenty-one states attorneys general sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14238 violated the Administrative Procedure Act because the Executive Order on “its face directs the agencies to engage in arbitrary and capricious actions by requiring them to eliminate discretionary functions and reduce to the minimum their statutory functions” and the agencies’ actions implementing the Executive Order are invalid because they did not follow notice and comment procedures.[9] Plaintiffs also argued that the Trump Administration violated the Appropriations Clause because “Defendants’ unilateral executive action to decline to expend [congressionally] appropriated funds . . . infringes on Congress’s appropriations power and is unconstitutional,” the separation of powers because “where Congress has created the Defendant Agencies and the programs they administer, the Executive cannot do away with the Agencies or effectively incapacitate their ability to administer appropriated grants or carry out statutorily assigned duties,” and the Take Care Clause because “[b]y dismantling the Defendant Agencies and the programs they administer, which are creatures of Congress, the Executive has failed to faithfully execute the laws enacted by Congress in violation of the Take Care Clause.”[10]
      • For example, plaintiffs described the grant program run by the Institute of Museum and Library Services (IMLS), which operates on a five-year cycle.[11] Every state and D.C. receives grants from IMLS, which support state libraries and related operations.[12] Plaintiffs argued that their millions of dollars of grants were suspended with the winddown of the agencies, which state and local libraries rely on to operate.[13]
  • American Library Ass’n v. Sonderling, 2025 WL 1062669 (D.D.C. Apr. 7, 2025)
    • On April 7, 2025, a group of nonprofits promoting library services sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14238 violates the Constitution’s Take Care Clause and separation of powers protections because it eliminated the IMLS through unilateral executive branch action in violation of Congress’ mandate that the organizations exist and be funded.[14] Plaintiffs further argued that Executive Order 14238 violates the First Amendment and the Administrative Procedure Act as arbitrary and capricious, the Impoundment Control Act, the Appropriations Act, and the statute which established IMLS as an independent agency.[15]

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14241: Immediate Measures to Increase American Mineral Production

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • The Secretary of Energy has the power to designate “any mineral, element, substance, or material” as a “critical mineral” (with some exceptions).[1] Executive Order 14241 does not expand 30 U.S.C. § 1606(a)(3)—because the Secretary of Energy has the authority to designate “critical minerals” under the statute—but does expand the list of what was considered a “critical mineral” under the Biden Administration to include uranium, copper, potash, and gold.[2]
    • Executive Order 14241 also gives the Chair of the National Energy Dominance Council the power to designate “any other element, compound or material” as a critical mineral.[3] While coal is not yet included on this list, the White House’s fact sheet related to Executive Order 14241 suggests the definition of “critical mineral” may be expanded to include coal in the future.[4]
  • Executive Order 14241 “waive[s] the requirements of 50 U.S.C. 4533(a)(1) through (a)(6)” to “address the national emergency declared pursuant to Executive Order 14156 of January 20, 2025 (Declaring a National Energy Emergency).”[5] Among other things, Executive Order 14241 waives:
    • Section 4533(a)(5), which says President cannot “execute a contract under this subsection unless the President, on a non-delegable basis, determines, with appropriate explanatory material and in writing, that[] (A) the industrial resource, material, or critical technology item is essential to the national defense; (B) without Presidential action under this section, United States industry cannot reasonably be expected to provide the capability for the needed industrial resource, material, or critical technology item in a timely manner; and (C) purchases, purchase commitments, or other action pursuant to this section are the most cost effective, expedient, and practical alternative method for meeting the need.”[6]
    • Section 4533(a)(6), which says the President must provide written notice to Congress “of a domestic industrial base shortfall prior to taking action under this subsection to remedy the shortfall” except during a period of national emergency declared by Congress or the President or if the President determines that the “action is necessary to avert an industrial resource or critical technology item shortfall that would severely impair national defense capability.”[7]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Executive Order 14241 also sets aggressive timelines as part of the implementation of the Executive Order, so enforcement will depend in part on whether and the speed at which these timelines are met.[8]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No apparent legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14241 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14242: Improving Education Outcomes by Empowering Parents, States, and Communities

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • The Department of Education was established when President Jimmy Carter signed the Department of Education Organization Act, which was signed into law on October 17, 1979.[1] Per the purpose of the Act, “Congress declares that the establishment of a Department of Education is in the public interest, will promote the general welfare of the United States, will help ensure that education issues receive proper treatment at the Federal level, and will enable the Federal Government to coordinate its education activities more effectively.”[2] Executive Order 14242 instructs the Secretary of Education to “take all necessary steps to facilitate the closure of the Department of Education” but caveats that this should be done “to the maximum extent appropriate and permitted by law.”[3] At a high level, congressional action would be needed to eliminate the Department of Education.[4]
  • Under existing law, there are limits to what the Secretary of Education can do to shut down parts of the agency unilaterally.[5] For example:
    • The Department of Education Organization Act established “officers, positions, and offices” at the Department of Education (e.g., the Secretary of Education, Deputy Secretary of Education, Assistant Secretary positions), which are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, as well as “U.S. Department of Education: Background and Statutorily Established Officers, Positions, and Offices.”[6] Office and positions that were established by statute “can only be eliminated or have their functions delegated to other agencies through an act of Congress.”[7]
    • The statute also permits the Secretary of Education to “allocate or reallocate functions among the officers of the Department, and to establish, consolidate, alter, or discontinue such organizational entities within the Department as may be necessary or appropriate.”[8] However, the statute says that this authority of the Secretary of Education “does not extend to . . . the abolition of organizational entities established by this chapter.”[9]
    • The Secretary of Education also cannot move funding or programs to other agencies where they have been established by statute.[10] For example, Section 301(2) of the Department of Education Act “authorizes the Secretary of the Education Department to administer the ESEA, including Title I-A [of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act],” so the Department or Secretary could not move this funding to another agency (such as the Department of Heath and Human Services) without congressional action.[11]
    • While bills aimed at shutting down the Department of Education have been introduced by the current Congress, these would require 60 votes in the Senate and are likely to pass given the Republican’s current 53-vote majority.[12]

• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • While the federal government plays a role in education (e.g., “the federal government does provide roughly a tenth of public school funding”), K-12 school administration is largely handled at the state and local levels, including school boards that are funded through state legislatures and local taxes.[13]
  • The Department of Education’s operations will also likely be affected by the agency’s significant funding and personnel cuts.[14]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In 2024, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he Administrative Procedure Act requires courts to exercise their independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and courts may not defer to an agency interpretation of the law simply because a statute is ambiguous.”[15]
  • Current Supreme Court precedent limits the President’s ability to remove heads of independent agencies.[16] However, the Trump Administration has fired independent agency officials and these actions are currently being challenged.[17]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Somerville Public Schools et al., v. Donald J. Trump et al., 1:25-cv-10677-MJJ (D. Mass)
    • On March 24, 2025, a group of public school districts sued the Trump Administration “seek[ing] declaratory and injunctive relief against Defendants’ unlawful effort to eliminate the Department of Education through the March 11, 2025, decision to fire half of the Department’s staff and President Trump’s Executive Order on March 20, 2025, seeking to abolish the Department as a whole.”[18] Plaintiffs argued that (1) the Administration’s actions to close the Department of Education (including Executive Order 14242) violate the separation of powers because “Congress has the exclusive authority under the Spending Clause and the Appropriations Clause to establish and fund federal programs and to direct payment of federal funds to the states for purposes defined by Congress”; (2) the Administration’s actions to close the Department of Education (including Executive Order 14242) “violate the Take Care Clause because they are directly contrary to the duly enacted statutes establishing the Department; establishing offices and programs within the Department; and establishing the Department’s duties”; (3) are ultra vires because “[o]nly Congress has the authority to abolish federal executive agencies or to enact, amend, or repeal statutes”; (4) violate the Administrative Procedure Act because “Congress has the exclusive authority under Article I of the Constitution to pass laws creating government agencies, to assign their duties, and to appropriate funds for the effectuation of those duties”; (5) the Administration does not have statutory authorization to dismantle the Department of Education; (6) “Defendants’ actions to incapacitate the Department of Education are in contravention of numerous Congressional directives requiring federal support for education”; and (7) the Administration’s actions are arbitrary and capricious.[19]
    • On April 1, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction related to the mass termination orders from the Administration issued on March 11, 2025.[20] On May 22, 2025, the district court granted the motion for preliminary injunction.[21] Defendants appealed, and, on June 4, 2025, the First Circuit denied the appeal.[22]
  • NAACP v. United States of America, 8:25-cv-00965-DLB (D. Md.)
    • On March 24, 2025, NAACP and other plaintiffs sued the Trump Administration seeking relief from the Administration’s efforts to dismantle the Department of Education (including through Executive Order 14242).[23] Specifically, plaintiffs argued that the Administration’s actions (1) violate the Take Care Clause which “prohibits the President from directing federal officers to act in derogation of federal statute and federal officers from implementing such directives”; (2) the Spending Clause because “Defendant McMahon’s unlawful impoundment of the Department’s congressionally appropriated funds infringes Congress’s exclusive power over the federal purse”; (3) the separation of powers because “Defendant McMahon’s dismantling of the Department, reflected in the March 20 Executive Order, exceeds Executive Branch authority and impermissibly arrogates power that is reserved to Congress”; (4) the Administration Procedure Act because “Defendants’ dismantling of the Department, reflected in the March 20 Executive Order, constitutes a final agency action”; and (5) is ultra vires because “[n]o statute, constitutional provision, or other source of law authorizes Defendants to dismantle the Department in violation of the DEOA and the statutes the Department administers.”[24]
    • On July 1, 2025, plaintiffs filed an amended complaint.[25] That same day, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction seeking to “enjoin Defendants’ actions dismantling the Department,”[26] which the court has not yet ruled on.

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14248: Preserving and Protecting the Integrity of American Elections

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • In 1993, Congress passed the National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which directs states to establish procedures for voter registration.[1] Under the NVRA, the Election Assistance Commission (EAC)—which is an independent, bipartisan federal agency established by the 2002 Help America Vote Act[2]—must consult with chief election officers of states to “develop a mail voter registration application form for elections for Federal office.”[3] Under the NVRA, the EAC must develop a mail voter registration form for Federal elections (known as the “Federal Form”) and must do so in consult with state officials.[4]
    • The NVRA also says that the form “may require only such identifying information . . . and other information . . . as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and other parts of the election process.”[5] The NVRA also mandates other requirements of the Form, including “a statement that—(A) specifies each eligibility requirement (including citizenship); (B) contains an attestation that the applicant meets each such requirement; and (C) requires the signature of the applicant, under penalty of perjury.”[6]
    • Executive Order 14248 directs the EAC to “require” documentary proof of United States citizenship in its national mail voter registration form within 30 days of March 25, 2025.[7] Lawsuits challenging Executive Order 14248 argue that the President “has no authority to give the EAC, an independent agency” directive to require documentary proof of citizenship and “no authority to direct any EAC Commissioner, much less three EAC Commissioners, to disregard the procedural and substantive restrictions on their authority to promulgate the Federal Form or their responsibility to engage in independent analysis and decision-making in doing so.”[8] Executive Order 14248 could also contradict or depart from the NVRA if changes to the Federal Form related to documentary proof of citizenship are not made “in consultation with the chief election officers of the States.”[9]
  • In 1986, Congress passed the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act (UOCAVA), which “protects the voting rights of members of the Uniformed Services (on active duty), members of the Merchant Marine and their eligible dependents, Commissioner Corps of the Public Health Service, Commissioned Corps of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, and U.S. citizens residing outside the U.S.”[10] The Federal Voting Assistance Program, under the Department of Defense, administers the UOCAVA program.[11] “UOCAVA voters rely on two essential federally prescribed forms: The Federal Post Card Application (FPCA) and The Federal Write-in Absentee Ballot (FWAB).”[12] These forms must be furnished under the requirements of the UOCAVA statute.[13]
    • The UOCAVA statute does not require the FPCA form to require proof of eligibility. At least one lawsuit has argued that Executive Order 14248 unlawfully expands the UOCAVA statute because “Congress has specifically instructed the President’s designee to design and administer a post card that standing alone can be sufficient to both register to vote and apply for an absentee ballot” and Executive Order 14248 may require voters to submit documents to determine proof of eligibility.[14]
    • The UOCAVA statute also requires the President’s designee (who is responsible for carrying out the program) to “consult State and local officials in carrying out [the statute]” so Executive Order 14248 could contract the statute to the extent the changes to UOCAVA voting procedure that are made as part of implementing are done without consulting state and local officials, as at least one lawsuit has argued.[15]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • The Elections Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the power to regulate most elections.[16] Executive Order 14248 “would consolidate a great deal of power over elections within the executive branch and diminish the legal role held by Congress and the states in election administration,” including in areas where Congress has already regulated (e.g., the NVRA).[17]
  • The EAC—which has responsibility for certain voting-related procedures, as explained above—is an independent federal agency which means that, even though the EAC is within the Executive Branch, the President “cannot currently compel compliance” with the directives to the EAC in Executive Order 14248.[18]
    • As at least one lawsuit points out, the EAC previously rejected attempts by certain states to “modify the state-specific instruction for the Federal Form to require documentary proof of citizenship.”[19]
  • Executive Order 14248 also “threatens to withhold federal funding from state and local election offices that do not comply with changes” which potentially conflicts with the “Tenth Amendment prohibit[ion on] the federal government from coercing states, including by withholding federal funding.”[20]

• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • League of United Latin American Citizens et al. v. Executive Office of the President et al., 1:25-cv-00946 (D.D.C. March 31, 2025)
    • On March 31, the League of United Latin American Citizens (LULAC) and two other nonprofits sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14248:
      • (1) exceeds the bounds of the President’s authority by, among other things, unlawfully instructing the Election Assistance Commission’s activity because it is an independent agency, commanding state and locals officials to use documentary proof of citizenship to complete the NVRA’s Federal Form, and compelling the heads of Federal voter registration agencies to assess citizenship prior to providing a Federal voter registration form to enrollees of public assistance programs;
      • (2) the separation of powers by because “[t]he President has no legal authority to condition the receipt of funds that Congress has appropriated for distribution to States by the EAC on compliance with the unlawfully-imposed documentary proof of citizenship requirement or the unlawfully-imposed Election Day ballot receipt deadline;
      • (3) the Electors and Elections Clause because “[t]he President has no legal authority to forbid the counting of ballots validly cast under State law, nor to direct the Attorney General to take any action with respect to such validly cast votes”;
      • (4) unlawfully “gut[s] a core and longstanding requirement of the Uniformed and Overseas Citizens Absentee Voting Act” because “[n]either the President nor the Secretary of Defense, his designee in the maintenance of the post card, has any legal authority to disregard UOCAVA’s statutory requirement to make such a post card available to military and overseas voters”; and
      • (5) the Administrative Procedure Act by unlawfully “imposing the proof of citizenship requirements as set forth in the Order on use of the Federal Form” and unlawfully making changes to the Federal Post Card Application.[21]
    • Plaintiffs asked the court to either “declare that Sections 2, 3(d), 4(a), and 7 of the Order are unconstitutional or otherwise unlawful, and further declare that nothing in 2 U.S.C. § 7 or 3 U.S.C. § 1 requires states to discard mail-in and absentee ballots validly cast and received in accordance with state law” or otherwise enjoin the Administration from implementing Sections 2, 3(d), 4(a), and 7, direct the Administration to rescind guidance or direction related to these sections, and enjoin the DOJ and Attorney General from taking any action that would seek to prohibit the counting of mail-in and absentee ballots validly cast under state law.[22]
    • On April 3, this case was consolidated with two other cases challenging Executive Order 14248 (Democratic National Committee v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00952 (D.D.C. Mar. 31. 2025) and League of Women Voters Education Fund v. Trump, 1:25-cv-00955 (D.D.C. April 1, 2025)), and the consolidated case will proceed under this case.
  • State of California v. Trump, 1:25-cv-10810 (D. Mass. April 3, 2025)
    • On April 3, 2025, nineteen states sued the Trump Administration arguing that Executive Order 14248:
      • (1) exceeds the President’s Article II powers and unconstitutionally infringes upon Congress’s powers because Section 2(a), which instructs the EAC to amend the Federal Form to require documentary proof of citizenship[,] violates the separation of powers because “[by] directing the [EAC] and imposing duties on it that are not contained in federal law, the Elections EO attempts to amend, repeal, rescind, or circumvent duly enacted federal statutes based on the President’s own policy preferences”;
      • (2) exceeds the President’s Article II powers, unconstitutionally infringes on Congress’s powers, and unconstitutionally attempts to amend federal legislation by amending the Federal Form to require documentary proof of evidence despite the National Voter Registration Act “require[ing] only such identifying information (including the signature of the applicant) and other information (including data relating to previous registration by the applicant), as is necessary to enable the appropriate State election official to assess the eligibility of the applicant and to administer voter registration and other parts of the election process”;
      • (3) exceeds the President’s Article II powers, unconstitutionally infringes on Congress’s powers, and unconstitutionally attempts to amend federal legislation by “command[ing] the Secretary of Defense to update the federal post card application provided under UOCAVA to require documentary proof of citizenship and proof of eligibility to vote in state elections”;
      • (4) exceeding the President’s constitutional authority by
        “order[ing] the Commission to condition federal funding to States on their acceptance of the Federal Form as unlawfully amended to require documentary proof of citizenship”;
      • (5) exceeding the President’s constitutional authority by directing the Attorney General to enforce federal statutes setting the date of federal elections against states that count vote-by-mail ballots after Election Day because “[t]he President has no constitutional authority to interfere with State and Congressional regulations of the times, places, and manner of elections, including voter registration”;
      • (6) exceeding the President’s constitutional authority by “require[ing] the Commission to condition federal funding on Plaintiff States’ acquiescence to an incorrect interpretation of federal Election Day statutes that would preclude Plaintiff States from counting ballots that arrive after Election Day” because “[t]he President has no constitutional authority to interfere with State and Congressional regulations of the times, places, and manner of elections, including voter registration”; and
      • (7) by violating the separation of powers by intruding on the state’s election powers granted by Article I and Article II.[23]
    • Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the “Challenged Provisions” (Sections 2(a)(i), 2(a)(ii), 2(d), 3(d), 4(a), 7(a), and 7(b)) of Executive Order 14248 unconstitutional and void and enjoin the Trump Administration from implementing and enforcing the Challenged Provisions of Executive Order 14248.[24]

Last Updated: 5/7

Executive Order 14251: Exclusion from Federal Labor-Management Relations Programs

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14251 excludes over thirty federal agencies and subdivisions from collective bargaining requirements under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, including the Department of Treasury, Internal Revenue Service, Department of Energy, Environmental Protection Agency, and Federal Communications Commission.[1] Under the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, the President can exclude agencies by executive order if the agency or subdivision “has as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work.”[2] This statute “cannot be applied to that subdivision in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.”[3]
  • Executive Order 14251 seeks to exclude certain agencies and agency subdivisions from the statute by determining that these entities “have as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work” and that Chapter 71 of title 5 “be applied to these agencies and agency subdivisions in a manner consistent with national security requirements and considerations.”[4] Executive Order 14251 may contradict 5 U.S.C. § 7103 if—as some plaintiffs are currently arguing in ongoing litigation related to Executive Order 14251—these agencies were impermissibly excluded based on existing statutory framework.[5]
    • Note: prior presidents have acted through executive orders to exclude certain agencies under the national security exemption in 5 U.S.C. § 7103, including, President Carter through Executive Order 12171.[6]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • As the Office of Personnel Management’s guidance (“OPM guidance”) related to implementation of Executive Order 14251 states, there may be existing collective bargaining agreements (“CBAs”) that affect how some of the provisions of the Executive Order are rolled out.[7] For example, the OPM guidance states that performance improvement plans for underperforming federal government employees should be 30 days long but says that “[w]here a CBA requires PIPs of more than 30 days, agencies must generally wait until such CBAs expire or otherwise terminate before shortening PIPs.”[8] As OPM guidance also notes, the roll out of other provisions related to federal government employee protections will not go into effect until the CBAs are terminated.[9] As of July 2025, agencies have reported that existing CBAs are slowing implementation of Executive Order 14251 where these CBAs have not yet been terminated.[10]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • In 1986, President Reagan promulgated Executive Order 12559, which sought to exclude the U.S. Marshals Service from the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute under the same authority that President Trump used for this Executive Order.[11] There was litigation related to President Reagan’s issuance of Executive Order 12559 and, in 1989, the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals held that the President was not required to issue written findings to support his designation under Section 7103(b)(1) to exempt U.S. Marshals exempt from coverage for collective bargaining for national security purposes.[12]
  • There is also existing precedent that addresses the scope of the term “national security” in other federal statutes (relevant here because the statutory framework being used to exclude agencies permits exclusion of agencies engaged in “national security work”). For example, in Cole v. Young, the Supreme Court held that the term “national security”—as defined in the Veterans’ Preference Act—“was intended to comprehend only those activities of the Government that are directly concerned with the protection of the Nation from internal subversion or foreign aggression, and not those which contribute to the strength of the Nation only through their impact on the general welfare.”[13]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-COP v. Trump, 2:25-cv-00451 (W.D. Wash.)
    • Prior to the issuance of Executive Order 14251, on March 13, 2025, a group of labor organizations who represent federal government employees sued Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem, senior Transportation Security Administration (TSA) official Adam Stahl, and the TSA “seek[ing] declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the Department of Homeland Security’s illegal and unjustified attempt to rescind . . . the lawfully executed collective bargaining agreement between the American Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) and the Transportation Security Administration.”[14] Specifically, plaintiffs argued that (1) Secretary Noem’s “unilateral recission of the 2024 TSA-AFGE collective bargaining agreement” was unlawful final agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act; (2) Secretary Noem’s instruction to rescind the 2024 CBA and terminate existing grievances was unlawful because the CBA is a binding contract that defendants “lack authority to unilaterally rescind”; (3) the recission of the CBA “constitutes unconstitutional retaliation against AFGE for the exercise of its First Amendment rights” to “petition the government by filing numerous lawsuits against the Trump administration challenging a variety of anti-worker actions”; and (4) Secretary Noem’s decision to rescind the 2024 CBA violated due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.[15]
    • On April 14, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction.[16] On May 15, 2025, the court granted the motion, citing the reasoning in National Treasury Employees Union v. Donald J. Trump, 1:25-cv-00935 (D.D.C.).[17]
  • National Treasury Employees Union v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 1:25-cv-00935 (D.D.C.)
    • On March 31, 2025, the National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU) sued Trump Administration officials related to twelve collective bargaining agreements that NTEU has with federal government departments and agencies, which Executive Order 14251 instructs the departments and agencies to terminate.^[18] NTEU alleged that Section 2 of Executive Order 14251 is (1) unlawful and ultra vires because none of the federal agencies or agency components meet Section 7103(b)(1)’s requirements that “President can exclude an agency from the Statute only if the agency has ‘as a primary function intelligence, counterintelligence, investigative, or national security work”’; (2) unlawful and ultra vires because it conflicts with 5 U.S.C. Chapter 71 and is an impermissible “attempt to largely nullify the Statute through the Statute’s national security exemption [and] conflicts with Congress’s intent in enacting the Statute: to facilitate and strengthen collective bargaining”; and (3) unlawful because it reflects retaliation in violation of NTEU’s First Amendment rights by “punish[ing] NTEU for its legal challenges to this Administration’s actions.”[19]
      • NTEU asked the court to declare Section 2 unlawful as applied to the defendants who are heads of NTEU-represented agencies, declare OPM guidance on the Executive Order unlawful as applied to the defendants who are heads of NTEU-represented agencies, enjoin defendants other than President Trump from implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order, and enjoin defendants from implementing the OPM guidance on the Executive Order.[20]
    • On April 4, 2025, NTEU filed a motion for preliminary injunction related to Section 2 of the Executive Order and OPM’s guidance on the Executive Order’s implementation.[21]
    • On April 25, 2025, the district court granted NTEU’s motion and held that Section 2 of the Executive Order is “unlawful as applied to the Defendants who are heads of agencies with employees represented by [NTEU]” and that the OPM guidance on the Executive Order is “unlawful as applied to Defendants who are heads of agencies with employees represented by [NTEU].”[22] In granting the motion, the court enjoined the Administration officials—with the exception of President Trump—from implementing Section 2 of the Executive Order and implementing OPM Guidance related to the Executive Order.[23]
      • On April 28, 2025, the court issued its opinion explaining the reasoning behind its grant of the preliminary injunction.[24] Among other things, the district court noted that Executive Order 14251 and its accompanying fact sheet directly contradicts Congress’ conclusion that “labor organizations and collective bargaining in the civil service are in the public interest.”[25] The court also said that statements in the White House’s Fact Sheet that accompanied the Order “bear no relation to the criteria established by Congress in Section 7103(b)(1)” and that the OPM guidance was motivated by policy goals and “says little about national security.”[26]
        • With respect to the statutory language, the court said that the “government’s interpretation of ‘national security’ and ‘national security work’ is also overly broad” and that the Order applies an “overly broad interpretation of . . . the term ‘primary function’” in the statue.[27]
      • On April 29, 2025, the Trump Administration appealed the order.[28] On May 16, 2025, the DC Circuit granted Defendants’ stay pending appeal holding that the “Government is likely to prevail in its appeal of the district court’s preliminary injunction . . . [because t]he National Treasury Employees Union failed to establish irreparable harm.”[29] In granting the stay pending appeal, the DC Circuit also said that the “Government suffers irreparable harm . . . [because] the injunction eliminates the President’s control over the decision to pause implementation of the Executive Order and, by consequence, his flexibility to respond to future developments” and also that “preserving the President’s autonomy under a statute that expressly recognizes his national-security expertise is within the public interest.”[30]
  • American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, et al., v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 4:25-cv-03070 (N.D. Cal.)
    • On April 3, 2025, a group of labor organizations sued the Trump Administration over Executive Order 14251 arguing that (1) the Executive Order and related OPM guidance constitute retaliation and viewpoint discrimination in violation of the First Amendment as they “were initiated, and were issued, in retaliation for Plaintiff Unions’ protected exercise of their First Amendment rights” by “petition[ing] the government by filing lawsuits against the Trump administration”; (2) the Executive Order is ultra vires in violation of Chapter 71 of Title 5 and the separation of powers because “[t]he Exclusion Order removes wholesale departments and subdivisions from Chapter 71 that do not satisfy the statutory criteria for exclusion” under 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1); (3) “[a]gency terminations of federal CBAs and outstanding grievances pursuant to the Exclusion Order and Exclusion Memorandum will deprive Plaintiff Unions, their affiliates, and their members of constitutionally protected property interests contained in collective bargaining agreements with the Excluded Agencies” in violation of the Fifth Amendment; (4) “the Exclusion Order abrogates Plaintiff Unions’ contracts with the federal government and associated property interests” in violation of the Fifth Amendment; and (5) the Executive Order violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment by “singl[ing] out similarly situated entities for adverse treatment without a constitutionally legitimate justification.”[31]
    • On April 7, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order.[32]
    • On June 24, 2025, the court granted plaintiffs’ motion and enjoined enforcement of the Executive Order, finding that plaintiffs “demonstrated a serious question as to whether their First Amendment rights have been violated” as the “record establishes that plaintiffs have frequently spoken against actions undertaken by President Trump and his administration since January 2025.”[33] The court also said that, because “plaintiffs have demonstrated a serious question under the First Amendment that warrants preserving the status quo pending further litigation[, t]he Court need not take up plaintiffs’ other claims as a potential ground for an injunction.”[34]
    • On June 26, defendants appealed and, on July 7, the Ninth Circuit granted an administrative stay pending appeal.[35]
  • American Foreign Service Association v. Trump, No. 1:25-cv-01030 (D.D.C.)
    • On April 7, 2025, the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA)—a labor union for foreign service employees—sued President Trump, three federal agencies (OPM, State, and USAID), and two administration officials arguing that Section 3 of Executive Order 14251 is ultra vires because it is “tantamount to repealing the entire [Foreign Service Labor-Management Relations Statute],” which violates the separation of powers, and it was not based on the required criteria of the statute.[36] Plaintiffs also argued that Executive Order 14251 retaliates against AFSA in violation of its First Amendment rights.[37]
    • On May 14, a district court granted AFSA’s motion for preliminary injunction for similar reasons as articulated in National Treasury Employees Union v. Donald J. Trump, 1:25-cv-00935 (D.D.C.), finding that Section 3 of the Executive Order “is entirely ultra vires.”

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14252: Making the District of Columbia Safe and Beautiful

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14252 establishes the DC Safe and Beautiful Task Force (“Task Force”), which is made up of certain federal officials,[1] and directs the Task Force to “coordinate to ensure effective Federal participation” in certain objectives as part of the Executive Order.[2]
    • Related to immigration and law enforcement, Executive Order 14252 instructs the Task Force to (1) “direct[] maximum enforcement of Federal immigration law and redirect[] available Federal, State, or local law enforcement resources to apprehend and deport illegal aliens in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area”; (2) “deploy[] a more robust Federal law enforcement presence and coordinat[e] with local law enforcement to facilitate the deployment of a more robust local law enforcement presence as appropriate in areas in or about the District of Columbia”; and (3) “monitor[] the District of Columbia’s sanctuary-city status and compliance with the enforcement of Federal immigration law.”[3]
      • The president has authority over the DC police department, but this authority is reserved for “special conditions of an emergency nature exist.”[4] Under DC law, the president can direct the DC police in emergency situations for 48 hours “unless the President has . . . notified the Chairmen and ranking minority members of the Committees on the District of Columbia of the Senate and the House of Representatives, in writing, as to the reason for such direction and the period of time during which the need for such services is likely to continue.”[5] If the president seeks to extend the control by notifying Congress, his control over the DC police will not last for more than 30 days unless Congress passes a law to extend it.[6]
    • Executive Order 14252 also directs the Task Force to “collaborat[e],” “review,” or “provid[e] . . . assistance” to achieve its policy goals in DC.[7] In these instances, it is not yet clear the extent to which the Executive Branch’s actions might depart from, modify, expand, or contradict existing federal laws or regulations.

• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Under the Constitution, Congress has “plenary legislative authority” over the District of Columbia.[8] In 1973, Congress passed the District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act (known as the “Home Rule Act”), which establishes that “residents of the District of Columbia elect a mayor and a 13-member council (one member for each of the eight wards and five at-large members, including the council chair).”[9] However, Congress retains ultimate authority over DC and the laws it passes; under the Home Rule Act, Congress “reserves the right, at any time, to exercise its constitutional authority as legislature for the District.”[10]
  • In practice, this means that Congress can block most laws that the DC government enacts before they go into effect.[11] As part of the review process for bills passed by the DC government, there is a period of time in which the proposed bills go to Congress for review.[12] Congress can pass a joint disapproval resolution in both houses if it does not want the bill to pass and, at that point, the bill then goes to the President who can veto the disapproval or sign it (overriding the DC law).[13] The President has other authority to exercise control over DC, including control of the DC police (as explained above) and over the DC National Guard.[14]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14252 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14253: Restoring Truth and Sanity to American History

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14253 does not appear to depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations. Most of the policies that the Executive Order advances are effectuated through spending and appropriations.
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Generally, the President’s role in appropriations is limited by the constitutional requirements providing Congress with spending power and, “[a]s a result, legislation to provide for government expenditures must adhere to the same requirements and conditions imposed on the lawmaking process as any other measure.”[1] In practice, this means that “[a]n executive order, by itself, is not considered a valid authorization of appropriations ‘absent proof of its derivation from a statute enacted by Congress.’”[2]
  • Executive Order 14253 also directs the Vice President to “work with the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Senate Majority Leader, to seek the appointment of citizen members to the Smithsonian Board of Regents committed to advancing the policy of this order.”[3] Citizen members are nominated by the Smithsonian Board of Regents and approved by Congress through a joint resolution signed by the President.[4] A joint resolution is like a bill and “requires the approval of both Chambers in identical form and the president’s signature to become law.”[5]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14253 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14257: Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • President Trump issued Executive Order 14257 with power given to him under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).[1] Previously, “[n]o President ha[d] used IEEPA to place tariffs on imported products from a specific country or on products imported to the United States in general” or “enact a policy that was primarily domestic in effect.”[2]
    • Enacted in 1977, “IEEPA grants sweeping powers to the President to control economic transactions.”[3] IEEPA gives the president the power to, among other things, “investigate, regulate, or prohibit” imports “to deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States, if the President declares a national emergency with respect to such threat.”[4] The National Emergencies Act (NEA) sets forth the procedures for the president to declare a national emergency.[5] Under NEA, to declare a national emergency, the president must “immediately transmit the proclamation declaring the emergency to Congress and publish it in the Federal Register.”[6] IEEPA “may give the President additional authority to impose tariffs under certain circumstances during specific kinds of national emergencies” but there are currently legal challenges “as to whether the President has legal authority to impose tariffs under IEEPA.”[7]
    • However, Congress has “enacted several laws authorizing the executive branch to impose tariffs in various circumstances.”[8] For example, when former President Richard Nixon “impose[d] a 10% tariff on all imports into the United States in response to a monetary crisis” in 1971, he “used the similarly worded Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 (TWEA), upon which IEEPA was based” as authority to do so.[9]

• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Congress does not need to approve presidential action under IEEPA (meaning the President can declare a national emergency unilaterally), but Congress can “terminate the underlying national emergency by enacting a joint resolution of disapproval using the expedited procedures provided in the NEA” or “amend IEEPA to restrict its use in imposing tariffs.”[10] On the “anniversary of the declaration of that emergency,” a national emergency declared by the President terminates unless the President publishes notice in the Federal Registrar and gives Congress notice that the emergency will continue 90 days in advance of its anniversary.[11]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • As mentioned above, in 1971, President Nixon imposed a temporary 10% tariff on imports using the President’s national emergency powers.[12] This action preceded the enactment of IEEPA, but considered some of the language that is now in IEEPA.[13] In 1975, the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals held that, under TWEA, Congress “delegated to the President . . . the power to regulate importation during declared national emergencies by means appropriate to the emergency involved.”[14] However, the Court noted that this tariff “passe[d] constitutional muster” because it was “a reasonable response to the particular national emergency declared therein.”[15]
  • While IEEPA has not previously been used by a President to impose tariffs, there have been cases related to the interpretation of IEEPA “including challenges to the breadth of presidential authority and congressionally delegated authority, and challenges asserting violations of constitutional rights.”[16] For example, in 1981, the Supreme Court considered a challenge to President Carter’s executive order related to the Iran hostage crisis using his IEEPA authority.[17] In that case, the Supreme Court said that “Congress’s implicit approval of the long-standing presidential practice of settling international claims by executive agreement was critical to its holding that the challenged actions were not in conflict with acts of Congress.”[18]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Webber and Jonathan St. Goddard v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, et al., 4:25-cv-00026 (D. Mont.)
    • On April 4, 2025, two individuals—one a member of the Blackfeet Nation and one a rancher on the Blackfeet Nation—sued the Trump Administration challenging the constitutionality of a group of executive orders, including Executive Order 14257, arguing that (1) the executive orders “are ultra vires because there is “no express constitutional or statutory authorization” empowering the President to impose universal tariffs under the limited authority of the IEEPA” and (2) the executive orders violate their rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fifteenth Amendment because the executive orders “impos[e] tariffs without notice and an opportunity to be heard” and “do not provide Plaintiffs with any basis to understand when the tariffs will be imposed, how they might be lifted, or what the basis for future tariffs may be.”[19] Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the executive orders unconstitutional and enjoin implementation of the executive orders, declare that tariffs cannot be imposed on cross-border transactions at Montana points of entry, and declare that tariffs cannot be imposed on tribal members.[20]
    • On April 28, 2025, the district court transferred the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade; plaintiffs appealed the transfer.[21]
  • V.O.S. Selections, Inc., et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 25-00066 (Ct. Intl. Trade)
    • On April 14, 2025, a group of businesses that import products from outside of the United States sued the Trump Administration related to a group of tariff executive orders, including Executive Order 14257, arguing that (1) the President does not have authority under IEEPA to impose tariffs, and so “[t]he President’s actions exceed the statutory authority Congress granted him” and (2) “even if IEEPA did grant the President the broad, standardless discretion he claims . . . it would be an unlawful delegation of legislative authority without any intelligible governing principle.”[22] Plaintiffs asked the court to:
      • “Declare that IEEPA grants the President no statutory authority to unilaterally impose tariffs;
      • Declare that the President has not identified a valid national emergency as required by IEEPA and that the continued existence of trade deficits in goods is not in and of itself a national emergency;
      • Declare that the President has failed to make any showing of an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ as required by IEEPA;
      • Declare that, if Congress has granted the President unilateral authority to impose global tariffs of any amount at his whim, it is an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power;
      • Enjoin the operation of the April 2, 2025, Executive Order entitled ‘Regulating Imports with a Reciprocal Tariff to Rectify Trade Practices that Contribute to Large and Persistent Annual United States Goods Trade Deficits’;
      • Enjoin the operation of the April 9, 2025, Executive Order entitled ‘Modifying Reciprocal Tariff Rates To Reflect Trading Partner Retaliation And Alignment’;
      • Award Plaintiffs damages in the amount of any tariffs collected by Defendants pursuant to the challenged orders;
      • Award Plaintiffs other such damages as are appropriate;
      • Award Plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d), and any other applicable law; and
      • Grant any such other relief as this Court may deem just or proper.”[23]
    • On April 18, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for a temporary restraining order to enjoin defendants from enforcing the tariffs imposed by Executive Order 14257.[24] On April 22, 2024, the court denied plaintiffs’ application for a temporary restraining order.[25]
    • On May 28, 2025, the court’s three-judge panel issued a ruling on the merits permanently enjoining the enforcement of the tariffs imposed by Executive Order 14257.[26] The Trump Administration appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and requested a stay of the injunction, and the Court granted an administrative stay on May 29, 2025.[27]
    • On June 10, 2025, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit granted the United States’ motion for a stay pending appeal of the Court of International Trade’s rulings enjoining certain executive orders imposing tariffs.[28]
  • State of California, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 3:25-cv-03372 (N.D. Ca.)
    • On April 16, 2025, the State of California and Governor Gavin Newsom sued the Trump Administration over tariff executive orders, including Executive Order 14257, arguing that (1) “IEEPA does not authorize President Trump to issue the [executive orders]” and (2) “President Trump’s conduct in issuing the IEEPA Tariff Orders violates the separation-of-powers doctrine.”[29] Plaintiffs asked the court to declare the executive orders unlawful and enjoin the Administration from taking any action to implement or enforce the executive orders.[30]
    • On April 17, 2025, the government filed a motion to transfer the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade.[31] On June 2, 2025, the court denied the motion,[32] which the government then appealed to the Ninth Circuit (and the court has not yet ruled on this appeal).[33]
  • Learning Resources, Inc. et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 1:25-cv-01248 (D.D.C.)
    • On April 22, 2025, two family-owned businesses sued the Trump Administration challenging a group of executive orders[34], including Executive Order 14257, that President Trump issued under IEEPA.[35] Plaintiffs argued that (1) the executive orders are ultra vires because “IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs”; (2) even if IEEPA authorized the President to impose tariffs, it would not authorize the tariffs in these executive orders because they “(a) do not involve an ‘unusual or extraordinary threat’ to the nation, (b) do not ‘deal with’—or in other words, reasonably relate—to the national emergencies that the President declared, or (c) have been employed to take on numerous, unrelated problems for which no national emergency has been declared in the first place”; (3) the Administrative Procedure Act because the Trump Administration’s actions through these executive orders are “hin excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations”; and (4) the separation of powers because, “[t]o the extent that IEEPA could be interpreted so broadly as to permit the President to impose the tariffs set forth in the Challenged Orders, it violates Article I of the Constitution.”[36]
    • On April 24, the Trump Administration filed a motion to transfer the case to the U.S. Court of International Trade[37] and plaintiffs moved for a preliminary injunction.[38]
    • On May 29, 2025, the district court issued an order denying defendants’ motion to transfer venue and granted plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.[39]
  • State of Oregon, et al. v. Donald J. Trump, et al., 1:25-cv-00077 (Ct. Intl. Trade)
    • On April 23, 2025, twelve states sued the Trump Administration challenging a group of executive orders—all of which “[t]he President purported to rely on IEEPA emergency powers as the substantive authority to impose”—and argued that (1) the executive orders are ultra vires and unlawful because they “are not authorized by the IEEPA or any other statute” and violate the separation of powers because the executive orders “are an exercise of Congressional authority”; (2) U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s guidance implanting the executive orders “are without statutory authority and are contrary to law”; and (3) the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s guidance implanting the executive orders is “arbitrary and capricious because it relies on factors unrelated to an ‘unusual and extraordinary threat’ as required under IEEPA, it fails to consider the economic consequences of the imposition of tariffs, and is implausible and counter to the evidence.”[40] Plaintiffs asked the court to hold that the executive orders are ultra vires and contrary to law, hold unlawful and set aside the U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s guidance, and preliminarily and permanently enjoin Secretary of Homeland Security Kristi Noem from implementing the orders and U.S. Custom and Border Production’s guidance related to the orders.[41]
    • On May 7, 2025, plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary injunction, which the court has not yet ruled on.[42]

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14279: Reforming Accreditation to Strengthen Higher Education

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • At a high level, the Higher Education Act, which was passed in 1965, and its current regulations establish a process for entities to be recognized and approved as accrediting agencies and through which the Department of Education can suspend or terminate an agency’s accreditation status.[1] Institutions must be accredited by a “nationally recognized” accrediting agency for students to be eligible to receive federal student aid from the federal government.[2]
  • Executive Order 14279 instructs the Secretary of Education to “hold accountable, including through denial, monitoring, suspension, or termination of accreditation recognition, accreditors who fail to meet the applicable recognition criteria or otherwise violate Federal law.”[3] While Executive Order 14279 does not appear to modify or contradict existing federal law or regulations, the Department of Education must follow certain processes, and meet certain criteria, established under current law and regulations when accrediting agencies and when denying, limiting, suspending, or terminating accreditation. Notably:
    • The Secretary of Education establishes the criteria—after notice and opportunity for a hearing—for determining whether an “accrediting agency or association [is] a reliable authority.”[4] Currently, “diversity, equity, and inclusion initiatives,” are not part of the criteria that the Secretary of Education must consider when assessing an agency’s accreditation status.[5] The Higher Education Act also put limits the scope of the criteria that the Secretary of Education can establish for determining accreditation status; for example, it prohibits the Secretary of Education from “prohibit[ing] or limit[ing] any accrediting agency or association from adopting additional standards.”[6]
    • Under current regulations, the Department of Education can decide to “deny, limit, suspend, or terminate an agency’s recognition . . . based on a finding that the agency is noncompliant with one or more criteria for recognition, or if the agency does not hold institutions or programs accountable for complying with one or more of the agency’s standards or criteria for accreditation that were not identified earlier in the proceedings as an area of noncompliance.”[7] The senior Department of Education official that determines that a decision to “deny, limit, suspend, or terminate an agency’s recognition may be warranted” must provide: “(1) The agency with an opportunity to submit a written response addressing the finding; and (2) The staff with an opportunity to present its analysis in writing.”[8] An agency can contest the Secretary of Education’s final decision to “deny, limit, suspend, or terminate an agency’s recognition” in court.[9]
    • The Department of Education also must “demonstrate that the procedures it uses throughout the accrediting process satisfy due process.”[10] For example, the Department of Education must provide, among other things: “adequate written specifications of its requirements,” “written specification of any deficiencies,” “sufficient opportunity for a written response by an institution or program regarding any deficiencies identified by the agency, to be considered by the agency within a timeframe determined by the agency, and before any adverse action is taken,” notification “in writing of any adverse accrediting action or an action to place the institution or program on probation or show cause” that describes the basis for the action,” and “an opportunity . . . for the institution or program to appeal any adverse action prior to the action becoming final.”[11]

• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • The Department of Education does not itself determine whether Institutions of Higher Education (IHEs) receive accreditation status.[12] The Department’s “primary role is to recognize, through the process and conditions set forth in the [Higher Education Act] and accompanying regulations, an accrediting agency as ‘a reliable authority as to the quality of education or training offered’ at IHEs for the purposes of Title IV funding and other federal programs.”[13] While the Department can revoke an accreditation agency’s recognition, it “has no authority to substantively intervene in the decision of an institution or program to select a particular accrediting agency (or to intervene with a State to direct its public institutions to seek a new accrediting agency).”[14]
  • States also generally have a meaningful role in the management of education.[15] Through its guidance, the Department of Education has recognized that “[s]tate legislatures and governors have legitimate authority to manage their public institutions and under the Department of Education Organization Act, the Department has no power to interfere with that authority reserved to the States under 34 CFR 602.11 (see 20 USC 3403(a)). Because of this, if the institution otherwise meets the requirements set out in law and regulation, in these cases the Department will determine that an institution has reasonable cause and therefore approve a change in accrediting agency for institutions that are required to do so based on State action.”[16]
    • Some states have also passed laws relating to accreditation requirements for institutions within their states. For example, in 2022, following the Department of Education’s updated federal regulations related to accreditation under President Trump’s first term, Florida passed a law “to prohibit Florida College System (FCS) institutions and state universities from being accredited by the same accrediting agency or association for consecutive accreditation cycles.”[17] North Carolina also passed a similar law in 2023.[18]

• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • No legal precedents identified that could affect enforceability.
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14279 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14281: Restoring Equality of Opportunity and Meritocracy

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 says that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”[1] Under Title VI, “[e]ach Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty, is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of [42 U.S. Code § 2000d] with respect to such program or activity by issuing rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the action is taken.”[2] The President must approve these rules, regulations, and orders before they become effective.[3]
    • Executive Order 14281 revokes (1) the Presidential approval of DOJ Title VI regulation 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2)[4] in full and (2) the Presidential approval of DOJ Title VI regulation as applied to the words “or effect” in 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(3),[5] and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(6)(ii)[6] and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(c)(2) in full.[7]
  • Executive Order 14281 also instructs all agencies to “deprioritize enforcement of all statutes and regulations to the extent they include disparate-impact liability,” but does not repeal any of these regulations.[8] According to the Executive Order, this includes Title VII’s provisions (42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2) relating to unlawful employment practices and Title VI’s implementing regulations (8 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2)–(3), 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(6)(ii), and 28 C.F.R. 42.104(c)(2)).

• There are likely other laws, regulations, guidance, etc. that will be modified or repealed related to this Executive Order as it also:
  • Instructs “the Attorney General [t] initiate appropriate action to repeal or amend the implementing regulations for Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for all agencies to the extent they contemplate disparate-impact liability”; and
  • Instructs “the Attorney General . . . [to] report to the President”:
    • “(i) all existing regulations, guidance, rules, or orders that impose disparate-impact liability or similar requirements, and detail agency steps for their amendment or repeal, as appropriate under applicable law; and
    • (ii) other laws or decisions, including at the State level, that impose disparate-impact liability and any appropriate measures to address any constitutional or other legal infirmities.”[9]

• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • Executive Order 14281 instructs the Attorney General to “determine whether any Federal authorities preempt State laws, regulations, policies, or practices that impose disparate-impact liability based on a federally protected characteristic such as race, sex, or age, or whether such laws, regulations, policies, or practices have constitutional infirmities that warrant Federal action, and shall take appropriate measures consistent with the policy of this order.”[10] While it is not clear what “appropriate measures” might consist of, there will likely be limits to what the federal government can do in the context of state laws, regulations, policies, or practices that impose disparate-impact liability. For example, some states have existing anti-discrimination laws that permit discrimination based on disparate impact liability, and the federal government cannot simply modify or override state law.[11]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • There is a long history of case law assessing disparate impact. For example, in 1971, the Supreme Court recognized disparate impact based on race in the employment context under Title VII.[12] Courts have also looked at disparate impact claims in other statutory contexts such as the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see Smith v. City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (2005), and the Fair Housing Act, see Texas Department of Housing and Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc., 576 U.S. 519 (2015).
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14281 is not currently facing legal challenges.

Last Updated: 7/11

Executive Order 14288: Strengthening and Unleashing America’s Law Enforcement to Pursue Criminals and Protect Innocent Citizens

• Does this executive order depart from, modify, expand, or contradict any existing federal laws or regulations?
  • Executive Order 14288 directs the “Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Attorney General, [to] determine how military and national security assets, training, non-lethal capabilities, and personnel can most effectively be utilized to prevent crime.”[1] Depending on how the Trump Administration plans to deploy military assets to “prevent crime,” this directive could contradict the Posse Comitatus Act which “forbids the U.S. military — including federal armed forces and National Guard troops who have been called into federal service — from taking part in civilian law enforcement.”[2] However, the President does have authority to deploy military forces to enforce the law; notably, the Insurrection Act “temporarily suspends the Posse Comitatus rule and allows the president to deploy the military to assist civilian authorities with law enforcement.”[3]
  • Executive Order 14288 also directs the Attorney General and other agency heads to “take all appropriate action to maximize the use of Federal resources” to do a number of things, including “strengthen and expand legal protections for law enforcement officers” and “seek enhanced sentences for crimes against law enforcement officers.”[4] While it’s not clear how the Attorney General and other agency officials might effectuate these instructions, there are existing statutes that likely will limit how the Administration can carry this out; for example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which allows individuals to seek redress for constitutional violations by state officials, and other state and federal laws set out sentencing guidelines.[5]
• Are there any non-legal challenges to enforcement?
  • At a high level, several provisions of Executive Order 14288 are likely to affect state and local law enforcement. The federal government typically plays a more limited role in state and local law enforcement given constitutional limitations and, historically, “Congress has used its spending power to enact legislation to influence the activities of state and local law enforcement” as well as Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment which “allows Congress to enforce constitutional rights directly through laws like Section 1983.”[6] Executive Order 14288 provides a number of directives to the Attorney General that may potentially encroach on state and local power in the policing context: for example, the Order directs the Attorney General to “create a mechanism to provide . . . indemnification to law enforcement officers,” “strengthen and expand legal protections for law enforcement officers,” and “seek enhanced sentences for crimes against law enforcement officers.”[7] Depending on how the Attorney General seeks to enforce these aspects of the Executive Order, the federal government may exceed the federal government’s ability to direct state and local governments in this context.[8]
  • Executive Order 14288 also directs the Attorney General to “review all ongoing Federal consent decrees, out-of-court agreements, and post-judgment orders to which a State or local law enforcement agency is a party and modify, rescind, or move to conclude such measures that unduly impede the performance of law enforcement functions.”[9] The federal government typically does not have the unilateral power to change or set aside such judicial agreements; for example, a party would need to seek relief from a court to set aside a post-judgment order.[10] However, on May 21, 2025, the Trump Administration’s Department of Justice announced it “is beginning the process of dismissing lawsuits against the Louisville, Kentucky and Minneapolis, Minnesota police departments.”[11]
• Are there any legal precedents that could affect its enforceability?
  • Police accountability has been a subject of many cases, including in the context of qualified immunity and use of excessive force.[12] As recently as May 2025, the Supreme Court held that the Fifth Circuit’s application of the “moment of threat” doctrine was wrong under the Fourth Amendment which may expand the likely success of excessive force cases against police officers.[13]
• Is this executive order currently facing legal challenges?
  • Executive Order 14288 is not currently facing legal challenges

Last Updated: 7/11